MORRISON INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

and its Morrison Institute for Public Policy.

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Arizona

East Valley Partnership

Greater Phoenix Chamber of Commerce

Greater Phoenix Economic Council

Greater Phoenix Leadership

Scottsdale Chamber of Commerce/ Scottsdale Partnership

Julie Alvarado, Motorola

John Benton, Benton-Robb Development

Steven Betts, Gallagher & Kennedy

Jerry Bisgrove, StarDust Companies

Richard Bowers, City of Scottsdale

Gary Brown, City of Tempe

Wayne Brown, Mayor, City of Mesa

Jay Butler, College of Business, Arizona State University

Sam Campana, Mayor, City of Scottsdale

Frank Fairbanks, City of Phoenix

Joanie Flatt, East Valley Partnership

Grady Gammage, Jr., Gammage & Burnham

Neil Giuliano, Mayor, City of Tempe

Terry Goddard, U. S. Department of Housing & Urban Development

Andrew Gordon, Coppersmith & Gordon, PLC

Phil Gordon, City Council Member, City of Phoenix

Lloyd Harrell, City of Chandler

Timothy Hogan, Center for Business Research, Arizona State University

John Keegan, Mayor, City of Peoria

Michael Kelly, City of Phoenix

Paul Koehler, Peoria Unified School District

Diane McCarthy, WESTMARC

Sharon Megdal, MegEcon Consulting

Chris Mulholland, Scottsdale Chamber of Commerce

Margaret Mullen, Urban Realty Partners

John Ogden, SunCor Development Company

Kevin Olson, Steptoe & Johnson

A. J. Pfister, School of Public Affairs, Arizona State University

Charles Redman, Center for Environmental Studies, Arizona State University

Skip Rimsza, Mayor, City of Phoenix

Mark Schnepf, Mayor, Town of Queen Creek

Elaine Scruggs, Mayor, City of Glendale

Tom Simplot, BRS Group

Frederick Steiner, School of Planning and Landscape Architecture, Arizona State University

Martin Vanacour, City of Glendale

Rick Weddle, Greater Phoenix Economic Council

Mike Welborn, Bank One Arizona

Keven Ann Willey, The Arizona Republic

Richard Bowers, City Manager, City of Scottsdale

R. Thomas Browning, Executive Director, Greater Phoenix Leadership

Robert Bulla, President, Executive Division, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Arizona

John DeGrove, Director, Joint Center for Environmental & Urban Problems, Florida Atlantic University

Frank Fairbanks, City Manager, City of Phoenix

Ed Fox, Vice President, Environmental, Health, Safety & New Technology Ventures, APS

Grady Gammage, Jr., Attorney, Gammage & Burnham

Terry Goddard, State Coordinator, U. S. Department of Housing & Urban Development

John Hall, Professor, School of Public Affairs, Arizona State University

Lloyd Harrell, City Manager, City of Chandler

Edward W. Hill, Professor, Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University

Linda Hollis, Senior Research Associate, Solimar Research Group

Jim Holway, Assistant Director, Arizona Department of Water Resources

Bruce Katz, Director and Senior Fellow, Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy, The Brookings Institution

Robert Lang, Director, Urban and Metropolitan Research, The Fannie Mae Foundation

Diane McCarthy, President, WESTMARC

Frank Mizner, Planning Director, City of Mesa

Rolf Pendall, Assistant Professor, City and Regional Planning, Cornell University

A. J. Pfister, Distinguished Research Fellow, Arizona State University

Luther Propst, Executive Director, Sonoran Institute

Charles Redman, Director, Center for Environmental Studies, Arizona State University

Judy Richardson, First Vice President, School Finance Consulting Services,

Peacock, Hislop, Staley & Given, Inc.

Ethan Seltzer, Director, Institute of Portland Metropolitan Studies, Portland State University

Frederick Steiner, Director, School of Planning: Landscape Architecture, Arizona State University

Martin Vanacour, City Manager, City of Glendale

Rick Weddle, President, Greater Phoenix Economic Council

Acknowledgments Many people and organizations contributed to the preparation of this report.

The work of scores of people and the support provided by public-and private-sector organizations are acknowledged gratefully. Nevertheless, the views expressed here remain solely those of Morrison Institute for Public Policy. Any errors of fact or interpretation are the responsibility of Morrison Institute. The Institute specifically thanks the following people and organizations.

Morrison Institute for Public Policy

School of Public Affairs | College of Public Programs | Arizona State University

P. O. Box 874405, Tempe Arizona 85287-4405 Voice (480) 965-4525 Fax (480) 965-9219 http://www.asu.edu/copp/morrison

Mary Jo Waits, Associate Director - Morrison Institute for Public Policy

Rebecca L. Gau, Senior Research Analyst - Morrison Institute for Public Policy

Mark Muro, Senior Research Analyst - Morrison Institute for Public Policy

Tina Valdecanas, Senior Research Analyst - Morrison Institute for Public Policy

Tom R. Rex Research Manager, Center for Business Research - Arizona State University

Leonard G. Bower, Economist

Elizabeth Burns Professor, Department of Geography - Arizona State University

Lisa DeLorenzo Assistant Professor, School of Public Affairs - Arizona State University

William Fulton, President - Solimar Research Group

Patricia Gober, Professor, Department of Geography - Arizona State University

John Hall Professor, School of Public Affairs - Arizona State University

Alicia Harrison, Research Associate - Solimar Research Group

Kent Hill, Assistant Research Professional, Department of Economics - Arizona State University

Glen Krutz, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science - Arizona State University

Scott Smith, Support Systems Analyst - Information Technology Research Support Lab GIS Services, Arizona State University

Jamie Goodwin-White, Graduate Assistant - Morrison Institute for Public Policy

Christina Kinnear, Graduate Assistant - Morrison Institute for Public Policy

Laura Valenzuela, Graduate Assistant - Morrison Institute for Public Policy

With Assistance From:

Rob Melnick, Morrison Institute for Public Policy

Karen Heard, Chalk Design

Nancy Welch, The Insight Group

Cherylene Schick, Morrison Institute for Public Policy

H I T S AN D M I S S E S : FAST GROWTH IN METROPOLITAN PHOENIX

Hits and Misses: Fast Growth in Metropolitan Phoenix is the first product

of a comprehensive effort to describe and analyze the region's growth. The

Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy in

Washington, D. C. presented the opportunity for this project to Morrison

Institute for Public Policy.

The Brookings Institution has been engaging leading local scholars to

study the role of government policies in growth and development patterns

in various metropolitan areas in recent years. As part of this urban agenda,

the Brookings Center invited Morrison Institute to prepare a case study of

the Phoenix region to supplement reports on the other five cities already

involved in the national research. Soon thereafter, Morrison Institute invit-ed

a number of metropolitan Phoenix cities, businesses and civic alliances

to provide financial support for this new investigation. The supporting

organizations were eager to obtain fresh, quality information about growth

in the area at a time of increasing anxiety about the topic. They also saw the

benefit of showcasing metropolitan Phoenix' sometimes surprising story

within Brookings' larger set of case studies.

The formal Phoenix case study will appear next year as a chapter in a

Brookings Institution book with national distribution. However, the pressing

public debate about growth issues in metropolitan Phoenix obliged Morrison Institute

to make its findings available locally now. This detailed

document offers significant data and discussion not included in the formal

Brookings case study. It also features a finer-grained local focus for local

audiences. Morrison Institute hopes the analyses and recommendations will

foster a better understanding of the dynamics at work in this region and

support wise decisions in the future.

Some readers will wonder why Hits and Misses does not take a specific

stand on the growth management measures on the November 2000 ballot.

The two measures represent a key moment in both Phoenix' and the state's

growth history, so this report's silence on the proposals may seem peculiar.

However, in keeping with this study's purpose to identify the causes of

growth patterns, the Morrison Institute team chose to pass over discussion

of particular ballot items in favor of offering fresh data and new options for

thinking about the challenges and opportunities of rapid growth. Such an

approach sacrifices topicality in favor of a potentially longer-lasting effect

on the region's future.

The story of growth in metropolitan Phoenix is a complicated, often

surprising, tale. There is much to be proud of in the region. Yet there is also

much to worry about, and much that needs to be done. Hits and Misses will

have been successful if it becomes a catalyst for getting started.

A NOTE ABOUT DATA Any study of this kind depends on accumulating a

comprehensive and up-to-date body of research that can inform regional policy making.

Fortunately, many cities in the region as well as the Maricopa Association of Governments (MAG),

the Central Arizona-Phoenix Long-Term Ecological Research Project at Arizona State University,

the state of Arizona and the federal government maintain large bodies of useful data on the region's

job market, population, land-use and transportation trends. However, assembling a comprehensive

statistical picture of the region remains problematic. Differences in collection efforts among

metropolitan Phoenix cities and agencies make the assembly of consistent, city-by-city

databases difficult. Hard figures do not exist for numerous topics. Or, relevant numbers date

back a number of years. The U. S. Bureau of the Census most detailed statistics covering small

geographic divisions, for example, date to either the 1990 census or the MAG 1995 special census,

precluding more up-to-date accountings. Clearly this lack of timely data creates

difficulties when speaking of a fast-changing region such as metropolitan Phoenix.

Nevertheless, Morrison Institute remains confident the trends it highlights here hold for the region.

1 MORRISON INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

THE SHAPE OF FAST GROWTH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Population is Booming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Metropolitan Phoenix is Becoming Denser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

Employment Remains Concentrated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Road Building is Accelerating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

The Fringe is Exploding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

The Phoenix Region is Using a Lot of Land . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

The City of Phoenix' Resources are Balanced Compared to Its Largest Suburbs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

The Region is Becoming More Diverse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Schools are Divided . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24

Aggressive Annexation is a Metropolitan Phoenix Tradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26

WHAT'S BEHIND THE TRENDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Timing and National Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

Coming of Age in the Auto Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

The Advent of Air Conditioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

Local Circumstances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Topography and Climate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

The Real Estate Crash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

Government Land Ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Policies and Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

Water, Land and Transportation Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30

Securing Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Holding onto Land . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Delaying the Freeways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32

What this Means . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Growth Management Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

Paying for Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34

Keeping the Center Vital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Protecting Open Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

What this Means . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

Western Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Strong Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

Weak Regional Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

Polarized Civic Agendas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

Spotty State Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

What this Means . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

WHAT TO DO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40

Understand the Full Range of Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40

Overcome Near Catch-22's . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40

Be Alert to Upcoming Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42

THE FUTURE AT A GLANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43

Notes and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44

Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

HITS AND MISSES: Fast Growth in Metropolitan Phoenix

Phoenix is often viewed as the quintessential Sunbelt metropolis: young,

fast-growing, auto-centered, and sprawling. While some facets of the stereo-type

are accurate, the complete picture of metropolitan Phoenix is more

complex. In some notable ways, metropolitan Phoenix' story is one of success.

For example, compared to other urban regions, the Phoenix metropolitan

area is fairly compact with relative equity between its core city and its suburbs.

Prospectively, however, the challenges are great. The desert landscape is

changing and some educational and economic divides are obvious, plus the

mechanisms available to cope with problems may be insufficient to handle

many rapidly-evolving situations.

Hits and Misses is based on a wide-ranging set of projects undertaken

by scholars at Morrison Institute for Public Policy (School of Public Affairs,

Arizona State University) during the past year. Overall, this research provides

an updated and expanded view of regional growth and development trends

and the pressures that will challenge the region's residents and policy makers

This has been a complicated inquiry, given the tangle of events, trends

and circumstances that affect and shape any region. Still, two things stand

out about metropolitan Phoenix' growth experience.

1) Metropolitan Phoenix has grown differently from other urban regions

and in ways that defy conventional wisdom.

° Density is increasing. Given residents' dependence on cars, most

people would not expect the Phoenix region to be showing increases

in population density from its core to its edges. But it is Ð making

it one of only a handful of large areas in the country to do so.

Population grew 263 percent between 1960 and 1990, while the

urbanized area expanded 199 percent during the same period. By

contrast, metropolitan Chicago gained 4 percent in population while

urban land area increased 47 percent. Metropolitan Atlanta consumed

nearly twice as much land as metropolitan Phoenix to accommodate

approximately the same number of people.

° The region's center is holding. Employment remains concentrated in

the metropolitan Phoenix core, unlike in many other urban regions. Jobs

in the area's center account for 32 percent of the region's employment.

In addition, both population and employment rose in the heart of the

metropolitan area in the 1990s, although the rate of expansion was less

robust than in other parts of the region. Still, these healthy signs belie the

"hollowing out" that has plagued many other regions.

° The region's core city and its major suburbs are quite balanced. In

keeping with the vitality of its center, metropolitan Phoenix is also

fortunate to retain a measure of balance among its major cities. The

absence of glaring disparities between the center and the next largest

cities Ð at least in terms of housing values, jobs and retail activity Ð

stands in contrast to other metropolitan areas and bodes well for the

future of the core and the entire region.

° People and businesses keep coming. To stay the same in today's

world usually means going backward. Metropolitan Phoenix still is

experiencing phenomenal growth with nearly 700,000 new residents

(31 percent more) and approximately 500,000 more jobs in just less

than 10 years. Between 1997-1998 alone, approximately 1,300 new

business establishments were counted in metropolitan Phoenix. The

region now ranks 13th in high-tech jobs.

2) Metropolitan Phoenix faces extraordinary challenges because of local

circumstances and the effects of past public policy decisions.

° Residential development is moving outward very swiftly. Overall

in the last five years, the urban edge has advanced nearly one-half mile

per year. In the southeast, the fringe pushed out an average of three-fourths

of a mile each year. The region's heaviest home building is

now occurring in a ring some 18 to 21 miles from downtown Phoenix.

It is fair to ask: How far out will the ring of development need to be

pushed to accommodate the 1.6 million additional residents projected

in the region by 2020?

° Metropolitan Phoenix is using up its agricultural and desert land.

Calculations from aerial photographs show that between 1975 and

1995 some 40 percent of all agricultural land and 32 percent of all

undeveloped desert land was lost to urbanization. The vivid Sonoran

Desert is what makes metropolitan Phoenix unique and gives it a

special character. Losing huge tracts of land threatens the region with

the loss of its most famous lifestyle and environmental asset.

° A regional divide exists by race, poverty and schools. For years, the

sections north and northeast of downtown Phoenix, including

Scottsdale, have been affluent areas with attractive housing, good

schools, and enviable amenities. Also for years, poor whites and

low-income minorities have been concentrated in neighborhoods

in the central and southern portions of the city of Phoenix. The

demographic divide plays out in schools as well, with few poor and

minority students in high-achieving school districts.

° The region's rapid growth disturbs the majority of residents. Since its

inception three years ago, the Morrison Institute quality of life survey

has documented the breadth and depth of residents' discontent with

growth. In 1999, 80 percent of residents said they were "concerned" or

"very concerned" with the region's growth. Most dramatically, nearly

half reported that they would leave Phoenix tomorrow if they could.

Two-thirds added that the region was doing a "poor" or "fair" job of

preserving the desert and open space.

THE RESPONSE: THREE STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

As the region's leaders and residents decide what to do next, actions in three

strategic areas seem imperative.

First, the Phoenix region needs to understand the full range of issues that

shape its growth and development patterns. The region's emerging divisions,

transportation challenges, loss of desert lands, and the many other growth

issues that threaten metropolitan Phoenix' quality of life are inextricably

linked and cut across jurisdictional boundaries.

The smartest regions today have embraced the "four E's" of a strong

economy, healthy environment, social equity and civic engagement as a

framework for analyzing problems and building regional advantages. They

recognize that everything is connected.

Metropolitan Phoenix' leaders can disregard the relationships among

the region's education, social, economic and environmental challenges and

hope for the best. But they would do better if together they "connected the

dots" among the issues and created new partnerships capable of responding

to growth's problems and paradoxes.

Second, the Phoenix region must overcome the near "Catch-22s" that

are rooted in its history. These Catch-22s will not succumb to old ideas or big

ideas borrowed from a Seattle or a Denver. Bold, innovative policy decisions,

based on the region's circumstances, will be needed. The Catch-22s include:

° Looming transportation and land use conundrums. In contrast

to other regions, highway building in metropolitan Phoenix has

supported the region's central area. The present round of suburb-to-suburb

freeway extensions, however, could create problems. By making

jobs and homes away from the center more accessible, the presence of

freeways will intensify land consumption on the fringe. But should

employment remain concentrated in the cores and home building

continue to move outward, commute times could worsen. The chal-lenge

to unraveling this Catch-22 will be finding transportation and

land-use initiatives that create dispersed mixed-use clusters of greater

residential and employment density that do not detract from the

vitality of downtown Phoenix, the region's signature core.

° State trust land questions. Large tracts of state-owned trust land near

the urban fringe constitute an irreplaceable asset for the region's quality

of life. This land could serve as a growth boundary that provides a vast

reservoir of open space. However, the state constitution requires that

these lands be managed to maximize revenues for Arizona's educa-tional

needs. The mandate bars wholesale conservation of the lands

and increases the likelihood of future land sales to developers. The

challenge for the region will be to amend the Arizona constitution and

state enabling act to allow for trust land to be dedicated to open space

while maintaining the ability to fund schools.

° Growth agendas in the smaller cities. Eighteen less-populous cities

on the urban fringe now control nearly as much land as the city of

Phoenix and the five largest suburbs combined. These areas also lag

behind the region in open space protection and use of growth man-agement

tools. This means that the municipalities in the region least

equipped to deal with the effects of fast growth will soon be making

decisions with enormous implications for the entire region. The chal-lenge

will be to bring a regional perspective to the planning efforts of

all cities while respecting the region's tradition of local control.

° Fixing the schools of the core. The region has reason to worry about

the education of children in central Phoenix and the southwest portion

of the region. Individual economic success correlates particularly with

education attainment (the number of years of school completed). The

weak schools of the center present a powerful impetus for decentral-ization.

Schools with high proportions of low-income, minority or

underachieving students may influence where people and businesses

choose to locate. This increases the viability of the fringe at the expense

of the core. Ironically, though, the region and its cities possess limited

authority to address the unique problems of schools. The challenge

will be encouraging more effective collaboration between school

districts and city leaders and including education issues in both fringe

growth management and core revitalization strategies.

° Conflicting views on sprawl and density. Residents of metropolitan

Phoenix decry sprawl, but they also dislike density. Unfortunately, con-trolling

one usually means encouraging the other. To confront this

Catch-22, regional leaders and residents will need to find an acceptable

way to promote greater density with "quality" development that fosters

convenience, diversity, transit options and access to open spaces. One

approach will be to re-evaluate traditional zoning ordinances with their

rigid and segregated land uses and consider new rules that foster

acceptable combinations of residential and commercial uses.

° Regional authority dilemma. Although valuable, especially as the 18

less-populous communities become a stronger force in the regional

dynamics, city-to-city coordination will only go so far. However, the

creation of a binding regional authority has been rejected so often that

implementation of such a concept appears unrealistic for metropolitan

Phoenix. The challenge will be to reap the benefits of regional "gover-nance"

without having to adopt a formal "regional government" structure.

° An on and off relationship with Washington. The region historically

has benefitted from federal assistance with water and public works

projects that have sustained a growing population. In recent years,

state leadership Ð executive and congressional Ð has disdained federal

help with similar projects, believing that the state should be more

independent from Washington. This stance handicaps the region's

ability to finance major growth management initiatives, such as light

rail or open space acquisition, that neither the state nor any single

municipality can afford on its own. The challenge will be to get back

to a long-term regional agenda so compelling that it would be

unthinkable for any elected official not to support it.

° Tensions that surround state support of metropolitan Phoenix. In

today's economy metropolitan regions are increasingly overtaking

states as the drivers of growth. The situation in Arizona is no

exception; the metropolitan Phoenix region currently accounts for 70

percent of the state's total personal income and is responsible for over

70 percent of new job growth. Thus, ensuring a viable metropolitan

Phoenix should be a top priority of state government. However, other

communities across Arizona have needs that also must be addressed at

the state level. The challenge will be to support the Phoenix region in

a way that does not neglect the needs of other localities, but accepts

that prosperity brought forth by a strong regional driver benefits the

° Water's changing role. Although the region has ample water for its

current population, water management will be more important given

that there are no potential projects on the scale of the Central Arizona

Project to increase the future supply of water. As such, water manage-ment

will be increasingly related to growth management, as water

becomes an invaluable regulator by influencing where homes and

businesses may locate. However, discussions on water management

and growth management currently take place in entirely separate

spheres. The challenge will be to bring together the water mavens and

the urban planners to come to an understanding of how water policies

could be used to manage growth.

This report's final suggestion is for the region to be alert to the demo-graphic,

technological and cultural trends that are shaping the next

metropolitan era. New faces, a new economy, and a new geography of

amenities may be as profound a determinant of the size, shape and prospects

of cities and their surroundings in the coming years as the post-war suburban

boom was. How a region chooses to take what it has and put it into play

amid these emerging trends will determine the region's competitiveness and

4 HITS AND MISSES: Fast Growth in Metropolitan Phoenix

Then and Now: How the Metropolitan Phoenix Region Has Changed

1970s 1990s* FAST GROWTH AND INCREASING DENSITY

Total Population 971,228 2,783,779

Population Density (people/ square mile urbanized area) 2,228 2,707

Average Lot Size for New Homes (square feet) 7,500 6,677

MAJOR CHANGES IN LAND USE Percent Urbanized Area 15 41

Percent Agriculture Area 32 19

Percent Desert Area 49 33

Distance of Fringe from Downtown Phoenix (miles) 10-11 18-21

STRONG CENTER Employment Concentrated in Two Central Areas 32% of jobs are on 4% of land area

Population Remaining in Core Percent in the city of Phoenix 60 43

Percent in the five largest suburbs** 25 39

Percent in the balance of the county 15 18

MORE EXTENSIVE ROAD SYSTEM Total Lane Miles per 1,000 Residents (freeways, major arterial roads, minor arterial roads) 3.5 4.1

Vehicle Miles Traveled (per person per day) 14 24

Transit Miles (per capita) n/ a 7

BALANCE BETWEEN THE CORE AND THE FIVE LARGEST SUBURBS Housing

Housing value in the city of Phoenix $48,500 $76,700

Housing value in the five largest suburbs $59,400 $92,600

Employment Number of jobs for every 100 residents in the city of Phoenix n/ a 58

Number of jobs for every 100 residents in the five largest suburbs n/ a 49

Retail Sales Retail sales per capita in the city of Phoenix $8,600 $7,500

Retail sales per capita in the five largest suburbs $8,500 $10,600

INCREASING DIVERSITY Percent of Ethnic Minorities in Metropolitan Phoenix 19 28

DEEPENING DIVIDE Concentration of Minorities

Percent of population in south Phoenix that is minority 47 77

Percent of population in the city of Phoenix that is minority 22 36

Percent of population in the five largest suburbs that is minority 13 22

Concentration of Poverty Percent of persons in poverty in central and south Phoenix 24 36

Percent of persons in poverty in Phoenix 12 14

Percent of persons in poverty in the five largest suburbs 9 10

Schools Performance (Stanford 9 reading score percentile rank) Percent of students nationwide scoring above the average score of students in central Phoenix n/ a 67

Percent of students nationwide scoring above the average score of students in the northwest quadrant n/ a 61

Percent of students nationwide scoring above the average score of students in the northeast quadrant n/ a 27

Percent of students nationwide scoring above the average score of students in the southeast quadrant n/ a 41

Percent of students nationwide scoring above the average score of students in the southwest quadrant n/ a 66

* NOTE: Except for the following, data is given for 1970 and 1998. Data for population density in the 1990s is based on data for 1990; land use compares percents in 1975 and 1995; housing values compare median figures for 1970 and 1990 (in 1990 dollars); employment figures are for 1995; retail sales comparisons are for 1980 and 1995; overall ethnic minority

comparison is for 1980 and 1995; poverty comparison is for 1969 and 1989; minority concentration for central and south Phoenix is for 1980 and 1995; and minority concentration for Phoenix and the region is 1980 and 1995.

** The five largest suburbs are: Chandler, Glendale, Mesa, Scottsdale, and Tempe.

5 MORRISON INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

Cities are the ultimate embodiments of their times, and metropolitan

Phoenix is no exception.

Nothing has determined the shape and tenor of metropolitan Phoenix'

development more than the fact that it has taken place almost entirely in the

post-World War II era of cars. The Phoenix region, in a word, has grown in

the largely suburban, horizontal way it has because that is how virtually all

cities grew during the past 50 years. The strengths and problems of the

Phoenix region are in that sense very much of their time.

Yet now a new time is beginning to shape metropolitan Phoenix and the

choices open to it. This era is the era of the Internet and the new economy.

So the region that came of age in the auto era is now sensing that new values

and new ways of living are going to rearrange the metropolitan fabric as

thoroughly as the suburban boom did.

Laptop gypsies with blue hair writing code at the Starbuck's; "yuppie

seniors" wired for semi-retirement; new immigrants and smaller firms: All

these are coming, and they will influence the layout and priorities of metro-politan

Phoenix as surely as did all those Chevy-driving defense workers of

the 1950s. Yet how, precisely, the newcomers will do this, and to what degree,

remains a riddle. Moreover, it remains unclear how the region that rose to

prominence by mass production will adapt its form to the new era of clus-tering,

networks and "quality of place." Change is everywhere. The world is

changing; cities are changing; and so are the possible solutions to the problems

faced by metropolitan areas.

This report, in order to help make sense for policy makers and the

public of this extraordinarily dynamic moment, endeavors to detail the

trends that are now shaping metropolitan Phoenix. Along the way, it identifies

the side effects of rapid growth that threaten the region's future. And it ponders

how the region may ensure it prevails as a competitive, high-quality region

Yes, cities embody their times, but that does not mean they need be

confined to the forms and problems of just one era. A new time is always

coming, and the trick for metropolitan Phoenix is to begin adapting

creatively and quickly to the new imperatives of region building.

Fortunately, as the following pages make clear, the region begins this evolution

from a position of surprising strength.

Snapshot of the Metropolitan Phoenix Region

The metropolitan Phoenix region is contained within Maricopa

County. At 9,226 square miles, the area of the county is larger

than New Jersey and four other states.

J U R I S D I C T I O N S

The region consists of only 24 cities and towns. The total

population in 1998 was almost 2.8 million.

C E N T R A L C I T Y

The city of Phoenix is the central city. With a population

of nearly 1.2 million, it covers 470 square miles.

L A R G E S U B U R B S

Chandler, Glendale, Mesa, Scottsdale, and Tempe are home

to 39 percent of the region's residents.

L E S S -P O P U L O U S M U N I C I PA L I T I E S

The 18 municipalities house only 11 percent of the population

and have grown 446 percent since 1970.

6 HITS AND MISSES: Fast Growth in Metropolitan Phoenix

Salt River Indian Community Paradise Valley

Fort McDowell Indian Community

North Mountain Preserve

Phoenix Mountains Preserve

South Mountain Preserve

Superstition Mountains

Tonto National Forest

White Tank Mountain Preserve

Gila River Indian Community

1971 or later Map prepared by Arizona State University

IT Research Support Lab -GIS Services

Data Sources: Maricopa County Dept of Transportation; Arizona Land Resource

Information System; U. S. Dept of Transportation.

Landmarks in Metropolitan Phoenix 10

7 MORRISON INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

The Shape of Fast Growth

Growth affects every dimension of the region's identity, including its population, employment,

transportation arrangements, land-use patterns and social landscape. This section tells what

changes are unfolding and what those trends might mean for the Phoenix region.

Guide to Official Descriptions of Metropolitan Phoenix

DATA NOTE According to the U. S. Bureau of the Census, the "Phoenix metropolitan area"

consisted only of Maricopa County until 1990 census results became available,

when Pinal County was added. For historical consistency,

and because little of Pinal County is part of the Phoenix urbanized area,

references in this report to the Phoenix metropolitan area equate to

Maricopa County unless otherwise noted. Other geographic units

occasionally referred to include (1) Phoenix urbanized area.

This geography closely follows the developed area, but only

decennial census data are produced for urbanized areas. Discussions of population

density use this geography, which in 1990 was only 8 percent of the county's land area.

(2) The Maricopa Association of Governments defines a planning area that includes

the current developed area plus land projected to be largely developed by 2020.

It is about one fifth of the county's land area. (3) The Central Arizona-Phoenix Long-Term

Ecological Research project defines a study area larger than the MAG planning

area, but still substantially smaller than Maricopa County. It is used in discussions of land use.

CAP-LTER Project Area 4,422 square miles

MAG Planning Area 1,768 square miles

Maricopa County 9,226 square miles

U. S. Census Bureau Urbanized Area 741 square miles

Phoenix Metropolitan Area

CAP-LTER Project Area

Basically, these pages show that the region's story conforms to neither

the "traditional" model of urban development, nor the popular image of

Under the traditional model, associated most often with older east coast

and midwestern cities, metropolitan areas frequently feature a distressed

central city confined to its boundaries by fast-growing suburbs. There in the

center, the old downtown becomes a catch basin for the region's poor and

minority residents, while middle-class families, corporations and job

growth migrate to the suburbs.

Popular views of the Sunbelt, by contrast, constantly assume metropolitan

Phoenix exemplifies the unpopular word "sprawl." Phoenix in this view is

denounced as a vast, auto-centered collection of retirement communities

and a sea of red-tiled roofs. Or worse, it is portrayed as a low-density urban

behemoth that lacks both a center and an "edge," as the architectural critic

Michael Sorkin had it in a 1997 review in Architectural Record. "Phoenix

has become the dreaded polycentric automotive metropolis," Sorkin wrote. 2

To be sure, aspects of both of these accounts of metropolitan Phoenix

growth hold true. But for the most part the picture of the region's develop-ment

that emerges from the research reported below is subtler than either

the traditional or popular view.

In this fashion, the trends that follow belie easy preconceptions.

Concepts and labels continue to be tossed about like footballs in the

growth debates. However, the data and other information presented here

stick closely to what is actually happening as metropolitan Phoenix gets

bigger and challenge the region's discussions with a number of surprises.

These pages show that the region's story conforms to neither the

"traditional" model of urban development, nor the popular image of Sunbelt growth.

The trends that follow belie easy preconceptions.

8 HITS AND MISSES: Fast Growth in Metropolitan Phoenix

Population is Booming

TREND: Growth driven by vast in-migration is occurring almost everywhere in

metropolitan Phoenix even near the core. But the most dramatic gains are

at the outer edges of the current urbanized area.

Metropolitan Phoenix grew faster than any

other large metropolitan region between 1970

and 1998.* From just 1990 to 1998, the region's

population increased 31 percent thanks in large

part to the arrival of an average of 57,000 new

residents a year.** Among the 25 largest metro-politan

areas in the nation only Atlanta grew

similarly (27 percent) during the 1990s.

About one-third of the region's population

growth between 1990 and 1998 occurred in the

city of Phoenix. Another fifth went to cities close

to the core - Tempe, Scottsdale and Glendale.

Tempe grew by 18 percent, Phoenix by 21

percent, Glendale by 32 percent, and Scottsdale

by 50 percent (see Table 1). The city of Phoenix

added 210,000 residents from 1990 to 1998.

Tempe, Scottsdale and Glendale together added

At the same time, 8 out of the 24 cities in the

Phoenix metropolitan area experienced a popu-lation

increase of more than 50 percent from

1990 to 1998. Cities with the fastest population

growth are at the urban edge. Avondale, Carefree,

Chandler, Fountain Hills, Gilbert, Goodyear,

Peoria and Surprise all extend along the metropolitan

area's outer ring. Map 1 shows these areas

in light blue and dark blue. The cities with over

50 percent growth accounted for about 200,000

new residents to the region during the 1990s.

The city of Phoenix' share of the regional

population dropped from 60 percent in 1970 to

43 percent in 1998 (see Figure 1).

The growth rate in the southern and central

portions of the city of Phoenix trailed the

numbers recorded elsewhere in the region.

South and central Phoenix (indicated in red on

Map 1) added only about 15,000 people (9 per-cent)

between 1990 and 1995. The metropolitan

area's largest pockets of population decline were

also in these areas.

Explosive population growth has enriched metropolitan

Phoenix' talent pool and enlarged its local markets, but it is also challenging the

region's infrastructure and natural resources,

particularly in the areas of the metropolitan

fringe. More traffic, longer commutes, air pollution,

and crowded schools all result from the

region's phenomenal influx of drivers and home

buyers. Local governments may be capable of

only minimal planning and may struggle to

provide basic services. Communities that are

relatively small and inexperienced, or where

growth outpaces the rate at which tax rolls and

census counts can be updated to ensure various

revenue flows, have been the hardest hit. Hence,

the potential for regional problems is great.

That the city of Phoenix and other "inner-ring"

cities are still growing at a rate relatively

close to the regional average suggests the

region's center is not "emptying out" as it is in

many other metropolitan areas. Between 1970

and 1999, for example, the city of Atlanta's

population decreased 14 percent compared to

the region's increase of 114 percent. 3 The city of

Phoenix' growth rate was 105 percent between

1970 and 1998, while the region gained 187 percent.

However, slower growth in south and central

Phoenix points to an emerging problem. Pockets

of population decreases caused primarily by

the demolition of housing units - cluster in an

area close to the region's core.

Over the last 30 years, an average of 127 new residents

moved to the Phoenix region every day.

Figure 1: Metropolitan Phoenix' Population Grew by

187 Percent, adding 1.8 Million People from 1970 to 1998

Phoenix Five Large Suburbs* All Other Suburbs

* Large Suburbs refer to Chandler, Glendale, Mesa, Scottsdale and Tempe.

Source: Morrison Institute for Public Policy, data from U. S. Bureau of the Census.

* Metropolitan Phoenix means Maricopa County, except where otherwise noted. See the Data Note for details on

** 1998 data reflect population estimates from the U. S. Bureau of the Census which were released March 2000.

9 MORRISON INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

Arizona State University IT Research Support Lab -GIS Services

MARICOPA COUNTY 971,228 1,509,175 55% 2,122,101 41% 2,783,779 31% 1,812,551 187%

Source: Morrison Institute for Public Policy, data from U. S. Bureau of the Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 1998.

10 HITS AND MISSES: Fast Growth in Metropolitan Phoenix

Metropolitan Phoenix is Becoming Denser

TREND: The Phoenix urbanized area is consuming land at a less rapid pace than

its population is growing. Its increasing population density contrasts with declining

densities in most of the nation's urbanized areas.

Very large population increases are driving

the rapid expansion of the urbanized area in

metropolitan Phoenix. Between 1960 and 1990,

the urbanized land area grew 199 percent, while

population increased 263 percent. The Phoenix

region is one of only a handful of large metro-politan

areas (including Dallas and Los Angeles)

that consumed land at a slower rate than popu-lation

increased, as Figures 2 and 3 show. By

contrast, the Atlanta region consumed nearly

twice as much land as the Phoenix region

(almost 900 square miles compared with about

500) to accommodate approximately the same

level of population growth.

The Phoenix urbanized area's population

density has been rising, according to the U. S.

Bureau of the Census. Between 1960 and 1990,

density rose 22 percent to 2,707 people per square

mile. Densities went up 23 percent in the 1980s

after holding steady in the 1960s and 1970s.

Other information, including comparisons of

1990 and 1995 census data and dropping housing

vacancy rates suggest density climbed even a little

more in the 1990s (see Map A in Appendix).

Density increases appear to stem from

increased construction of multi-family dwellings,

decreases in average lot size and considerable

"in-fill" construction. At the simplest level, pop-ulation

density is a function of occupied housing

density (units per square mile) and average

household size. An analysis of housing types and

sizes suggests that favorable tax rules in the 1980s

led to the construction of an unusually high

proportion of multifamily housing units. Also,

high interest rates at that time limited residents'

ability to purchase single-family houses. During

the 1980s, much of the single-family and multi-family

housing construction happened on parcels

that initially had been skipped over. At the same

time, median lot sizes in metropolitan Phoenix

dropped from 7,828 square feet in 1980 (about

one-sixth of an acre) to 7,200 square feet in 2000.

The region is being built at quite even

densities and lot sizes, even at the fringe. With

few exceptions, most new neighborhoods in metro-politan

Phoenix continue to be built at densities

similar to the county average, rather than at the

much lower densities common in some regions.

This is true even in the prime new-home

construction ring which now circles metropolitan

Phoenix about 18 to 21 miles from downtown

Phoenix. The median lot size generally does not

vary too much from city to city. Most of the cities

have been within 10 percent of the county average,

although each quadrant of the region has some

areas with larger and smaller lot sizes. Carefree

and Paradise Valley are the major exceptions with

median lot sizes of more than one acre. Lot sizes

were more than 10 percent above the county

average in Sun City West, Fountain Hills, and

Queen Creek. Avondale has had the smallest

median lot size (see Table A in Appendix).

Central Phoenix has also noted density

increases. During the 1970s and 1980s, population

density decreased within a three-mile radius of

central Phoenix, much as it did near many urban

cores in the United States. However between 1990

and 1995, densities increased in the center even

though there had been little residential construction

in the area. The turnaround is due mostly to a

sharp decline in housing vacancy rates and an

increase in household size, largely related to the

center's growing Hispanic population. In addition,

a growing number of people lived in "group

quarters," such as prisons and homeless shelters,

thereby increasing densities.

The Phoenix region, contrary to its sprawling,

low-density image, is actually growing fairly

compactly. Starting from a low base, popula-tion

density increased to a point where it was

only about 10 percent less than the national

median for large urban areas (2,975 persons per

square mile) in 1990. Moreover, unlike areas

such as Atlanta, Denver or San Diego, the region

is consuming land at a slower rate than it is

adding people. Such trends mean that the

region's land consumption, commute times,

decentralization and toll on the desert are less

than they might have been given the area's

phenomenal population growth.

Population growth is probably inevitable as

long as the Phoenix region remains an attrac-tive

place to live and work. But density is not

inevitable. As Washington Post columnist Neal

Peirce recently told San Diego's leaders, "Density

doesn't just appear like sprouts; it needs careful

planning and permission." 4 Moreover, the key

question ought not to be whether or not the region

creates more density, but how. Merely squeezing

more homes onto smaller lots in segregated

housing developments is not the optimal strategy

for compact development Ð though that is part

of the picture. The region is likely to find huge

land savings in the future by following through

determinedly with current policies for in-fill

development, transit-focused development zones,

mixed use (and accompanying revisions to zoning

ordinances) or other such vital centers with com-binations

of places to live and work.

Between 1960 and 1990, Phoenix' urbanized area grew 199 percent,

while population increased 263 percent.

Phoenix is one of only a handful of large metropolitan areas that consumed land

at a slower rate than its population grew.

11 MORRISON INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

Employment in the region is growing. Employment

in metropolitan Phoenix is now 1.7 million,

up from 1.2 million in 1990. Regional employment

increased 24 percent from 1994 to 1997. During

this period, the major employment cores added

39,000 jobs (12 percent). The region's greatest job

increases occurred in outlying areas with 117,500

jobs (a 44 percent change), but this high growth

rate was a product of increases from a small base.

A third of all of the region's employment in

1997, approximately 400,000 jobs, was located in

two central areas that account for only 4 percent

of the land in the regional planning area. The

primary employment core is located in downtown-midtown

Phoenix. This central area of the city

of Phoenix has the highest employment density

and the greatest number of industries. 5 The jobs

are in high-paying industries such as finance,

insurance, real estate, professional services and

government, and many of them require substantial

education (see Map 3).

The second strong employment core includes

some of the city of Phoenix, but also stretches

into central and downtown Tempe and south and

downtown Scottsdale (see Map 2). Arizona State

University, Sky Harbor International Airport,

public utilities, communication assets and gov-ernment

are located in this employment core.

Access to the region's first two freeways helped

portions of Tempe become the largest employ-ment

center outside of the downtown-midtown

Phoenix core. Scottsdale's employment success can

be traced to its proximity to affluent residential

areas that extend to the area around the Phoenix

Mountains Preserve through north Scottsdale.

Combined, the two employment cores contained

32 percent of the region's jobs, but cover only 76

square miles. Only 13 percent of the population

lived within these two core areas.

Areas with the fewest jobs and the least job

growth are in south Phoenix, west of Central

Avenue, and in the Ahwatukee Foothills south

of South Mountain Park. While the south

Phoenix area is 73 percent non-white and largely

low-income neighborhoods, Ahwatukee Foothills

is mostly white, middle-income neighborhoods.

In addition, the fringe of the urban area on

the west and north formed a nearly continuous

employment-poor area. The exceptions were

along part of I-10 (e. g., Tolleson) and along part

of I-17 north of Beardsley Road. In contrast, no

portion of the region east of Scottsdale/ Rural

Road is employment-poor.

The employment core is so strong today that

even with little growth in the next 20 years, it

would still be the primary employment area

for the region. In 1997, the Maricopa Association

of Governments (MAG) issued a set of employ-ment

projections in line with its population

projections. The data forecast a 50 percent gain in

regional employment by 2020. Employment in

the primary core was expected to remain steady

over the next 25 years. However, the core still

would have the highest employment densities in

2020 at more than 7,000 employees per square

mile. The secondary core would retain its status

with employment densities between 5,000 and

6,200 employees per square mile.

Two areas in the southeast quadrant that had

essentially no employment in 1995 are projected

to have densities equal to the secondary core in

2020. These areas are Chandler Municipal

Airport and the Williams Gateway Airport. In all,

north Scottsdale and the southeast quadrant are

anticipated to have substantial growth. The

greatest percentage of growth is expected to

occur in outlying areas, but none of these areas,

except the Chandler and Williams airports,

would achieve an employment density anywhere

near secondary core status.

High technology industry is growing outside

the core. Metropolitan Phoenix ranks 13th

among metropolitan areas in the total number of

high-tech jobs. But, employment in industries

such as aerospace, information, bioindustry,

plastics and software is limited in the primary

core. On the other hand, software and information

industries have a large presence in Tempe and

Scottsdale, part of the secondary employment

core. As Map 4 shows, large high technology

manufacturing companies, especially in aerospace

and semiconductors, are generally located on

large parcels outside the core areas in the north-west

(along Black Canyon Freeway, north of Bell

Road) and the southeast (Chandler and Mesa)

portions of the region.

The center is holding in metropolitan Phoenix

when it comes to employment. This employment

strength contrasts sharply with most other metro-politan

areas. Between 1972 and 1995, core employ-ment

in Chicago, for example, declined 19 percent,

while other areas in the region grew 97 percent. 6

Central Phoenix' strength bodes well for providing

alternative transportation options and more close-in,

middle-class residential areas. It also continues

to give the central city the inherent advantages of

plentiful face-to-face contact and access to infra-structure

(e. g., airports) that have always fostered

economic growth but which are critical for new

economy firms and global businesses.

A "spatial mismatch" could also grow. There

is a potential separation in the region between

appropriate job opportunities and the location

of less-skilled workers. In metropolitan Phoenix,

these less-skilled workers often reside predom-inantly

in or near the downtown Phoenix

employment areas. However, the jobs accessible

to them there are heavily weighted toward

professional positions. That raises the possibility

of their spatial isolation from needed entry-level

12 HITS AND MISSES: Fast Growth in Metropolitan Phoenix

Employment Remains Concentrated

TREND: Employment in metropolitan Phoenix remains highly

concentrated in central locations, though it is beginning to disperse.

Approximately 400,000 jobs - one-third of the region's employment

are located in central locations that account for about 4 percent

of the land in the regional planning area.

Table 2: Employment Growth in Metropolitan Phoenix'

Central City is Growing, but Trails Other Areas, 1994 to 1997

1994-1997 Employment Percent

Downtown/ Midtown Phoenix (Primary Core) 6,350 6%

Sky Harbor/ Tempe/ Scottsdale/ Metrocenter (Secondary Core) 32,507 15%

Level 3 Employment Core 39,021 22%

Level 4 Employment Core 36,367 20%

Outlying Areas 117,508 44%

Source: Morrison Institute for Public Policy, data calculated from Zip Code Business Patterns, U. S. Bureau of the Census.

13 MORRISON INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

METROPOLITAN PHOENIX EMPLOYMENT CORES:

Primary Core (Level 1) Downtown Phoenix

Secondary Core (Level 2) East Phoenix, I-10 to Van Buren Street

Central Tempe Downtown and west Tempe

Downtown and south Scottsdale Metrocenter area of Phoenix

Level 3 Core Uptown Phoenix

Biltmore/ Squaw Peak Area of Phoenix East Phoenix, Thomas Road

to Camelback Road Southwest Mesa

Southeast Phoenix West Central Phoenix, Van Buren Street

Level 4 Core Downtown Glendale

West Central Phoenix, Grand Avenue to Northern Avenue

North Scottsdale, McCormick Ranch North Scottsdale, Airport Area

Northwest Mesa Central Mesa

South Tempe South Central Phoenix

Durango Area of Phoenix East Phoenix, Van Buren Street

Data Source: Maricopa Association of Governments (MAG), 1995.

Downtown/ Midtown Phoenix Employment

Sky Harbor/ Tempe/ Scottsdale/ Metrocenter/

Employment Core (Secondary Core)

Map 2: Metropolitan Phoenix Employment is Highly Concentrated

To learn what's behind the employment patterns,

see Figure A and Table B in the Appendix.

14 HITS AND MISSES: Fast Growth in Metropolitan Phoenix

Road Building is Accelerating

TREND: Metropolitan Phoenix' recent transportation spending has

focused overwhelmingly on highways. Access to the urban core has been improved,

but alternative forms of transportation have been neglected.

Metropolitan Phoenix is striving now to com-plete

a freeway system that was begun in 1957,

but expanded little between 1970 and 1985.

At that time, local resistance to routing,

federal funding, and high costs slowed con-struction.

Consequently, as noted by the Texas

Transportation Institute, only 290 lane miles of

limited-access highways were available in 1985,

none of which came together as a beltway. 7 Today

as a result, metropolitan Phoenix makes do with

a less-extensive limited-access road network than

most regions its size. This belatedness also has

made the region rely inordinately on arterial

streets. In fact, the region is only now building

beltways around the urban area about 10 to 20

miles from downtown Phoenix (see Map 5).

The freeway network has grown rapidly

since 1985. In 1985, voters approved a county

sales tax increase for freeway construction.

Between 1985 and 1997, limited-access lane miles

tripled from 290 to 870. The one-mile grid of

arterial roads also increased substantially from

2,400 miles to 2,940 miles, a 42 percent increase.

As a result, while traffic is increasing, its negative

impacts have not yet become unmanageable.

The Texas Transportation Institute also found

congestion less in the city of Phoenix than in

comparable cities. Per capita daily vehicle miles

traveled increased in the early 1990s, but have

remained on par with the rate of population

growth since (see Figure 4). While Phoenix violated

the federal ozone standard on 11 days as recently

as 1995, the Environmental Protection Agency

recently recognized the region's achievement in

going three years without violating the standard.

Much of metropolitan Phoenix' transporta-tion

investment has benefitted the region's

central area. Almost one-third of the $4.8 billion

spent between 1986 and 1998 (in 1998 dollars) on

highways funded freeways at the center of the

region (see Table 3 and Map 6). An additional 28

percent of the expenditures went to roads that

serve the southeast, the fastest-growing residential

area, including the Loop 101 and State Route 60.

At the same time, public transit has been

neglected. While investments were made in highways,

a lack of local and state funding has

constrained the Regional Public Transportation

Authority (RPTA). This disparity helps explain

why transit service miles in metropolitan

Phoenix (7 miles per capita) remain among the

smallest for any large metropolitan area in the

United States, and far below almost all other

comparably-sized metropolitan areas (11 transit

service miles per capita in San Diego, 23 in

Seattle, and 20 in Denver). These conditions

may begin to change with the recent sales tax

assessments authorized by voters in Mesa,

Tempe and Phoenix. The new funds will pay for

more bus service and the start of a 34-mile light

rail project that will run through the central

Transportation investments in the Phoenix

region, unlike other metropolitan areas, have

supported the region's center. From 1986 to

1998, the region's highway spending afforded

access from more distant communities to the

central locations of major employers, and helped

keep the downtown area vital. This focus on

infrastructure investment in the central region

contrasts with decentralized spending patterns in

Chicago, Atlanta, and Washington, D. C. where

the construction of perimeter freeways contributed

to movement away from the urban center.

Transit is a limited option for most residents.

The lack of a comprehensive system effectively

precludes the transit-oriented, in-city lifestyle

which some people prefer. Lower-income citizens

are especially locked into a bus system that, despite

improvements in routes and schedules, still limits

their access to employment and other activities.

The region faces complex transportation

and land use decisions. The experiences of

Chicago, Atlanta and Washington, D. C. make

clear what could happen. 8 Completing Phoenix'

planned freeway system appears likely to acceler-ate

the pace of outward growth, particularly in

those areas outside the planned beltways. (For an

example, see Learning from Atlanta, page 28).

However, should employers remain heavily con-centrated

as projected by the Maricopa Association

of Governments, and if home building remains

widely dispersed, major traffic problems for

commuters converging on compact employment

cores are a real possibility. Combined with contin-ued

underinvestment in transportation alterna-tives,

the region risks limiting its comparative

advantages over other fast-growing regions by

increasing congestion, degrading air quality,

lengthening commutes and limiting choices.

Figure 4: Vehicle Miles

Traveled Are Now Growing at

a Rate Even with Population

in Metropolitan Phoenix

Vehicle Miles Traveled (in millions, miles per day)

Source: Morrison Institute for Public Policy, data from Mark Schlappi, Arizona Department of Transportation,

Phoenix is one of the last major metropolitan areas in the United States to assemble a major freeway system.

15 MORRISON INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

Map 5: Metropolitan Phoenix Freeways

Map 6: Highway Expenditures

from 1986 to 1998 Have Supported

Table 3: Metropolitan Phoenix: Federal and State Highway Spending,

1986 to 1998 (in 1998 dollars)

Federal and State Percent of Number of Highway Spending Federal and State

Region Route Segments (for projects above $1 million) Highway Spending

Northwest 19 $842,865,377 17.6%

Northeast 11 $868,081,289 18.1%

Southeast 24 $1,347,625,827 28.1%

Southwest 9 $289,068,344 6.0%

Central 15 $1,445,647,559 30.2%

TOTALS 78 $4,793,288,396 100.0%

Note: Does not include federal and state highway funds going directly to cities. For a definition of the regions, see Map 6 and the Notes and Methodology section.

Source: Dr. Elizabeth Burns, Department of Geography, Arizona State University, data from Arizona Department of Transportation.

Source: Dr. Elizabeth Burns, Department of Geography, Arizona State University.

Source: Arizona Department of Transportation, January 2000.

16 HITS AND MISSES: Fast Growth in Metropolitan Phoenix

The Fringe is Exploding

TREND: During the 1990s, most new home construction took place about

18 to 21 miles from downtown Phoenix. Both local movers and new arrivals are going to the fringe.

Metropolitan Phoenix' residential construction

is moving outward swiftly. Currently, homes

are going up most quickly in a ring far from

downtown Phoenix (see Figure 5). From 1993 to

1998, the urban edge has moved outward nearly

one-half mile per year. But in the southeast

quadrant, the rate has been faster approaching

three-fourths of a mile a year. With the exception of

the southwest quadrant which absorbed only about

three percent of new residential development,

new construction has been quite evenly distrib-uted

geographically (see Figure 5 and Table 4).

A close look at the data suggests that devel-opment

across the region during the 1990s has

followed a three-step pattern. Construction in the

early 1990s took place within a zone approxi-mately

12-18 miles from downtown Phoenix

that left a band of bypassed development

between the initial urban fringe and the new

edge. This was followed by in-fill construction

along with further development of the outer

zone. Finally, construction was expanded from

the outer zone to extend the ring of development

even further to the current 21-mile distance. 9

Local residents are moving to the new

fringe neighborhoods. People moving from one

part of metropolitan Phoenix to another represent

a solid majority of new residents on the urban

edge, according to Morrison Institute survey data

gathered in September 1999*. Almost 60 percent

of new residents at the urban periphery (18 miles

or more from downtown Phoenix) came from

another metropolitan address, rather than from

out of town. New arrivals also choose homes at

the fringe, but they comprise a smaller share of

For every local mover who came closer in,

two moved farther out. Recent movers went out-ward

an average of nearly five miles. In other

words, they left a home about 10 miles from

downtown Phoenix for one 15 miles out. The

main destinations of outward movers were the

north, northeast and southeast edges. Meanwhile,

a third of metropolitan Phoenix movers moved

inward an average of two-and-a-half miles. These

relocations, however, cannot be construed as a

"back-to-the-central-core" movement because

their destinations were generally suburban sections

of northeast Phoenix and older areas of Scottsdale.

Persons over 55 years of age represent almost

one-third of new urban fringe residents. These

residents tend to congregate in the numerous age-segregated

retirement communities located along

the northwest and eastern edges of the urban area

(see Map 7). These senior migrants are likely to

arrive at the edge directly from outside the region.

Migrants to the fringe have higher incomes

than their more centrally-located counterparts.

About two-thirds of recent edge migrants reported

household incomes above $50,000, compared to

one-half of movers to more central locations.

This contradicts the notion that affordable housing

is the primary motivation for moving outward.

Fringe migrants tended to favor "newness" more

than proximity to work, quality schools, transit

or established neighborhoods. They also felt a

surprisingly strong sense of community and

belonging in their new neighborhoods.

Though employment is dispersing at a

slower rate than population, three employment

subcenters are developing near the urban

fringe. The areas around the Scottsdale Airport,

Scottsdale Ranch, and along the Black Canyon

Freeway north of Greenway Road at this time

probably include 10,000 jobs each.

WHAT THIS MEANS The fast pace of outward expansion highlights

the importance of setting out strategies early

to accommodate fast residential growth and to

protect resources and open space. The tendency

of residential housing development to extend

to the outer limits first and then focus on in-fill

construction leaves planners less time to prepare

for growth on the fringe. Moreover, given that

development is taking place across jurisdictions,

the land-use plans of one city will intersect with

and perhaps contradict the land-use policies

Extremely fast growth at the fringe strains

the capacity of outlying communities. Fringe

areas are struggling to provide new schools,

services and infrastructure, while preserving

open space and protecting the environment.

Many of these communities were essentially rural

until very recently, but now they must contend

with growth rates of 40 percent or more. New

people require new services, water lines and sewer

connections. But, many places, because they are

essentially "bedroom communities," lack the

resources and expertise to extend their systems

across larger, more-populous service areas. For

example, school districts as diverse as Avondale,

Mesa, Peoria, Queen Creek, Glendale, and Deer

Valley are worrying about hiring teachers to

accommodate sudden pulses of new students.

These pressures motivated Apache Junction to

adopt a school impact fee on new residential

development. Glendale recently adopted an

ordinance which requires developers to show that

school capacity exists before the city will approve

The large numbers of seniors and affluent

households in the fringe areas may complicate

community decision making. Well-off house-holds

and senior citizens can be a boon to their

new hometowns. However, these populations

could also compound the challenges facing

these municipalities. Retirees require different

services than young families. That they are

attracted more by new homes and health care

facilities than by accessibility to work and

schools can pose challenges for communities

seeking to provide a full range of transportation,

recreation, and education services.

Map 7: Metropolitan Phoenix

Retirement Communities

Source: Dr. Patricia Gober, Department of Geography,

Arizona State University.

Between 1993 and 1998, new residential development moved outward

by an average of nearly half a mile each year.

* The survey respondents which were plotted on the street maps to identify their new location overrepresented affluent

homeowners and underrepresented low-income renters.

17 MORRISON INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

Figure 5: Most New Home Construction Took Place About 18 to 21 Miles from Downtown Phoenix* during the late 1990s

* Calculated from the intersection of Washington Street and Central Avenue for single-family homes.

Source: Gober and Burns, 2000; data from Maricopa Association of Governments.

Table 4: New Residential Development Moved Outward by an Average of Nearly Half a Mile Each Year between 1993 and 1998

SOUTHEAST NORTHEAST NORTHWEST SOUTHWEST

Distance* Number of Distance Number of Distance Number of Distance Number of YEAR (miles) Housing Units (miles) Housing Units (miles) Housing Units (miles) Housing Units

1990 16.4 3,930 17.1 2,249 18.1 2,483 19.2 197

1991 16.7 5,442 17.2 3,176 17.7 3,238 18.9 227

1992 16.5 7,205 17.4 4,806 17.1 4,455 19.6 284

1993 16.5 7,753 18.1 5, 481 17.9 5,861 16.8 387

1994 17.1 10,314 18.4 6,612 18.1 7,644 16.8 431

1995 17.7 10,461 19.1 6, 870 17.3 7,943 16.7 585

1996 18.8 11,883 19.0 8,245 17.3 9,696 18.8 729

1997 19.9 10,262 19.6 7,537 18.2 9,716 19.6 818

1998 20.6 10,498 19.4 8,142 18.5 10,432 20.1 904

* Calculated from the intersection of Washington Street and Central Avenue for single-family homes.

Source: Gober and Burns, 2000; data from Maricopa Association of Governments.

18 HITS AND MISSES: Fast Growth in Metropolitan Phoenix

The Phoenix Region is Using a Lot of Land

TREND: The region's urban land area doubled between 1975 and 1995.

Forty percent of all agricultural land and 32 percent of undeveloped desert was lost.

Metropolitan Phoenix is rapidly losing desert

and agricultural areas to urban uses. Between

1975 and 1995 metropolitan Phoenix' urban area

more than doubled.* Many other regions have

urbanized their land more quickly than Phoenix.

Still, urban development now covers more than

40 percent of the MAG planning area, compared

to 15 percent in 1975.

Increasingly, urbanization is taking over

natural desert. Prior to 1975, most urbanization

occurred on farm acreage which was replaced by

new irrigated land (see Map 8). But urbanization

soon spread to the west and the southeast onto

agricultural land while replacement dwindled,

and to the north and northeast onto desert land

(see Maps 9 and 10). Undeveloped desert in 1995

represented only 33 percent of the land in the

planning area compared to 49 percent in 1975

(see Table 5). A 49 percent increase in recreational

land mitigates the agricultural and desert losses

somewhat (see Table 6).

Local governments have moved to offset

development with open space protection and

recreation areas. In 1995, Maricopa County had

almost 2 million acres (or over 3,000 square miles)

of dedicated open space, including federal lands,

city and county parks and mountain preserves.

Much of this space is in unincorporated sections

of Maricopa County. This figure represented

an increase of nearly two percent since 1990.**

The region's eight largest municipalities more

than doubled their combined open space and

recreational holdings from 23 square miles in

1975 to 49 square miles in 1995. Fully 40 percent

of the city of Scottsdale is now slated to be

protected as open space.

Nevertheless, open space acquisition lags

behind population growth and development

in most communities. Countywide, open space

set aside declined on a per capita basis from

.84 acres per person in 1990 to .71 in 1995.

Furthermore, open space acquisitions are

fragmentary. This results partly from Phoenix'

setting, which has dictated the location of the

region's mountain parks. But "patchy" open space

provisions also follow from the divergent political

orientations and financial conditions of metro-politan

Phoenix' local governments. These local

circumstances have meant various rates of open

space acquisition and disparities in the amounts

of open space available in different cities

State and federal lands are also affecting

metropolitan Phoenix' open space and desert

landscape. Federal and state land and Indian

reservations encompass 25 percent of the MAG

planning area. Although they have not blocked

urbanization tightly so far, they have helped shape

overall growth patterns and will likely play a larger

role in the future. Moreover, federal holdings such

as Tonto National Forest provide easily accessible

open space and recreational opportunities for

outlying communities, such as Mesa, as well as for

residents throughout the region. State trust land,

which is currently undeveloped, represents 275

square miles, or 15 percent of the MAG planning

area (see Figure 6). The state constitution mandates

that these lands must be managed to support the

state's education system. This requirement is often

interpreted as a mandate for the sale or lease of

the lands to developers.

The development of almost 500 square miles

of desert and fields in the MAG planning

area between 1975 and 1995 represents a major

alteration of the landscape. Most tangibly, this

change has substantially reduced the accessibility

of open space in parts of the region, whether for

recreational use, viewscapes or as a contrast to the

built environment. Yet other impacts have come

with the loss of agricultural fields and creosote

flats. Already the "urban heat island" effect of mass

paving has pushed nighttime low temperatures in

the urban area a full eight degrees higher than 50

years ago Ð a significant impact on a desert

climate's livability. And the movement of most

building onto open desert from retired fields in

recent years raises additional concerns. Home con-struction

is now cutting the remaining patches of

natural vegetation into smaller and smaller

fragments. Meanwhile, the channelization or block-age

of riparian corridors, in addition to creating

flood control problems, disrupts wildlife migration

corridors and natural drainage patterns.

State policy choices will soon play a greater

role in desert land protection and open space

provision in the region. The city of Phoenix

estimates that state trust land encompasses 70

percent of the land within its northern bound-aries.

Similarly, large state tracts comprise the last

sizable parcels left in areas of north Scottsdale,

Peoria and southeast of Apache Junction. This

fact guarantees that imminent state decisions will

have a huge bearing on the shape of the metropolis.

Whether the land is sold to developers will

determine what happens in the future. To date,

the state has not sold much of the land, as little

demand has surfaced for it given its location

beyond the region's northern and eastern fringe.

However, with the urban edge now reaching the

state's largest land holdings, the parcels are "in

play." Developers are pressing to buy them, while

conservationists want to change the state consti-tution

to allow the state to preserve large portions

of the land as open space. A key policy decision

lies just ahead. Selling large tracts of this land, as

the state has begun to do in several high-growth

areas, could supply land for massive new edge

development. Conversely, holding this land would

protect a major open space reserve and barrier to

Failure to protect adequate tracts of natural

desert threatens the region with the loss of its

most famous lifestyle asset. Wide-open spaces,

jagged purple mountains, the stately saguaro cactus Ð

these compose more than just the local ecosystem.

Along with the climate, these are the region's top

amenities, its leading points of local pride and the

region's signature image in the wider world. More

than anything else, the vivid Sonoran Desert is

what makes metropolitan Phoenix unique and

gives it character. To lose too much of it would be

to lose a crucial unifying amenity and a critical

point of competitive advantage.

An average of 23 square miles of desert and farm land

were converted to urban use annually between 1975 and 1995.

* This section refers to the MAG planning area.

** Based on land use reports submitted by individual cities and towns to MAG between 1990 and 1995.

19 MORRISON INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

Table 5: Urban Development Now Covers Over 40 Percent of

PERCENT SHARE OF TOTAL Agriculture Desert Recreation Urban Total

1975 32% 49% 4% 15% 100%

1995 19% 33% 7% 41% 100%

* The MAG planning area is 1,768 square miles within the metropolitan Phoenix region.

Recreation is dedicated open space Ð large natural areas dedicated for public use.

Source: Morrison Institute for Public Policy, data from 1995 CAP-LTER, "Land Use Change in Phoenix: Phase I" overlayed on the MAG planning boundary.

Table 6: Percent Change in Land Use in MAG Planning Area

Agriculture 557 334 -40%

Recreation 77 115 49%

* The MAG planning area is 1,768 square miles within the metropolitan Phoenix region.

Recreation is dedicated open space Ð large natural areas dedicated for public use.

Source: Morrison Institute for Public Policy, data from 1995 CAP-LTER, "Land Use Change in Phoenix: Phase I" overlayed on the MAG planning boundary.

Maps 8-10: Metropolitan Phoenix: Land Use Change from 1955 to 1995

Source: Morrison Institute for Public Policy, data from CAP-LTER, "Land Use Change in Phoenix:

Phase 1," 1955, 1975, 1995 overlayed onto MAG planning area.

Figure 6: MAG Planning Area: Percent of Land Ownership, 1997

Note: The total land area represented here is 1,780 square miles, which covers the MAG planning area of 1,768.

Source: Morrison Institute for Public Policy, data from Arizona Land Resources Information System.

20 HITS AND MISSES: Fast Growth in Metropolitan Phoenix

The City of Phoenix' Resources are Balanced Compared to Its Largest Suburbs

TREND: Unlike in many regions, the city of Phoenix exhibits relatively balanced

distribution of housing values, jobs and retail sales compared to its five large suburbs.

The region's central city and its major suburbs

display relatively even distributions of housing,

jobs and retail sales. This balance likely results

from the fact that the city of Phoenix contains a

mix of established central areas, old and new

suburbs and recent fringe development. The city

of Phoenix has more jobs than the per capita

regional average. Retail sales and housing values

are somewhat below the regional average. These

figures suggest that the city of Phoenix, unlike

many core cities of metropolitan areas, has

maintained a broad revenue base to pay for

services to residents.

Retail figures are used as one indicator of

municipal fiscal capacity (see Table 7). Sales tax

collections account for about 62 percent of local

tax revenues in the region, compared to 27 percent

nationwide. Six of the most populous cities in

the region obtain at least 70 percent of their local

tax revenue from sales activity. In contrast, the

property tax is the primary source of local rev-enues

nationally. Housing values are an indicator

of property tax collections, which account for

32 percent of local tax revenues in the region

(compared to 53 percent nationally).

Among the five populous suburbs, the

measures of housing values, jobs and retail sales

vary widely. Tempe and Scottsdale are the

region's leaders in all three measures (see Figure

7). Scottsdale's per capita retail sales figure is

almost twice that in the region and its housing

value was 37 percent higher.* Tempe has attracted

almost 80 percent more jobs than the regional

average. Tempe and Scottsdale are part of the

region's secondary employment core.

Smaller, outlying communities tend to have

fewer resources. In nearly all of these municipalities,

the per capita retail sales and jobs per capita

figures are below the regional average. Housing

values in some communities on the east side of

the region are well above the metropolitan average.

Metropolitan Phoenix fortunately does not

have the city-suburb resource disparities with

which many regions struggle. Many urban

regions in the United States suffer from gross

disparities in the distribution of people, jobs, and

economic and social resources between their core

cities and their suburbs. Frequently, the cores and

inner suburbs are caught in a downward spiral of

poverty, crime, housing decline, job shortages

and revenue shortfalls, made worse by the flight

of middle-income families and many employers

to more prosperous suburbs. 10 Metropolitan

Phoenix does not fit this model since no glaring

deficiency in resources separates the core city Ð

Phoenix Ð from its five largest suburbs.

The stability of sales tax collections is a

legitimate concern. Unlike urban regions in the

northeast and midwest, metropolitan Phoenix

cities rely heavily on sales tax revenue and rela-tively

little on property tax collections. Property

tax is limited by Arizona law. Conversely, sales

tax collections can be set at the discretion of each

city. Such a reliance on sales tax revenue raises

policy issues for the future. The most familiar

concern centers on the variability of sales tax

collections, which tend to stagnate in economic

recessions. But there are three other worries.

For one, the state is beginning to boost sales

taxes for its own needs. The governor and the

state legislature put a proposal on the November

2000 ballot to raise the state sales tax from 5.0 to

5.6 percent. The additional $445 million a year

would be used for education. Public acceptance

of sales tax increases may quickly "hit the wall."

That could limit cities' ability to raise taxes fur-ther

for key urban services. Most large cities in

the Phoenix region have recently increased their

sales tax rates for a variety of special purposes.

For example, Tempe and Phoenix approved an

increase to fund more transit, and Scottsdale raised

its rate for the purchase of land for preservation.

Mesa voted to fund a performing arts center and

transit among other civic improvements in a

quality-of-life measure.

Another concern is E-commerce (Internet

sales) which currently escapes local taxation. This

too could restrict municipal revenue growth. An

assessment by the League of Arizona Cities and

Towns suggests that Internet sales growth could

cost Arizona cities $102 million by 2003. In this

scenario, the eight largest Phoenix area cities

would lose about 10 percent of current total sales

tax collections. This would be a serious threat to

Phoenix' metropolitan balance.

In addition, a sales tax that exempts most

services will, over time, fall behind growth as an

increasing percentage of spending shifts away

from taxable goods to untaxed services.

The city of Phoenix has 15 percent more jobs per capita than the regional average.

* The bed and use tax was excluded from this study because varying definitions limited comparisons.

21 MORRISON INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

Figure 7: Housing Values, Jobs, and Retail Sales for Phoenix and Five Large Suburbs Compared with Regional Averages

Figure 8: Housing Values, Jobs, and Retail Sales for 18 Other Cities Compared to the Regional Averages

Table 7: Composition of Local Taxes, 1998 (Percent of Total Local Taxes)

Total Sales Tax Sales Taxes Property Tax Other Revenue per Capita

Phoenix 76% 24% 0.4% $343

Chandler 74% 21% 5% $273

Glendale 72% 24% 4% $257

Scottsdale 74% 22% 4% $540

Tempe 81% 14% 5% $578

* Total Sales Tax Revenue per capita (1998) was calculated using 1998 Sales Tax Revenue and 1998 Population Estimates from the U. S. Bureau of the Census.

Source: Morrison Institute for Public Policy, data from annual budget and fiscal reports of the various city governments.

Avondale Buckeye Carefree Cave Creek El Mirage Fountain Hills Gila Bend Gilbert Goodyear Guadalupe Litchfield Park Paradise Valley Peoria Queen Creek Surprise Tolleson Wickenburg Youngtown Regional Average = 100%.

Source: Morrison Institute for Public Policy, data from: Housing Units Ð U. S. Bureau of the Census; Jobs -Maricopa Association of Governments;

Retail Sales Ð League of Arizona Cities and Towns, Arizona Department of Revenue, Phoenix Department of Revenue, Tempe Department of Revenue.

22 HITS AND MISSES: Fast Growth in Metropolitan Phoenix

The Phoenix region's overall population is 72

percent white. Most of the non-white residents

of the region are Hispanic, according to 1995

census data. As Table 8 shows, the Hispanic pop-ulation

has surged in recent years, increasing

from approximately 13 percent of the population

in 1980 to 20 percent in 1995.

Most of the region's Hispanic and African-American

residents live in the city of Phoenix.

In 1980, 64 percent of the region's Hispanics and

83 percent of its African-Americans lived in

Phoenix, while the city was home to 52 percent of

the region's total population. By 1995, when the

city of Phoenix included 45 percent of the

region's total population, 58 percent of all

Hispanics and 64 percent of the region's African-Americans

lived in the city (see Maps 11 and 12).

In contrast, the five largest suburbs included

about 30 percent of the region's minority popula-tion,

38 percent of the region's white population,

and 38 percent of the overall population in 1995.

Importantly, however, Hispanic numbers have

been growing throughout the region.

Moreover, a clear north-south racial divide

exists within the city of Phoenix. A line along

State Route 202/ I-10 separates a majority-white

area from a majority non-white area. And the divi-sion

is growing more dramatic. In 1980, minority

residents accounted for nine percent of north

Phoenix and 47 percent of south Phoenix. By

1995, 28 percent of north Phoenix residents

belonged to ethnic minority groups while the per-centage

living in south Phoenix grew to 77 percent.

The concentration of minorities corre-sponds

to concentrations of high poverty and

low housing values. As the region has grown, the

geographic extent of poverty in metropolitan

Phoenix has expanded.* Maps 13 & 14 illustrate

the startling increase in the number of areas

within metropolitan Phoenix that are struggling

with significant poverty levels (20 percent or

more). However, while the physical extent of

poverty expanded between 1970 and 1990, it was

in line with the expansion of the urbanized area.

Overall, 12.3 percent of the region's people lived

in poverty in 1990 (see Figure A in Appendix).

At the same time, however, several high

poverty clusters have grown larger and more

pronounced - notably in central and south

Phoenix, covering a 58-square-mile area of distress.

In the middle of this cluster are the region's high-est

poverty rates (in excess of 40 percent) (see

Table C in the Appendix). In this most struggling

area, the median income was $11,500 in 1989 Ð

compared to a countywide median income of

$30,797 and $16,750 for the entire south and

central Phoenix poverty zone. Other poverty

clusters are evident in some portions of down-town

Tempe and much of the west side of the

region. Glendale, Tempe and Phoenix experienced

an increase in the poverty rate between

1979 and 1989. The 1989 rate in Phoenix and

Tempe was higher than the metropolitan average,

though university students inflate Tempe's rate.

Guadalupe and the Fort McDowell and Gila River

Indian reservations also struggled with a very

By contrast, poverty rates are low and

income levels high in much of the northeast and

southeast. In the most affluent part of the north-east

quadrant, the 1989 median per capita

income was $62,900. Another major swath of

relative affluence ran south of South Mountain

into south Tempe and west Chandler. Other low

poverty areas were in portions of Chandler,

Gilbert and east Mesa, along North Central

Avenue in Phoenix, in the northwest region near

the Sun Cities retirement communities, and in

scattered tracts west of 83rd Avenue between

Thomas Road and Olive Avenue.

Home values show a divide similar to race

and poverty. The north and northeast parts of

the region have high home values, while lower-value

housing and rental values are concentrated

in the southern and central parts of the city of

Phoenix. For example, in 1990 the median value

of older south and central Phoenix homes

hovered around $50,000, while homes in north

Phoenix were valued around $98,000, with prices

even higher to the northeast.* In fact, the region's

lowest-priced housing and rental values Ð those

affordable to families with $20,000 in yearly

income (approximately equivalent to two

minimum-wage earners) Ð were almost exclusively

clustered in the south and central area. The core's

low rents and valuations, however, are less than

affordable to the central area's low-income resi-dents.

In 1998, for example, a household with one

minimum wage income could afford monthly

rent or a mortgage of just $267. However, very

few properties exist at that cost (see Maps B and

New high-density construction caters to

more-affluent citizens living some distance from

the core. Most of the approximately 10,000 units

constructed annually since 1996 are going up 10 to

15 miles from downtown Phoenix. Most of these

units appear to be aimed at high-end markets,

even though the core's lower-income residents are

the ones most in need of rental housing.

Metropolitan Phoenix is divided by race,

income and housing values, though not as

starkly as some cities. Areas north and northeast

of central Phoenix, including Scottsdale, continue

to be less diverse and wealthier and have higher

property values than other areas. Meanwhile, the

region's minorities, poor people and lowest-value

housing are concentrated in a growing set of

neighborhoods in the central and southern parts

of the city of Phoenix. But contrary to national

trends, these poorer, and increasingly Hispanic,

areas exhibit some characteristics of stability such

as a moderate level of home ownership. Still,

these areas remain marked by the distress that

comes from the combination of race, poverty, low

employment rates, low educational attainment,

and housing problems.

This regional divide has negative implica-tions

for metropolitan Phoenix. Literature and

history show that heavy concentrations of poverty

and social distress at a region's center play a

major role in out-migration among middle-class

residents. Research also reveals that growing

income inequality undermines regional cohesive-ness

and economic success. 11 Thus, regional well

being and poverty alleviation are inextricably

linked. With such disparities as are evident now,

everyone loses when residents in some areas

must cope with substantial disadvantages and

restricted opportunities.

The Region is Becoming More Diverse

TREND: Racial and ethnic diversity is growing throughout the

metropolitan area. However, a regional divide exists by race,

poverty and housing and has the potential to get worse.

Fifty-eight percent of the region's Hispanics live in Phoenix -

and they are clustered in south and central Phoenix.

* The 1990 Census is the most recent year for which there is reliable poverty and home value data available at this

23 MORRISON INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

Map prepared by Arizona State University IT Research Support Lab -GIS Services

Data Source: 1990 U. S. Census Bureau STF3A.

Map prepared by Arizona State University IT Research Support Lab -GIS Services

Data Source: Maricopa Association of Governments (MAG), 1995.

Map 11: Percent of Hispanic Population in 1990 Map 12: Percent of Hispanic Population in 1995

Table 8: Metropolitan Phoenix' Racial and Ethnic Composition, 1980 to 1995

White* 81.3% 77.1% 71.9%

Hispanic 13.2% 16.3% 20.5%

African-American* 3.1% 3.3% 3.5%

Asian* 0.9% 1.6% 1.9%

Native American* 1.4% 1.5% 1.5%

*Not of Hispanic origin.

Source: Morrison Institute for Public Policy, data from U. S. Bureau of the Census.

Map prepared by Arizona State University IT Research Support Lab -GIS Services

Data Source: 1970 U. S. Census Bureau.

Map prepared by Arizona State University IT Research Support Lab -GIS Services

Data Source: 1990 U. S. Census Bureau STF3A. No data

Map 13: Percent of Population in Poverty, 1970 Map 14: Percent of Population in Poverty, 1990

The region's demographic divide plays out

in its schools, placing higher than average

numbers of poor and minority students in the

schools of central Phoenix and the southwestern

portion of the region. Out of fifty elementary

and unified school districts regionwide, the ten

with the highest percentage of Hispanic students

were predominantly in central Phoenix and

the southwest. In fact, central Phoenix districts

averaged only 20 percent white students and

southwestern districts only 41 percent. In

contrast, the five northeastern school districts

averaged 87 percent white students. In general,

rapidly-expanding schools Ð which tend to lay

along the fast-growing fringe, have the greatest

percentages of white students, higher family

incomes and higher education levels in students'

families (see Map 15).

An achievement gap also exists. The region's

lowest-achieving districts, based on percentile

ranking of standardized test scores, are in central

Phoenix and the southwest. Two of them

(Murphy and Roosevelt) are a part of the non-white

center (see Table 9). This non-white center

was one of the few areas to lose students in the

1970s and 1980s, though the districts are gaining

now. At the same time, the best performing school

districts were mostly in the fringe areas that are

predominantly white. In 1998, northeast elemen-tary

school districts Ð Cave Creek, Scottsdale, and

Fountain Hills Ð had the highest test scores, the

highest percentage of white students and, except

for Scottsdale, were the fastest growing between

1990 and 1998. Additionally, lower rates of high

school completion in the poor, non-white center

add to the educational gap (see Map 16).

Because of high rates of growth, all schools

and districts are struggling to provide resources

for their students. One measure, students per

teacher, determines class size and a school dis-trict's

ability to provide instruction. Of the five

school districts in the region with over 20 students

per teacher, two are in central Phoenix and two

are in the southwest.

The metropolitan area's school divide creates

a greater disadvantage in central Phoenix and

the southwest portion of the region. Economic

success correlates particularly with educational

attainment (the number of years of school completed).

Since poverty can reduce the likelihood

of finishing high school, for example, the schools

in these locations must overcome enormous

challenges to providing a quality education. These

challenges need to be addressed so Hispanic and

other students, especially those in core and

southwestern school districts, can compete for

high-earning, high-skill technology jobs.

The education divide exacerbates growth at

the edges and makes the region's center less

economically viable. The weak schools of the

center present a powerful impetus for decentral-ization.

Schools with high proportions of low-income,

minority or underachieving students

may influence where families with children

choose to live. Specifically, such schools could

drive middle-class families Ð and the businesses

that employ them Ð away from central Phoenix

toward better-performing, white-dominated

schools farther out in the metropolitan area. This

would perhaps increase the viability of the fringe

at the expense of the core.

Poor student performance in the center of

the region likely contributes to expansion at the

fringe; quality education and growth affect one

another. Low-performing schools deter families

from moving to or staying in the center of the

region, thus further straining the resources of

schools elsewhere. The complex interrelatedness

of the problems of growth and student perform-ance

mean that discussions of one must include

24 HITS AND MISSES: Fast Growth in Metropolitan Phoenix

TREND: Students from poverty and minority backgrounds with

low test scores are clustered in southwest and central portions of the

metropolitan area. Fast growth throughout the region finds all school

districts struggling to accommodate student populations.

Metropolitan Phoenix' lowest education test scores are in central Phoenix,

while the highest scores are found along the fast-growing, white-dominated fringe.

Data Source: Arizona Department of Education, 1998

Map prepared by Arizona State University IT Research Support Lab -GIS Services

Map 15: Most School Districts in the Region

Map 16: 4th Grade Test Score Percentile Rankings, 1998*

Table 9: Standardized Test Scores and Race by Quadrants, 1998*

Reading Test Score Rank, Math Test Score Rank, Elementary School Elementary School % White Students

See Notes and Methodology section for a list of which school districts are in each quadrant. Test score ranks are the median rank of the school districts in each quadrant.

Source: Morrison Institute for Public Policy, data from Arizona Department of Education.

* Based on the Stanford 9 Achievement Tests, score ranks are percentiles, which range from 1 to 99. They show the average of schools in the district compared to all students taking the test nationally. For example, a rank of 33 means that on average, students taking the test in a school district scored lower than 67 percent of students nationwide.

26 HITS AND MISSES: Fast Growth in Metropolitan Phoenix

Aggressive Annexation is a Metropolitan Phoenix Tradition

TREND: Metropolitan Phoenix cities have a history of annexing to

capture new revenue and desirable locations and to facilitate planning.

Aggressive annexation by cities has been a

distinctive feature of metropolitan Phoenix

growth since 1970. Since then, the city of

Phoenix has added 230 square miles to its

territory. Such geographic expansion makes the

city of Phoenix a classic "elastic city," in urban

observer and former Albuquerque mayor David

Rusk's terms, since it has been able to push its

boundaries outward and thus compete for new

residential and commercial projects. 12 The larger

suburbs also have annexed heavily. In fact, while

the city of Phoenix set the pace for annexation

before 1970, Scottsdale, Glendale, Mesa and

Chandler, moved to the fore in the 1970s (see

Figure 9). Only land-locked Tempe, among the

five populous suburbs, did not annex large tracts

of land during that time. Combined, the five

suburbs added some 329 square miles.

More recently, the action on annexation has

shifted outwards. Since 1980, the region's

municipalities with less than 100,000 population

each have annexed land even more aggressively

than their more established neighbors. By 1998,

these cities and towns encompassed some 667

square miles, compared to Phoenix' 470 square

miles and the five large suburbs' 449 square miles.

Since the 1960s, Arizona law has discour-aged

new municipalities from forming close to

existing ones. Territories within three miles of a

city or town that has less than 5,000 people, or

within six miles of a city or town that has 5,000 or

more, cannot form a separate municipality unless

the existing city formally agrees. This may

encourage these territories to solicit annexation

in order to get services, since they cannot incor-porate

Cities say they pursue annexation to gain

more control over the development of new

territory in their vicinity. Controlling the quality

and cost impacts of growth in nearby unincorpo-rated

areas was rated the most important reason

for annexations in Morrison Institute's survey of

cities' growth management techniques. The second

most important reason cited by the cities was

developers' threats to build in the county where

there are fewer land use and zoning regulations.

Other important motivations included obtaining

additional sales and property tax revenue and

Widespread annexation makes the Phoenix

metropolitan area different. In more traditional

regions, smaller existing towns or bodies of water

have often hemmed in the core city, preventing it

from gaining control of lands with attractive

growth potential. In metropolitan Phoenix, how-ever,

that has not happened. Few geographic or

political boundaries have kept the city of Phoenix

or its major satellites from absorbing large

amounts of desirable new land. The central cities'

activism in this area has influenced the region's

growth patterns in several ways.

Annexation by the city of Phoenix has

helped prevent gross disparities from arising

between the regional core and its largest

suburbs. By extending its boundaries, the city of

Phoenix has been able to compete with the

surrounding cities for desirable populations, jobs,

residential development and retail activity. This

has promoted "balance" in the region; as a result of

its annexations, the city of Phoenix contains not

just old central core areas and old suburbs, but new

suburban areas and recent fringe development. The

same goes for the populous suburbs as a group. By

expanding aggressively they gained shares of the

newest development and population growth.

Annexation has helped to keep the political

map simple. Large-scale annexation has brought

large amounts of unincorporated land under

established government, which is potentially an

advantage for more orderly development in the

region. But it also has kept at a minimum the

number of municipalities that exist in the region.

Although one of the largest metropolitan areas in

the United States, the region consists of only 24

relatively large cities and towns - the city of

Phoenix which contains almost 45 percent of the

region's population and nearly 30 percent of its

land area, plus 23 other municipalities (see Figure

10). This political map stands in stark contrast to

a metropolitan region such as Chicago (with 265

municipalities) or Los Angeles (with approximately

180). Both these effects - annexing unincorporated

land and a simple political map - may well have

promoted more orderly development in the

region by reducing the number of possibilities for

excessive fragmentation that can lead to land-use

Now that the region's less-populous,

farther-out towns control so much land, the

future of the region increasingly depends on

some new players. Their responses to rapid growth

can either undermine or encourage compact devel-opment

patterns and quality of life in both cities

and suburbs. Their involvement in regional coop-eration

and their access to tools and resources

become important issues.

The 18 less-populous municipalities contain 38 percent

of the land in the regional planning area.

27 MORRISON INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

Figure 9: Land Annexation Trends in Metropolitan Phoenix from 1919 to 2000

Figure 10: In the Metropolitan Region,* the 18 Less-Populous Municipalities Control 38 Percent of the Region's Land Area

* "Metropolitan Region" here refers to the MAG planning area of 1,768 square miles.

** Does not include any portion of Apache Junction, which encompassed only 150 people and one-tenth of a square mile in the MAG planning area in 1995.

Source: Morrison Institute for Public Policy, data from 1998 population estimates, U. S. Bureau of the Census; 1998 city land is square miles within city limits, from the League of Arizona Cities and Towns.

PERCENT OF THE POPULATION PERCENT OF THE LAND

28 HITS AND MISSES: Fast Growth in Metropolitan Phoenix

Taken together, the trends in population, density, employment, education,

transportation, and land-use tell a compelling story about the current state

of metropolitan Phoenix.

In some important ways, metropolitan Phoenix' growth is a success story.

° Density is increasing, albeit from a very low point.

° The center is not "hollowing out."

° And in keeping with the vitality of the center, the region retains a

measure of "balance" between its core city - Phoenix - and its largest

suburbs: Scottsdale, Glendale, Mesa, Tempe and Chandler.

Metropolitan Phoenix, in short, has grown at a phenomenal pace without

succumbing to the center-city disinvestment and deep social and economic

divides that often accompany metropolitan growth and development pat-terns.

To that extent, the region confounds large parts of the traditional

model of urban development and the Sunbelt stereotype. Unlike in older

east coast cities, the region's center is holding, city-suburb disparities are

relatively few and the innermost municipalities have been able to widen

their boundaries, capture suburban growth and prosper. Likewise, the

region defies its Sunbelt reputation because it boasts a job-rich core, brims

with young people and has grown relatively compactly.

At the same time, fast growth has left some negative imprints on the

urban form and the social landscape.

° Serious environmental, open space and air quality problems have

resulted from the region's fast growth.

° The sharpening segregation of many of the region's poor and

minority residents in the region's heart isolates those populations,

keeps families with resources out and can drive business develop-ment

° Many residents are dissatisfied and discontent with the growth

situation in metropolitan Phoenix.

Each of these impacts unfortunately confirms an aspect of the conventional

wisdom. Popular criticism of Sunbelt growth consistently dwells on its envi-ronmental

costs. Diagnoses of traditional regions' ills dwell on the social

divides that can accompany urban development patterns. And both analyses

warn of the social and quality of life anxieties provoked by imbalanced growth.

In this respect, cause for concern runs through the story of metropolitan

Phoenix' growth. According to the data, the region may not hold any special

immunity from the traffic congestion, environmental endangerment and

social inequity that now plague traditional cities like Washington, D. C. as

well as Sunbelt regions like Atlanta.

The potential for complications challenges metropolitan Phoenix to

think carefully as it considers, as this study will next, why it has grown the

way it has, and how it might respond to the dynamics now unfolding.

Summing Up the Trends

Learning from Atlanta

The rise of metropolitan Atlanta, a region not unlike metropolitan Phoenix,

is a cautionary tale. Atlanta resembles metropolitan Phoenix in that it came

of age almost entirely during the postwar auto age with its shift of population

toward low-density suburbs. The Atlanta region also stands out as a Sunbelt

success, having added 650,000 people and 350,000 jobs since 1990.

With its strong cluster of Fortune 500 and high-tech corporate headquarters, Atlanta's

above average per capita income presages growing regional affluence in the future.

Less desirable, through, is the accumulation of negative impacts

that has come with Atlanta's development. Some 30 years of unabated freeway

building and inner-city school decline have led to vast, unbalanced and

low-density growth and major problems.

Atlanta began the construction of its more than 360 miles of highways in 1946.

Since 1970, this aggressive infrastructure campaign has attracted new

businesses to a major transportation hub, but it has also enabled residential

and commercial development to advance farther and farther from the city

center. At the same time, the concentration of low-income African-American

residents and failing schools in the city of Atlanta and its inner southern

suburbs has exacerbated the decentralization of the region and sharpened

its divides. Seventy percent of metropolitan Atlanta's massive population growth

since 1990 has occurred north of the region's core in far-flung, majority-white

suburbs. Almost three-fourths of the region's job growth has occurred in

the northern part of the region. And low-income minority residents remain

trapped in a segregated, job-thin core far from the job-rich northern suburbs.

These imbalances have caused serious traffic, environmental and social distress.

The average per capita driving distance in Atlanta is now the highest of

any city at nearly 35 miles a day. The average driver spent 68 hours in traffic

delays in 1997. Congestion cost the region more than $2 billion a year

in delays and extra fuel costs. Air pollution has become so serious that the region

was at one time denied federal transportation funding, and more

than 200,000 acres of trees are endangered. Finally, a serious "spatial divide" in Atlanta,

combined with the region's neglect of mass transit, keeps many African-American

workers isolated from the region's greatest concentrations of jobs and affluence.

Atlanta's experience, then, can serve as a warning for metropolitan Phoenix.

Source: Morrison Institute for Public Policy, data from Moving Beyond Sprawl:

The Challenge for Metropolitan Atlanta. The Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy, 1999.

29 MORRISON INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

What's Behind the Trends

Metropolitan Phoenix is where it is today - with its good and bad points - because of its special

attributes, national factors, and local choices. Patterns common to most post-war metropolitan

areas, including auto dependence and the rise of the suburbs, have made a difference here as

they have everywhere. But because the Phoenix region is so new (having

developed largely since 1970), it may have been affected by these patterns

more than other places. The following sections discuss some of the reasons

why metropolitan Phoenix is the way it is.

Timing and National Trends

COMING OF AGE IN THE AUTO ERA

Nothing is more important to metropolitan Phoenix' growth than the fact

that it has taken place mostly in the automobile era. As late as 1940, this

region was a modest provincial hub with 120,000 residents. The transfor-mation

to an urban region of almost 3 million took place almost entirely

after World War II when cars meant freedom and new work and lifestyle

choices. Metropolitan Phoenix expanded as an assemblage of dispersed

suburbs because of its time and place.

THE ADVENT OF AIR CONDITIONING

Willis Carrier, the inventor of air conditioning, helped set the stage for

metropolitan Phoenix' rapid growth. In 1957, the Federal Housing

Administration agreed to accept central air conditioning as part of its

mortgages. The conquest of the desert's summer heat made metropolitan

Phoenix an attractive Sunbelt destination and gave housing and business a

green light to expand as never before.

TOPOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE

Phoenix' striking setting and pleasant climate have attracted new residents

and businesses, and helped determine its form. The region's mountains and

flood plains have fostered the spread of development and shaped it some-what.

The Salt River Valley offers few natural barriers to outward growth.

Large rugged mountains just beyond the northern fringe offer some limits

to the region's future growth, though few such obstacles exist in the south

and west. Phoenix' mild winters and low humidity have made the region a

leading western destination for lifestyle seekers and retirees.

THE REAL ESTATE CRASH

The real estate crash of the late 1980s and the national recession about the

same time also influenced Phoenix' current form. The "bust" just over a

decade ago slowed decentralization and encouraged several years of more

cautious in-fill development at a time of phenomenal population growth.

Not surprisingly, metropolitan Phoenix' growth industry was affected

significantly by the tight financial markets created by the virtual collapse of

savings and loan institutions by 1990. Banks in Arizona lost more money in

the first half of 1989 than those in any other state.

As a result, development moderated in the early 1990s. Home construc-tion

slowed. Where development occurred, developers took fewer risks in

site selection and turned their attention inward. The average distance from

downtown Phoenix of new home construction barely increased from 16.4

miles in 1990 to 16.5 miles in 1993. Only after the local and national

economies rebounded did attention refocus on outer areas. Today, the

frontier lies more than 20 miles away from downtown Phoenix, but the 1989

crash may still be affecting fringe expansion. Lenders, according to John

Ogden, CEO of Phoenix-based SunCor Development Company, keep a far

tighter hold on development financing now than during the 1980s.

GOVERNMENT LAND OWNERSHIP

A vast amount of public land in the Phoenix region is another important

local characteristic. Together the federal and state governments and three

Indian reservations control a quarter of all land in the MAG planning area,

and about two-thirds of the entire county. Public lands have so far played a

modest role in determining how the region grew, but their importance will

grow in the future as the urbanized area abuts them.

Development patterns have already been shaped to the east and south

by the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community, the Fort McDowell

Indian Community and the Gila River Indian Community. Federal holdings

and the Indian reservations form a de facto growth boundary for parts of

metropolitan Phoenix (see Map 18). A more variable factor is the 275 square

miles owned by the state of Arizona in the regional planning area and

mandated by the state constitution to be managed to generate the maximum

financial benefit for Arizona's schools.

Policies and Effects Specific state and local policy choices have influenced how and how fast the

region has developed in the last 30 years. What follows, then, examines the

state and local policy decisions - wise and otherwise - that have determined

the way the region has changed, and begins to suggest areas for future

30 HITS AND MISSES: Fast Growth in Metropolitan Phoenix

Water, Land and Transportation Choices

TREND: State policy choices on water, state lands and transportation in the 1980s facilitated fast growth, but also presented some limits.

Early, bold federal and state efforts made water

a facilitator of regional growth. Without a

reliable water supply, Phoenix would never have

developed into a large metropolitan region. In

the early years of the 20th century, Phoenix-area

government and business leaders persuaded the

federal government to construct massive dams

and water delivery systems. Among these projects

were the Salt River Project (SRP). Since 1986, the

Central Arizona Project (CAP), a 365-mile long

system of aqueducts, tunnels, pumping plants

and pipelines, has provided water to Phoenix.

Through the SRP and CAP, metropolitan Phoenix

can access as much as 1.7 million acre feet per

year of surface water. By some estimates, this is

enough water to support a population at least

double the region's current number.

The Groundwater Management Act (GMA)

of 1980 further supported expansion by

supplementing dam-and canal-building with

conservation. Brokered by then-governor Bruce

Babbitt, the act was named by the Ford

Foundation as one of the nation's ten most inno-vative

programs in state and local government in

1986. With the act, the state of Arizona moved

aggressively to administer its substantial, but

finite, water supplies and control groundwater

pumping. Specifically, the GMA limits ground-water

pumping in the Phoenix region and, until

1998, required developers to verify that projects

had a 100-year water supply that would not fur-ther

deplete the aquifer. These requirements

responded to several negative environmental

impacts of metropolitan Phoenix' expansion

(such as land subsidence due to groundwater

pumping) as they rationalized more growth by

imposing a semblance of order on the water

scene. The indiscriminate proliferation of new

homes was replaced by a managed process in

which subdivisions were forced to refrain from

unrestrained groundwater use and usually had to

connect to existing water infrastructure.

The GMA likely has limited the region's

spread somewhat. New development can proceed

more easily in cities like Tempe, Phoenix or

Scottsdale, which have access to CAP water.

Conversely, the GMA presents hurdles to devel-opment

in areas such as Cave Creek or Carefree

that are more distant from CAP and lack sufficient

groundwater supplies. In these communities, the

cost of building infrastructure to deliver CAP

water appears to discourage rapid construction.

In the western part of the region, community

leaders have enough water but are struggling with

the cost of a treatment plant.

Other shaping impacts of the water law

could be broader. The need to connect to

centralized water supplies discourages "wildcat"

building, and fewer urban dwellers in Phoenix

use wells and septic systems than in most other

metropolitan areas. Also, the need to use existing

water and sewer infrastructure provides developers

and local governments with considerable incentive

to use land efficiently. This situation likely has

contributed to the region's relatively compact form.

Whether the current water regime does any

more to shape the metropolitan area remains a

subject of debate. The GMA does not prohibit

"leapfrog" development. It only makes developers

financially responsible for securing long-term

water supplies. The Del Webb Corporation,

accordingly, has managed to proceed with its

planned community of Anthem, miles beyond the

existing northern urban fringe, by purchasing

water from tribal interests. Many developments

approved since the GMA have fulfilled their

obligations by joining a regional "groundwater

replenishment district," securing groundwater

rights and paying what amounts to a mitigation

fee, even if replenishable water supplies are

unavailable nearby. Still, metropolitan Phoenix'

water regime appears to favor more compact

The restrained pace of the state of Arizona's

sales of its school trust land has also fostered

compactness, at least thus far. The state consti-tution

requires that the trust lands, part of the 11

million acres Arizona gained at statehood from

the federal government, be managed to maximize

their benefit to the state's schools. This requirement

has always raised the possibility of these lands'

sale or lease to developers. However, analysis of

State Land Department records suggests that

such transactions have had only a minor influence

on the region's physical form. Many states sold off

their trust lands for short-term gain decades ago.

By contrast, Arizona retains more than 90 percent

of its original grant, including the vast majority

of the acres it controls near the Phoenix urban-ized

area. Relatively few parcels have been sold to

developers; a fact that owes largely to decades

during which the Land Department focused on

generating revenue primarily from livestock

grazing and mineral fees in rural areas.

The Urban Land Management Act of 1981

also has limited sales of state trust land for

development. Another accomplishment of the

Babbitt years, this law anticipated the approach

of the urban edge to state lands and sought to

supervise the state's participation in the real

estate business. The act gave the State Land

Department new authority to plan, zone and

merchandise lands within or near the metropo-lis'

urban areas. It directed the Land Department

to encourage "appropriate" development and

"in-fill," and to discourage "urban sprawl" and

"leapfrog" building. To date, the State Land

Department has sold off just 7,446 acres of land

near all of the state's cities. 13 The net effect is that

the state now retains a reservoir of more than

200,000 acres of vacant land around metropoli-tan

Phoenix, much of it just to the north of the

current urban fringe. This legacy offers the

region an important resource for open space

preservation or other growth management

projects (see Map 17).

32 HITS AND MISSES: Fast Growth in Metropolitan Phoenix

DELAYING THE FREEWAYS

The Phoenix region's initial decision not to

build a comprehensive freeway system promoted

more compact development, notwithstanding

the inconvenience it caused. At least one fortu-nate

effect resulted from the delays neighborhood

groups and Arizona Republic publisher Eugene

Pulliam forced in the construction of Interstate

10 through central Phoenix during the 1970s. By

blocking construction until after 1978, freeway

opponents delayed the types of highways that in

many metropolitan areas facilitated large-scale

decentralization. As late as 1987, metropolitan

Phoenix' 290 miles of limited-access lane miles

ranked last among the largest 22 metropolitan

areas while the number of people per highway

mile ranked third. Early road-building choices

in metropolitan Phoenix spread jobs and people

to the urban edge less than they did almost

Delaying freeway construction also promoted

reliance on the region's one-mile grid of arterial

streets, which has tended to encourage relatively

even development patterns. The arterials, a legacy

of agricultural service roads, have provided the

region with a flexible way to relate transportation

and growth. The streets provide the driver with

multiple routes and detours around congestion.

They are easy to build as they are needed. As

development attorney and urban observer Grady

Gammage has pointed out, the arterials afford

the city a way to serve new areas of settlement in

an "incremental" way that does not distort ongoing

development patterns with sudden additions of

capacity. The delay in freeways and embrace of

arterial streets may be said to have encouraged

balanced expansion. In road building too, then,

state and local policy choices made in the 1970s

and 1980s significantly influenced (largely for the

better) the current form of the region.

How the future completion of the Loop 101

and 202 beltway will impact the urban form

remains to be seen. The decision to expedite this

construction may speed the dispersal of employ-ment

into affluent suburban areas. If so, the

current round of freeway construction may leave

a more ambiguous legacy than the last one did.

Metropolitan Phoenix' past policy choices on

water issues, state trust land, and transporta-tion

priorities on balance have facilitated the

region's growth. At the same time, they have off-set

rapid decentralization and inefficient

resource use to an extent. Securing CAP water

enabled rapid growth and made it more sustainable

by offering an alternative to destructive aquifer

pumping. The Groundwater Management Act

strongly encouraged connections to established

water systems, which promoted development

within or adjacent to established neighborhoods.

Slow freeway building helped the central core

retain and attract employment at a time when the

rapid spread of jobs and people to the edge was a

feature of urban growth. By holding on to the

trust lands, the state retained acres that may soon

become critical to promoting livability while stay-ing

away from the business of artificially driving

fringe development with land sales. These past

policies have served the region well.

Now, these past policies need to be updated. To

do so, the region will face some tough decisions.

Whether water policy can be used to help shape

and regulate the region's growth in the future

merits careful study, especially since there are not

likely to be any big water projects to bail the state

out of any future resource binds. The State Land

Department's past restraint in land sales also

leaves the region with an important choice:

Should the state sell big chunks of its holdings to

raise money for education, or should it hold this

land for use as open space? And the continued

neglect of mass transit, coupled with beltway

building that may disperse employment and

housing, compels dialogue about how the region

should proceed on transportation. In each of

these areas, failure to adapt and update may

threaten the dynamics of the past 20 years.

33 MORRISON INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

Growth Management Efforts

TREND: Though they are late in coming and uncoordinated,

more efforts to manage growth are underway in the region than is commonly thought.

Local government growth management pro-grams

are fairly widespread in the Phoenix

region and more prevalent than conventional

wisdom would predict. Morrison Institute sur-veyed

the 25 cities and towns (including Apache

Junction) in the metropolitan area and Maricopa

County to better understand the nature and level

of local growth management efforts. The county

and 18 municipalities responded. In developing

the questionnaire, the Institute used the Lincoln

Institute of Land Policy's description of a system-atic

growth management framework, including:

° Strategies to discourage sprawl and encourage

compact urban development, in-fill and

revitalization of blighted or troubled areas

° Provision of infrastructure (roads,

schools, water service, parks) at the time

° Urban design requirements that aim at

aesthetically pleasant urban areas, mixed

uses and environmentally friendly places

° Policies and programs that protect sensitive

lands, rural areas and open spaces

° Policies and programs to assure that

affordable housing is a major component

° Growth management boundaries

Morrison Institute's survey revealed surprising

activities in the 19 responding communities (see

° Only one municipality Ð Litchfield Park Ð

employs none of the possible tools.

° Fifteen of the 19 jurisdictions utilize impact

fees to help pay for the costs of new growth.

° Fourteen have mandatory downtown urban

° Twelve cities maintain an adequate public

facilities ordinance.

° Eight provide revenue for open space.

° Seven cities provide direct incentives for

in-fill development.

Taken together, this array of approaches points to

the emergence of a "Phoenix style" of growth

management practiced which focuses on requiring

new development to "pay for itself " rather

than on restricting it.

Rules for "adequate public facilities" in 12

cities suggest the relative newness of the present

commitment to growth management. Just four of

11 jurisdictions surveyed in a 1994 study reported

that they had adopted such ordinances. 15

Though numerous, the growth management

practices cannot be characterized as universal or

uniform. The Morrison Institute survey shows

that several smaller towns have as many manage-ment

tools in place as the larger cities. For example,

Queen Creek, a small community on the region's

southeastern edge, employs every strategy used

by Phoenix, Mesa and Scottsdale. Still, smaller

jurisdictions generally have fewer growth man-agement

tools than their larger counterparts.

Contrast Goodyear and Surprise (one and two

tools respectively) with Phoenix and Scottsdale

(six and five tools). In this regard the smaller

jurisdictions often appear to be welcoming

growth without hesitation. Another contrast

appears when east and west cities are compared.

East Valley fringe towns and cities wield more

restrictive growth management tools than their

counterparts in the West Valley. In the east,

Apache Junction, Queen Creek, Mesa and

Chandler indicated on average five management

instruments. To the west, Glendale, Goodyear,

Litchfield Park, Surprise and Peoria have an

average of two tools.

Table 10: Prevalence of Growth Management Tools by City

Adequate Public Downtown Urban Revenue for Limits on CITY Impact Fees Infill Incentives Facilities Ordinance Design Guidelines Open Space Urban Limit Line* Population Growth

* Examples of "urban limit lines" are urban service area boundaries (lines beyond which public services will not be extended) and greenbelts of dedicated open space around cities designed to limit growth there.

Source: Morrison Institute for Public Policy Growth Management Survey, 2000.

34 HITS AND MISSES: Fast Growth in Metropolitan Phoenix

Impact fees constitute the region's leading

growth management response. The Morrison

Institute survey shows 15 of the region's juris-dictions

have established impact fees to recoup

the costs of infrastructure and public amenities.

Cities vary widely in their use of the fees, as

Figure 11 and Tables 11 illustrate. Most often the

assessments are used to fund water and sewer

service. Still, little uniformity characterizes their

use. Chandler, Glendale and Peoria charge

developers for such projects as parks, police

and road construction. Mesa assesses builders of

single-family homes $159 per home for cultural

programs, and Apache Junction charges $1,368

per home to support its schools (though the fee

is facing a legal challenge).

The amount charged by the region's towns

varies widely. The fees charged ranged from

$1,800 per single-family house in Tempe to

$13,000 in parts of Peoria. Also, the Institute

survey reveals a staged array of impact fees

within the region that clearly responds to

regional growth patterns.

Peoria and Phoenix (the Ahwatukee area)

clearly outpace the other jurisdictions in total

impact fees assessed. However, the breakdown

between the amounts charged by categories for

these two cities varies. Peoria charges most of its

fees for two categories Ð roads/ transportation

and water systems. Phoenix' Ahwatukee impact

fees break out more subtly, and one of the larger

categories is parks. Glendale and Scottsdale sit on

a second level of sorts but well above the others.

Mesa and Tempe charge the lowest amounts

(Carefree does not charge impact fees). Tempe

only assesses fees in two areas, water and sewers

(similar to but much lower than Scottsdale).

The cities and towns were asked to estimate

the percentage of public facilities costs covered by

fees. More specifically, they picked ranges of costs

for streets, traffic lights, sewers, water, parks,

public safety and libraries covered by fees.

Respondents replied that impact fees typically

balance the majority of costs.

Impact fees often are higher at the fringe

and much less in the core of cities. This is both a

way to pay for new growth and a de facto in-fill

strategy because it is less expensive in such a scenario

to develop a subdivision in a vacant area that

already has sewer and water. Cities using varying

impact fees include Peoria, Phoenix, Scottsdale

and Surprise. Table 11 illustrates how some cities

charge different impact fees for different loca-tions

within their boundary. In addition to these

differences, there are areas of some cities (e. g.

Phoenix) where no impact fees are charged at all.

The region's diverse impact fees turn out to

constitute a surprisingly well-ordered system.

Though levied independently by an increasing

number of the region's cities, the fees together

make up a tiered regime that generally exacts

more from fringe-area developers than central-area

Whether this array of fees really promotes

regional compactness, however, remains

unclear. Recent research concluded that metro-politan

areas that rely on impact fees rather than

tax revenue to finance new public infrastructure

are more likely to develop in a compact manner. 16

However, the Morrison Institute analysis did not

detect a clear trend in this regard. Suffice it to say

that the uncoordinated assessment of impact fees

in metropolitan Phoenix Ð largely out of fiscal

self-interest Ð raises the possibility of an orderly

discouragement of extreme sprawl.

KEEPING THE CENTER VITAL

Efforts to revitalize central areas and promote

in-fill represent another noteworthy growth

management response in metropolitan Phoenix.

Seven of the 19 responding jurisdictions have

specific in-fill programs. Peoria, Phoenix, Scottsdale

and Surprise zone their impact fees to constitute a

de facto in-fill program by charging more at their

urban fringe than at their cores. And several of the

region's cities are also now following Phoenix' and

Te mp e 's efforts over the last decade to boost their

downtowns (see Table 10).

The cities of Phoenix and Tempe mounted

early, sustained and ambitious campaigns to

enhance their downtowns. City of Phoenix

reports show that the city took its first major

steps toward downtown redevelopment in 1971.

Since the 1980s, almost $2 billion of public and

private funds have been invested in downtown

projects such as a new city hall, Arizona Science

Center, America West Arena and Bank One.

The full list of reasons for metropolitan Phoenix' relatively strong center can be debated. But a

key factor remains the extraordinary lengths to which Phoenix and Tempe have gone to avoid

the hollowing out and disinvestment many other cities face.

Phoenix began boosting its center in the 1970s. In the 1980s, Mayor Terry Goddard refocused

the city's work on the core, declaring in his 1986 "State of the City and Budget" message that

"the downtown is going up." Plans, to be supported with over $300 million in public funds, were

drawn up for a third hotel, a sports complex, a new city hall and a science museum. In 1988,

Goddard and the City Council initiated a special excise tax earmarked for downtown facilities,

and steered a large percentage of a bond election toward central-city cultural projects.

Eventually, America West Arena resulted, along with major new office and retail construction

spurred by city tax incentives. By the late 1990s the Arizona Science Center, Bank One Ballpark,

the Arizona Center retail project and other facilities had given Phoenix a lively downtown

oriented toward sports, entertainment and government.

The result is that downtown Phoenix, with the densest concentration of employment in the

region, has become a more interesting, connected place. Approximately 9 million people attend

events downtown each year. A half-dozen housing projects may double downtown's population

from 6,000 to 12,000 within a few years. And a 1998 survey found that half of metropolitan

Phoenix' residents had dined downtown in the previous 12 months, compared with only 31

percent in 1997 and 23 percent in 1994.

Another strong effort has played out successfully in Tempe. Land-locked Tempe could have lost

ground to newer suburbs. But like Phoenix, Tempe turned to downtown revitalization as a way

to remain prosperous.

In the 1980s, the city began rejuvenating its downtown area adjacent to Arizona State

University. Over time this campaign has fostered an increasingly dense concentration of restau-rants,

condominiums, retail, entertainment and high-tech business activity. In addition, the city

has created a town lake in the dry Salt River bed and turned it into a regional recreational

amenity and local economic magnet. The result of Tempe's efforts has been the creation of

another strong urban center in metropolitan Phoenix, one that offers a "pedestrian-dominated"

environment and an appealing location for recreation and business activity. More recently, the

city is focusing on becoming a "Technology Oasis" by building the downtown area into a hub

largely for software and other cutting-edge industrial clusters.

35 MORRISON INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

Figure 11: Cities with High Population Growth Have Moderate Impact Fees

Table 11: Single-Family Impact Fees by City and Category*

* Total dollar amount per single-family dwelling unit. ** Area A of Peoria extends from Northern Avenue to Bell Road. *** Assumed Density of 2-4 dwelling units per acre for Scottsdale. + Reclaimed water fee for Chandler; sanitation fee for Glendale; meter price and solid waste container costs for Peoria; equipment repair facilities and solid waste container for Phoenix.

Source: Morrison Institute for Public Policy Growth Management Survey, 2000.

36 HITS AND MISSES: Fast Growth in Metropolitan Phoenix

A structured impact fee system places a

heavier burden on development in fringe areas so

as to free up funds to support downtown and

existing neighborhoods. Fee waivers of up to

$2,200 are designed to encourage in-fill. Tempe

has focused on creating a diverse, mixed-use

"vital center" of the sort valued by the people-centered

companies of the new economy. Both

cities are now devoting sales tax revenues to a

light rail system to connect the Chris Town area,

downtown Phoenix, and Sky Harbor Inter-national

Airport to Tempe and Mesa.

Though it is hard to quantify, it stands to

reason that efforts to boost downtown Phoenix

and Tempe have helped the region retain a

strong center and minimized decentralization.

Such investments have clearly fostered the con-tinued

concentration of business activity within

the region's center. In doing so, they have helped

prevent the central-area disinvestment that has

"hollowed out" other cities. Beyond that, these

cities' significant efforts to provide amenities

within their cores have likely offset some of the

conditions pushing middle-class families away

from region's center. Downtown revitalization

continues to be an important strategy for growth

management in metropolitan Phoenix.

PROTECTING OPEN SPACE

Open space protection is a strategy of increasing

importance in the region. This growth response

goes back a long way. In addition to the 16,500-

acre purchase that became South Mountain Park

in 1924, the city of Phoenix has made major land

acquisitions in every decade since the 1950s. In

keeping with that, city of Phoenix voters in 1973,

1979, 1984 and 1988 approved bond issues to

purchase 9,700 acres to establish the Phoenix

Mountains Preserve. Altogether, the city of

Phoenix has doubled the size of its parks system

since 1964 through the addition of 17,000 acres,

more than any other city except San Diego.

Over the same time frame, virtually all

of the region's jurisdictions have set aside

considerable amounts of open space. Dedicated

open space owned by the six largest municipalities

doubled from 23 square miles in 1975 to 47

square miles in 1995. Mesa, Fountain Hills and

Glendale approved major park bond issues, while

Chandler and Peoria used impact fee revenue to

expand their park systems. In addition, Queen

Creek implemented a development impact fee

that mandates at least 20 acres of parkland or

open space per 1,000 residents. These efforts have

kept vacant or parkland in key areas within the

urban form of metropolitan Phoenix.

Scottsdale and Phoenix have been moving

beyond preserving "breathing spaces" within

the urbanized area toward the creation of major

greenbelts. For its McDowell Sonoran Preserve,

for example, Scottsdale plans to acquire approxi-mately

57 square miles in the McDowell

Mountains. This will ultimately create a preserve

significantly larger than Boulder, Colorado's

famous "ring of mountains" system. Phoenix

plans to purchase about 21,500 acres, or 33

square miles, of natural desert north of the CAP

canal. These efforts are funded by municipal sales

taxes, and both are designed to offset fast growth

toward the urban fringe. Together, the programs

aim to create a regionally significant open space

belt that will limit the region's outward expansion

along its north edge.

For all this activity, though, open space

acquisition does not appear to be keeping pace

with population growth. The amount of dedi-cated

open space available on a per capita basis

county wide declined between 1990 and 1995.

Also, much of the new open space acquisition

appears to be piecemeal. This spottiness results

partly from the differing political orientations

and financial conditions of the region's cities. But

it also owes something to Phoenix' typography

which naturally determines where the region's

mountain parks will be. The resulting irregular

distribution of parklands means that cities far

from the area's mountain preserves (such as

Glendale and Chandler) may be significantly

under served with open space compared to those

containing mountains.

Protecting open space and desert land is a

concern among local residents. Two-thirds of

the respondents to Morrison Institute's 1999

quality-of-life survey said that the region is doing

a "poor" or "fair" job of preserving the desert.

And when the Institute asked more broadly about

the region's growth, those surveyed expressed

deep anxiety about the changes taking place

around them. Most dramatically, 80 percent of

metropolitan Phoenix residents said they were

"concerned" or "very concerned" about the

region's growth. These figures were in line with

the nearly 75 percent who have said in each of

the past three years' surveys that the region's

population is growing "too fast." In 1999, nearly

half of the respondents indicated they would

leave the region tomorrow if they could because

of "too many people."

Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Phoenix

metropolitan area does practice growth man-agement.

A regional or state-level regime does not

exert strong management across the urban area,

but many local governments employ an array of

growth management approaches. Significant

tracts of desert are being protected as open space

within and near the built-up area. Urban cores are

undergoing revitalization. And financial assess-ments

are recouping sizable portions of the costs

to cities of new development.

But, questions persist about the effectiveness

of this local, largely uncoordinated response to

the regionwide challenges of fast growth. The

spontaneous rise of a robust, tiered array of

impact fees suggests that important policies can

be implemented without the establishment of a

formal institutional framework. Yet the rate at

which residential development is moving

outward raises concerns about the adequacy

of metropolitan Phoenix' current city-based

approach. Likewise, the spottiness of the cities'

open space initiatives suggests the need for coop-erative

planning on this and other issues. For

example, the lack of a central authority to plan

open space acquisitions in the metropolitan area

makes the creation of a comprehensive, widely

accessible and equitable system of desert pre-serves

Conundrum: Metropolitan Phoenix Residents Do Not Connect Density with "Smart Growth"

When asked: "Is this idea 'smart growth' or not?", residents said: YES NO DON'T KNOW

Provide things like roads, schools and parks at the time of development 91% 6% 3%

Work on revitalizing older communities 88% 8% 4%

Protect rural areas, sensitive lands, and open spaces 88% 8% 4%

Build communities with a mix of housing, shopping, and schools in close proximity 87% 10% 4%

Focus new growth in areas that already have some development 78% 15% 7%

Create urban growth boundaries 73% 17% 10%

Widen roads and freeways 79% 16% 5%

Provide more public transportation 86% 9% 5%

Build communities that are taller and more dense instead of wider and more spread-out 38% 53% 9%

Protect private property rights 84% 9% 7%

1999 survey, n= 1,020. Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding; Responses were weighted to correct for a sampling bias.

Source: Morrison Institute for Public Policy, data from Quality of Life Survey, Morrison Institute for Public Policy and The Arizona Republic, 1999.

37 MORRISON INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

A "frontier spirit" continues to shape the region.

Political scientist David Berman points out that

metropolitan Phoenix' prevailing political culture

has for decades revolved around three "frontier"

watchwords Ð individual rights, a pro-growth

view of economic development and a focus on

local power and control. 18 These "western" values

have clearly played out in every aspect of the

region's growth story.

A pervasive mistrust of big government has

resisted limitations on personal autonomy,

particularly with regard to private property

rights. Likewise, a presumption that the area's

prosperity depends on development dictates an

ethos of constant growth promotion that has

frequently discounted residents' and others'

concerns about the pace of expansion. Thus, while

the region boasts a successful public-private eco-nomic

development organization - the Greater

Phoenix Economic Council - it lacks an equivalent

organization to address environmental concerns,

land-use patterns and transportation issues.

Finally, the intense localism of the area's political

culture has helped to make citizens and leaders

mistrustful of major regional initiatives. Two

cases in point are the public's resistance to free-way

expansions in the 1970s, and the region's lack

of action on MAG's "Desert Spaces" proposal.

Cities and city-based localism predominate.

Cities bulk large in the governance of metropolitan

Phoenix. Phoenix, Mesa, Scottsdale, Glendale,

Tempe and Chandler are sizable cities with signif-icant

fiscal and managerial capacity. Moreover,

metropolitan Phoenix cities possess "home rule

charters" that guarantee them unusually robust

powers. This state of affairs has seen individual

cities achieve much in terms of planning, tax-collection

and downtown development. But it has

also made it difficult for localities to align their

agendas to solve problems affecting the whole

region. Differing political orientations and finan-cial

conditions, for instance, have clearly delayed

the now-nascent framing of a light rail system.

And open space acquisition has been fragmented.

At the same time, though, the relatively

small number of cities in the region and the

sheer size of the city of Phoenix have helped to

reduce the fragmentation that can lead to gross

land-use mismanagement. Thanks to the

region's history of annexation, the political map

has not seen myriad small suburbs incorporating

into separate cities, as has occurred in California,

Chicago, St. Louis and elsewhere. Rather, a small

number of local governments have aggressively

used annexation to increase their population and

their land area. As a result, one of the largest

metropolitan areas in the United States remains a

collection of one county and only 24 relatively

large cities and towns (see Map 19). Moreover, 82

percent of the region's population (approximate-ly

2.3 million people) lives in the six largest

municipalities. This stands in sharp contrast to

metropolitan Chicago's 265 municipalities or Los

Angeles' approximately 180 entities. It gives met-ropolitan

Phoenix a potential advantage in its

problem solving in the future.

Equally helpful is the city of Phoenix' size.

With 470 square miles in the city of Phoenix, much

of the region "lives by the same rules." Even better,

those rules appear to be good ones. Phoenix

consistently wins high marks for its management

skills, innovations and problem solving. Over the

years, the city has received a number of presti-gious

awards, including the Bertelsmann world

prize for city management and Governing

Magazine's top grade for urban management.

WEAK REGIONAL ENTITIES

Maricopa County and the Maricopa Association of

Governments (MAG) lack strong authority.

Only this year did the Growing Smarter Plus

legislative package give counties the same power

as cities to impose impact fees, and provide

restrictions on further city annexations.

Moreover, voters have consistently rejected

expanding Maricopa County's powers, most

recently in 1996 when they turned down a pro-posed

"home rule" charter for the county much

like those of major cities in the region.

MAG has helped since the 1970s to promote

uniformity in planning and programming of

various activities, especially as required for various

federal transportation and other programs. Still,

the association lacks the power to enforce deci-sions.

Even MAG's ability to produce voluntary

approaches to regional problems has been limited.

Recent efforts to craft a vision for the year 2025

have not been successfully incorporated into the

region's culture or governance.

Another conspicuously weak entity is the

Regional Public Transportation Authority (RPTA).

Fifteen years after its creation the authority

remains hobbled by funding constraints. These

leave RPTA ill-equipped to adequately address the

region's transportation needs, let alone manage

growth as similar authorities in other cities do.

POLARIZED CIVIC AGENDAS

The region's civic culture also remains fractious.

Discord did not end with the bitter fight

against freeways in the 1970s. In recent years, the

lack of a regional consensus on a number of

growth-related issues has generated new polariza-tion

and litigation. Action on air quality issues

in the 1990s, for example, came only under the

pressure of lawsuits brought by the Arizona

Center for Law in the Public Interest.

Dissatisfaction with legislative responses to

growth pressures has resulted in the placement of

a Sierra Club-sponsored initiative requiring cities

to create urban growth boundaries on the

November 2000 state ballot. Meanwhile, a court

challenge embroiled a rival legislative proposition

to dedicate a portion of the state's land near cities

TREND: The region's governance is one of strong cities,

weak regional entities, polarized civic agendas and spotty state leadership.

This measure is strongly opposed

by various environmental groups, including

The Nature Conservancy and Tucson's Sonoran

Institute. This coalition wants the state to set aside

far more trust land, and it plans to bring its own

citizens' initiative to the ballot in 2002. In short,

metropolitan Phoenix' political culture has hardly

been conducive to the broad-based consensus

building likely to drive effective responses to the

regional impacts of rapid growth.

SPOTTY STATE LEADERSHIP

The state of Arizona has provided inconsistent

leadership in the metropolitan area. The

Groundwater Management Act and the Urban

Lands Act of the early 1980s underscore the

potential for creative regional problem solving by

the governor and the Legislature. However for

most of the 1990s, the state was essentially a non-player

on growth issues. Recently, responses have

emerged under the threat of citizens' action, but

these have been of mixed quality. State require-ments

for cleaner gasoline and Maricopa

County's vehicle emissions inspection program

have been clear wins for the region. Likewise, the

state moved in 1998 to require comprehensive

land-use and zoning ordinances of local govern-ments.

However, this reform has been compromised

by the lack of a state agency to monitor compliance.

More significant may be the Arizona Preserve

Initiative (API), passed by the Arizona Legislature

in the spring of 1996. API is designed to encourage

the preservation of select parcels of state trust

land in and around urban areas like Phoenix as

open space. Under the original legislation, only

trust land within three miles of municipalities

larger than 10,000 persons could be reclassified

for conservation sales or leases, and no public

funding was available to support the program.

However, amendments were enacted to the API in

1997, 1998 and 1999 that expanded the applicable

area in Maricopa County an additional ten miles

beyond the 1996 boundaries and added land

adjacent to the San Tan Mountains to the eligible

areas. Equally important, Proposition 303, passed

by the voters in November 1998 as part of

Governor Jane Dee Hull's Growing Smarter pro-gram,

required that $20 million be appropriated

annually for eleven years, beginning July 1, 2000,

primarily for the purchase or lease of state lands

classified for conservation, or for the purchase of

development rights on the land. This money sig-nificantly

forwards the open space cause. It allows

cities, counties and certain nonprofit organizations

like land trusts to apply to Arizona State Parks for

matching grants to acquire or lease trust land.

All these initiatives are important, but they

cannot be said to constitute a strong or compre-hensive

approach to the issues raised by fast

growth across the region. In the state land conser-vation

program, only a small portion of the

region's sensitive lands are eligible for protection.

Little grant money is available through a compli-cated

process of fees, hearings and studies. It

remains to be seen whether the region's fringe cities

will comply with statewide planning requirements

and what the state will do if they do not.

Metropolitan Phoenix' decentralized governance

may not be up to the challenge of

addressing the region's lengthening list of

growth complications. In particular, the lack of

any robust coordinating authority at the regional

level in metropolitan Phoenix leaves it without

much ability to craft and enact responses to issues

that cut across boundaries, whether it be traffic,

open space or urban form. Little interaction now

occurs between the public and private sectors

on growth issues. The state of Arizona has taken

few steps to promote regional thinking or local

collaboration on agendas such as light rail. And

the continued refusal of voters to entrust either

MAG or Maricopa County with any kind of binding

managerial power, especially, suggests that the

region urgently needs to seek out alternative

mechanisms for achieving collaborative planning

and cooperative action. However, the moment is

far from bleak. Many regions across the U. S. are

now experimenting with new forms of regional

cooperation; these efforts provide plenty of

intriguing ideas for the Phoenix region to consider.

One way or another, though, an individualistic

metropolis needs to find ways to act as a region

on numerous issues facing its cities.

38 HITS AND MISSES: Fast Growth in Metropolitan Phoenix

Map 19: Metropolitan Phoenix: Jurisdictional Boundaries, 1997

39 MORRISON INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

Taken together, this report draws a number of conclusions from the multiple

research projects on the Phoenix region.

Part I suggested metropolitan Phoenix' extraordinary growth is

defying a number of conventional expectations, even as it shows signs of

succumbing to familiar pitfalls. Contrary to expectation, the urban area

is gaining in density and the central city is remaining robust, despite a

proliferation of residential development at the region's fringe. Also, the

metropolitan area does not yet display the kind of gross imbalance of invest-ment

and fiscal capacity between its core city and its largest suburbs that

plague many urban areas. At the same time, cause for worry centers on the

region's social and racial divide, and the serious environmental impacts of

converting the desert to subdivisions. These problems are interconnected.

Poor schools and concentrations of low-income and minority residents

in the center of the region tend to push families and businesses out and

drive fringe development. Fringe development makes open space less acces-sible,

leads to long commutes, and worsens air pollution.

This section, in looking behind these trends, identified several factors

of timing, local conditions and regional policy that have conditioned

metropolitan Phoenix' growth. Timing dictated much about how Phoenix

grew. In a word, the region grew as a horizontal collection of auto-oriented

central city-suburbs because that is how most new American metropolitan

areas developed during the post-World War II suburban era.

Similarly, the region's setting and climate - its specific circumstances -

attracted and accommodated vast inflows of new residents. Once air

conditioning became widespread, few natural barriers impeded the metropolis'

geometric expansion across the Salt River Valley. Significant state, federal

and tribal land holdings have blocked expansion in just a few places though

these tracts could soon become major delimiters of the urban form as the

urbanized area begins to abut them.

Finally, particular policy choices have influenced how the region

developed. Widespread annexation has limited the imbalances among the

region's major cities by giving them shares of new development to comple-ment

their older areas. The Salt River Project and the Central Arizona

Project, combined with restrictions on the use of groundwater, have

facilitated growth while discouraging leapfrog development. And in like

fashion, the region's late start on freeway building has promoted more

compact development than might have occurred. Conversely, the intense

localism of the region's political culture has delayed mass transit and

precluded regionalized efforts to manage growth and protect open space.

Current freeway building and the imminent disposal of much state-owned

land also appear poised to change the region's future growth and

development patterns.

The bottom line: Metropolitan Phoenix has grown in ways unlike, and

like, other regions of its type.

Considered together, these crosscurrents challenge Phoenix to think

carefully now for two reasons.

First, the strong role timing has played in metropolitan Phoenix' rise

raises the possibility that the region's relative health thus far owes mainly to

its extreme youth. To be sure, a number of particular local twists of topog-raphy,

land ownership, water policy and massive annexation have made the

Phoenix region different than many. Yet, for all that, metropolitan Phoenix'

resemblance to cities that have grown since 1970 suggest it may not be so

much different as younger than other more troubled cities. And that raises a

vexing question: Is it just a matter of time before metropolitan Phoenix

grows into a highly decentralized set of suburbs encircling a poverty-impacted,

physically decaying downtown?

Otherwise, the region faces the future at a moment when many

"givens" about what matters in region building have been changed by

the age of knowledge. The new economy is altering much about the way

companies, people, cities and governments operate. Most crucially, this new

order, so important to metropolitan Phoenix' future, values quality of life

more than the old economy Ð because it depends on people more than the

old one. People Ð particularly skilled workers and entrepreneurs Ð gravitate

to places that combine compelling career opportunities and a desirable

lifestyle. Regions, therefore, must now compete on quality just as companies

do. This ups the ante as the region weighs its present condition and

considers its future.

Metropolitan Phoenix' economic competitiveness now depends on

successfully managing its past and current growth trends so as to avoid

becoming a region of haves and have nots and to prevail as a lifestyle Mecca

for the knowledge workers of the new economy. And yet, the problems on

display in Atlanta, Washington, D. C. and Denver may be inseparable from

the maturity toward which Phoenix is moving.

If that is so, the region should think hard about how to avoid the pitfalls

of maturity while seeking its benefits. More than likely, such planning Ð

as the next section of this report suggests Ð will require important and

potentially controversial policy choices.

40 HITS AND MISSES: Fast Growth in Metropolitan Phoenix

First, the Phoenix region needs to understand the full range of

issues that shape its growth and development patterns. The region's

emerging divisions, transportation challenges, loss of desert lands, and the

many other growth issues that threaten metropolitan Phoenix' quality of

life are inextricably linked. The challenges cut across jurisdictional bound-aries.

Yet the practice of this state has been to approach the region's growth

This Arizona-style disconnect is best illustrated by the current collection

of high-level state planning and policy commissions that are now, or recently

have been, deliberating in isolation on five critical aspects of growth:

growth management itself, the new economy, water, transportation and air

quality. There is little evidence thus far that these dialogues will be con-nected

into a comprehensive, coordinated response to the overarching issue

of growth management.

By contrast, the smartest regions today have embraced the "four E's" of

a strong economy, healthy environment, social equity and civic engagement

as an integrative framework for analyzing problems and building regional

advantages. These metropolitan areas recognize that the times and the

terms by which regions compete in the world are changing and their

responses relate to the powerful forces of migration, competition,

globalization and technology.

They notice that "clusters" of businesses and the talented people they

depend on are increasingly attracted to vital, livable places. They see that

"livability" has become a rallying cry for companies and their workers who

want clean environments, open space and an end to excessive sprawl. And

they recognize that everything is connected.

Metropolitan Phoenix' leaders can continue to disregard the relationships

among the region's education, social, economic and environmental

challenges and hope for the best. But they would do better if together they

"connected the dots" among the issues and created new partnerships capable

of responding to growth's problems and paradoxes.

Second, the Phoenix region must overcome a number of near

"Catch-22s" that are rooted in its history. As the region continues to grow,

a number of trends - both positive and negative - have the potential to

confront the region with a series of dilemmas. For example:

° Looming transportation and land use conundrums. In contrast to

other regions, highway building in metropolitan Phoenix has