Editorial

U.N. needs strong policy, not inspector

On Aug. 2, 1990, Iraqi forces, under the direction of Saddam Hussein, invaded Kuwait. On Jan. 17, 1991, the United States launched an aerial attack on Baghdad after five months of failed political negotiations. On June 8, 1991, we celebrated our victory.

Of what?

On Jan. 26, 2000 -- a near decade after the conflict began -- there is still little resolution. The United Nations appointed a new lead weapons inspector for the organization's Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission.

The U.N. Security Council unanimously approved Hans Blix, a Swede, for the position Wednesday, The Associated Press reported.

One simple question: Why are we (the United States and the United Nations) still dealing with Iraq after nearly a decade of conflict, mistrust and broken promises? Because we have maintained weak policy on Saddam -- hoping the dictator will just go away.

Blix's appointment won't solve the problem. Only new, serious policy can help.

In the past decade, we have demonstrated our "seriousness" by asking Hussein to be nice, by bombing Baghdad when Hussein wasn't and by sending weapons inspectors to check up on him.

In return, he has repeatedly been reluctant to cooperate.

So, we asked again, and again -- surprise -- he told us to go away.

Rather than getting serious about Hussein, we've tip-toed around the issue for almost 10 years.

Of course, we have a legitimate reason for our wavering -- the all-important cost of oil. Oil prices reached a record high last week. With Saddam sitting on our greatest source of oil, we surely wouldn't want to upset him.

Possible mass destruction from Saddam's collection of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons or cheap oil?

The choice is not so obvious. Historically, we've toed the line.

The U.N. Security Council just spent the past month debating who should take over as the lead weapons inspector. Blix previously served as director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency from 1981 until his 1997 retirement. Under his command, the IAEA conducted regular inspections in Iraq, and under his command, the agency had no evidence of Iraq's nuclear weapons program.

Blix's background is questionable. His appointment is controversial. It is a forced compromise because the members of the Security Council just couldn't agree on anyone else. We have settled for a third-string weapons inspector. But it doesn't really matter, because at this point, we have no legitimate reason to continue this charade.

The leader of the inspections is not nearly as important as the policy: What happens if Blix finds "illegal" weapons? If we continue our past trend, we'll politely ask Saddam not to do that again. As great of an idea as this is, it has proven to be ridiculous and impotent in the last 10 years.

If we are not going to offer a policy that seriously punishes Saddam when he breaks laws, treaties and agreements, then let's just quit now. Let's stop wasting our time and money looking for weapons and arguing over weapons inspectors.

Besides, mass destruction might not be that bad. At least we'll have cheap oil.