ࡱ> 7 bjbjUU  7|7|lFFFFFFFZ###8$L^$ZO$$(%%%%%%DOFOFOFOFOFOFO$P RjOF%%%%%jO)FF%%O)))%"F%F%DO)%DO))p.(HFF(O%$ \Y[Z #@%NM(OO0ONS)"S(O)ZZFFFFCriminal Procedure/Spritzer/Fall 99 Overview of Criminal Justice Process -a series of procedures through which the substantive criminal law is enforced -SCs interpretation of 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th amendments has given us parameters and some degree of uniformity but hallmark of American criminal justice process is diversity Elements of Diversity fifty-two lawmaking JDs (50 states, D.C., fed system) local law (elaborates fed constitutional regulations) diversity in local law (adoption of Federal Rules and model codes) diversity in applicable law w/i a single JD (procedural subsets for different offenses or different categories of officials) diversity in administration (discretion) range of discretion (broadest where the decision is not to exercise governmental power adversely to the individual, more restrictive where the official exercises governmental power and the choice is between alternative procedures) factors influencing exercise of discretion (administrative environment shaped by agency bureaucracy and local community) fragmentation of enforcement agencies (separation of police and prosecutorial agencies and separation w/i these agencies) organizational variations (administrative ethos) variations in administrative interactions (interdependence) community variations The Steps in the Process (some continuing and overlapping) crime reported (known offense) prearrest investigation on-scene arrests reactive investigations proactive investigations (deception) prosecutorial investigations (subpoena authority) arrest (warrant or warrantless) booking post-arrest investigation (lineup) decision to charge pre-filing police screening pre-filing prosecutor screening post-filing prosecutor screening complaint (charging doc, later replaced by #12 in felony cases) magistrate review/Gerstein review initial appearance (ID def, advise rights, set bail) preliminary hearing (if PC, bindover to trial court) grand jury review (usually optional) information/indictment (replaces complaint as charging doc) arraignment (plea) pretrial motions trial post-trial motions sentencing (fine, release, incarceration) appeals postconviction remedies Nature and Scope of 14th Amendment Due Process; Retroactivity; Federal Supervisory Power; State Rights Protections The Ordered Liberty Fundamental Fairness, Total Incorporation and Selective Incorporation Theories History -There was a concern that the original Constitution contained insufficient protection for individuals against overreaching by the feds. Assurance was given that the 1st Congress would address the concern and the Bill of Rights resulted. Many states put similar protections in their own constitutions. In Barron v. Baltimore the Ct ruled that the Bill of Rights did not apply as against state action. The post Civil Warm amendments (14th Amendment) created limitations on the states and thereby created a plausible basis for federal JD in state legislation cases. But Slaughter-House Cases took a very restrictive view of the 14th Amendment. Ct said it was intended to safeguard against slavery and that neither PI, DP, or EP Clauses provide any general protection against arbitrary or burdensome state legislation. Bill of Rights NOT privileges and immunities. Modern Doctrine -Selective Incorporation has arisen from DP Clause, not the still impotent PI Clause. Ct looks at provisions that are central to ordered liberty (Palko) or deemed fundamental (Duncan). -Two guarantees found to be nonfundamental are grand jury indictment (5th Amendment) and bail/fines (8th Amendment). -Harlan opposes Malloy-Duncan approach that applied provisions to same extent. Argues it disregards relevant differences between state and federal criminal law and its enforcement. -Baldwin, Williams, Apodaca, Johnson jury cases allow for elbow room in procedure to help address Harlans governmental diversity BUT they dilute federal provisions in doing so argues Harlan. The Problem of Bodily Extractions: Another Look at the Due Process and Selective Incorporation Approaches Rochin (stomach pumping): Def argues 4th and 5th Amendment violation which dissenter Black would have given him on selective incorporation grounds. Frankfurter holds that police violated 14th amendment due process, a historic and generative principle that respects certain decencies of civilized conduct. Announces shocks the conscience test. Black criticizes this approach as too ambiguous. Breithaupt (needle case): no coercion, violence or brutality to meet Rochin test; so slight an intrusion as to be permissible Mapp/Malloy: hold 4th and 5th Amendments as applicable to the states (selective incorporation one at a time) Schmerber (needle case): reaffirms Breithaupt; Ct finds probable cause for search and holds that blood is not testimonial or communicative so as to invoke right against self-incrimination. County of Sacramento: substantive due process claim raised in civil context (constitutional tort); Ct again applies Rochin test The Federal Courts Supervisory Power Over the Adminstration of Federal Criminal Justice McNabb: While the power of the court to undo convictions in state courts is limited to the enforcement of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice secured by 14th amendment due process, the standards of federal criminal justice are not satisfied merely by observance of those minimal historic safeguards. Ct formulates rules of evidence. (criticism that federal courts lack authority to exclude evidence or dismiss a prosecution unless govts conduct violated the Constitution) Payner briefcase caper: Ct limits its supervisory authority, holds that the supervisory power does not authorize a federal court to exclude evidence that does not violate the defs 4th Amendment. Dissent argues for more active judicial role to protect the integrity of the court. The Right to Counsel, Transcripts and Other Aids; Poverty, Equality and the Adversary System The Right to Appointed Counsel in Criminal Proceedings Betts: Ct held that DP Clause of 14th A does not incorporate the specific guarantees found in the 6th A and that a state only violates DP by failing to provide counsel if a conviction lacks fundamental fairness. Gideon: reverses Betts, 6th A is fundamental and essential to a fair trial and therefore obligatory to the states under the 14th A DP Clause. Argersinger: Ct held that no person may be imprisoned for any offense (including lesser offenses) unless he was represented by counsel. Extends right to counsel to some minor offenses. Scott v. Illinois: interprets Argersinger and distinguishes actual imprisonment from threatened imprisonment The Griffen-Douglas Equality Principle Griffin: There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the money he has. All indigent defendants are entitled to a copy of the trial transcript. Douglas: An indigent is entitled to appointed counsel to prepare an appellate brief where the appeal pursued is granted as a matter of right to all defendants. Ross: There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel for discretionary appellate proceedings. Ake: An indigent is entitled to a psychiatrist or other expert assistance when sanity is a trial issue or when state presents psychiatric evidence of defs future dangerousness. Meaningful access to justice rule. Arrest, Search and Seizure The Exclusionary Rule Wolf: incorporates 4th A but not exclusionary rule (distinguishes Weeks) Mapp: exclusionary rule applies to the states (overrules Wolf) Leon: establishes good faith exception (b/c exclusionary rule is a judiciously created remedial device, not an independent constitutional procedural right) Kaplan limitations...note 8, p. 143 Burdeau: evidence obtained by private individuals illegally can be used in criminal proceedings unless they were acting as agents of govt Evans: evidence obtained illegally by nonpolice govt employee can be used in criminal proceedings (again, deterrence rationale not served by exclusion) Other remedies: constitutional tort, federal tort claims act Probable Cause Aguilar: constitutional requirement of PC can be satisfied w/hearsay but warrant application must state why informer is reliable and the underlying circumstances from which the informer drew his conclusions Draper: detail plus police corroboration supports inference that informants info is reliable Spinelli: affirms Aguilar Gates: A magistrate must evaluate the totality of the circumstances presented to him, including, but not limited to, the reliability of an informant and the basis of his knowledge, in determining whether the PC exists to issue a search warrant (Ct seems to be encouraging the use of search warrants by lowering the standards required to find probable cause.). Aguilar/Spinelli test had evolved to the point where the Ct felt that effective police functions were being undercut by overly expansive interpretations of 4th Amendment rights. Probable cause also reqd for warrantless arrests and searches. Def can challenge facially valid affidavit if he can make a substantial preliminary showing that it includes a knowing, intentional, or reckless false statement. Search Warrants (Rule 41) issuance of the warrant a. neutral and detached magistrate requirement (doesnt have to be an attorney though) (policy to avoid rubber stamping and magistrate shopping) b. particularity of place to be searched cts take common sense approach particularity of description of search items to avoid general searches execution of the warrant time of execution w/i 10 days provided PC still exists, generally only during day gaining entry knock and announce rule not inflexible, in order to justify a no-knock entry police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing under the particular circumstances would be dangerous or futile or would inhibit effective investigation (destruction of evidence) detention and search of persons on premises no PC to search bar patron (Ybarra), detaining a person during search is permissible seizure (Summers) intensity and duration of search cant search desk drawers when looking for stolen TV seizure of items not named in warrant plain view doctrine (inadvertent discovery requirement abandoned) the preference for warrants (many exceptions and modifications) Warrantless Arrests and Searches of the Person Watson: a law officer may arrest a suspect w/o a warrant for a felony committed in his presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence if he has reasonable grounds for making the arrest (preference for arrest warrants when they can be reasonably obtained before the arrest, but no requirement of such) Garner: use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable. Gerstein: 4th Amendment requires judicial determination of PC shortly after arrest (no need for it to be an adversary process) (48 hours reasonable per McLaughlin) Payton: absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless entry to make an arrest is unconstitutional (unless hot pursuit per Warden) Robinson: a full search of a person incident to a lawful arrest is a reasonable search under the 4th Amendment and need not be limited to a frisk for weapons in cases involving crimes, such as traffic violations, where there would be no further evidence of such crimes Whren: temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police constitutes a seizure of persons w/i the meaning of the 4th Amendment and therefore is subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be unreasonable under the circumstances; the decision to stop a vehicle is reasonable where police have PC to believe that a traffic violation has occurred and evidence discovered during such a stop is admissible Lafayette: upholding inventory of the items found on the arrestees person as a part of the booking process, on the ground that it is a reasonable means of safeguarding the accuseds property and ensuring that contraband is not introduced into the jail Edwards: once def is lawfully arrested and is in custody, the effects in his possession at the place of detention that were subject to search at the time and place of his arrest may lawfully be searched and seized w/o a warrant even though a substantial period of time has elapsed btwn the arrest and subsequent administrative processing on the one hand and the taking of the property for use as evidence on the other Knowles: officer cant conduct warrantless search incident to citation (even if officer issued citation in lieu of lawful arrest) Cupp: under Chimel rationale, Ct allows search of person voluntarily appearing at station for questioning Warrantless Searches of Premises, Vehicles, and Containers Chimel: under the 4th and 14th Amendments, a warrantless search conducted incident to a lawful arrest may only extend to a search of the arrestees person and to the area within his immediate control (i.e., the area w/i which he might obtain a weapon or destructible evidence) Gioacalone: search allowed and evidence obtained admissible when def goes into another room following arrest (street clothes case) Buie: police should be permitted to conduct a protective sweep whenever they make an in-home arrest for a violent crime, but only a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be found Block: in view of undetermined number of participants and fact upstairs light was on, officers had reasonable cause to believe other participants might be present If an officer is lawfully present w/i premises to make an arrest, he may observe certain items not w/i the immediate control of the arrestee which will nonetheless be subject to warrantless seizure under the so-called plain view doctrine. Carroll: Ct recognizes that privacy interest in an automobile is constitutionally protected; however, the ready mobility of the automobile justifies a lesser degree of protection of those interests. (While auto searches dont require warrants, PC still necessary.) Carney: the automobile exception to the warrant requirement applies to motor homes (and per Chambers it doesnt matter if exigency rationale behind warrantless search of automobiles no longer exists b/c police have seized vehicle) Houghton: police officers w/PC to search a car may inspect passengers belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search Acevedo: the warrantless search of an automobile under the Carroll doctrine can include a search of a container or package found inside the car when such a search is supported by PC (affirms Ross, overrules Chadwick) Belton: when police have made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, they may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of the automobile (bright line rule like Chimel) Bertine: a police inventory inspection may involve the opening of closed containers (routine inventory searches) (but see Opperman holding that warrantless inventory searches of automobiles must be restricted to safeguarding those articles which are w/i plain view of the officers vision) Stop and Frisk Terry: regardless of the existence of PC, where a police officer reasonably concludes in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons w/whom he is dealing may be armed and dangerous, he may stop such persons; and, if after identifying himself and making reasonable inquiries, his fears are not dispelled, he may conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons for weapons (less stringent rule that arrest and search) (but see Michigan dissent arguing that govt must have an important purpose beyond the normal goals of criminal investigation to qualify under Terry balancing test) Bostick: seizure does not occur simply b/c a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions. So long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his business, the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is reqd. (no 4th Amendment scrutiny unless consensual nature lost) Hodari: no physical restraint and no constructive arrest (i.e. police tell suspect to stop and he flees) does not constitute a seizure for 4th Amendment purposes Sibron: (clarifies Terry) an officer must be able to point to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous; the inference that persons who talk to narcotics addicts are engaged in the criminal traffic in narcotics is simply not the sort of reasonable inference reqd to support an intrusion by the police upon an individuals personal security White: an anonymous caller could provide the reasonable suspicion necessary for a Terry stop; apply Gates totality of the circumstances test Van Leeuwen: (seizure of papers or effects) upheld detention of mail parcels w/o a warrant, while an investigation was made b/c investigation was conducted promptly Place: govt interest in seizing luggage briefly to pursue further investigation is substantial and b/c seizures of property can vary in intrusiveness, some brief detentions of personal effects may be so minimally intrusive of 4th Amendment interests that strong countervailing governmental interests will justify a seizure based on specific articulable facts that the property contains contraband or evidence of a crime (brevity an important factor) Adams: (protective search) in the case of a self-protective frisk for weapons, officer must be able to point to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous (informants tip enough even if it is not reliable enough to create PC for a search) Lower courts have really stretched frisk rule, allowing for automatic frisk in many cases. Dunaway: transporting def to police station for questioning w/o informing him he is free to go is indistinguishable from traditional arrest and therefore requires PC; detention for custodial interrogation triggers 4th Amendment Administrative Inspections and Regulatory Searches: More on Balancing the Need Against the Invasion of Privacy two departures from the traditional PC requirement: Terry: to require individualized suspicion (reasonable suspicion) less compelling than is the need for the usual arrest or search (in contrast to regular Ybarra/Hicks rule) Bertine: to require that the seizure or search be conducted pursuant to some neutral criteria which guard against arbitrary selection of those subjected to such procedures (like impoundment-inventory process approved in Bertine) 2. Safety inspections: if an occupant wont consent to fire/health/housing code inspections, the inspection authorities must be a warrant but that PC is met for issuance (Camara warrant) 3. Border searches: Ramsey upheld a customs inspection of mail entering the U.S. (did not extend to reading of correspondence) 4. Vehicle checkpoints: PC is reqd to stop and search a vehicle for illegal aliens but only Terry-type reasonable suspicion is reqd for the stopping of motorists and inquiring briefly as to their residential status; Michigan upheld sobriety checkpoint program 5. Search of students: using Camara balancing test, Ct held that school officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their authority in T.L.O. 6. Supervision of parolees and probationers: no PC reqd for probation searches (Griffin) Drug testing: suspicionless testing of employees who apply for promotions to positions directly involving the interdiction of illegal drugs, or to positions which require the incumbent to carry a firearm is reasonable (Von Raab); upheld blood and urine testing of railroad employees following major train accidents (Skinner); upheld school districts policy of random drug testing of athletes (Acton) Consent Searches 1. A search based on valid consent may be conducted w/o a warrant and w/o probable cause. Valid consent must be unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion, and is not lightly to be inferred (i.e. more than acquiescence) Schneckloth: whether a consent to a search was, in fact, voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from all of the circumstances, and while the persons knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent Rodriguez: where a third party agrees to allow officers to search certain premises over which they reasonably believe that the former has common authority, their subsequent warrantless search of the premises is reasonable under the 4th Amendment Duran: defendants wife gave valid consent to search of his building, b/c she had continual access (not a per se spousal rule) Chapman: a landlord may not consent to a search of his tenants premises (as compared to areas of common usage), and this is so even though the landlord may have some right of entry for purposes of inspecting or cleaning the premises Practice Problems Analysis (see 409 F.Supp. 535) Regulatory? No, this is traditional law enforcement. Stop? Yes. Reasonable suspicion? Yes, but Hughes case weakest. Consent? Yes, except Hughes. Arrest justifying search? No, Hughes evidence suppressed. Electronic Surveillance; Protected Areas and Interests; Use of Secret Agents Historical Background Olmstead held that wiretapping did not amount to search and seizure for reasons that have since been rejected. Lee made exclusionary rule applicable to states (like Mapp). Silverman led the way to Katz, which switched from a physical trespass rule to a expectation of privacy rule regarding electronic eavesdropping. B. Protected Areas 1. Katz: expectation of privacy rule (4th Amendment protects people, not places. Prof. notes that place is not irrelevant b/c people are only protected in certain places.) Are bugs the same as searching a person/place? No notice, no particularity, implicates others. Greenwood: most inquisitive members of general public rule; trash is fair game Oliver: open fields rule, only premises and curtilage protected Riley: open fields includes greenhouse observed by lawful elevation helicopter Privacy expectation: Businesses covered, private areas in public places covered, detention facilities not covered, vehicle exteriors not covered (Cardwell) Place: a canine sniff is permissible b/c it is not as intrusive as a typical search Karo: installation of a beeper OK, monitoring triggers 4th Amendment though Dow: photographic magnification not a search, enhanced senses argument Cusumano: thermal imaging not a search except in 10th Cir. C. Berger and Katz; The Wisdom and Constitutionality of Title III of the Crime Control Act The Implications of Berger and Katz -Berger invalidated a New York wiretapping statute as too broad, left dissenting justices and law enforcement wondering if any statute could pass constitutional muster. Katz indicated surveillance OK if Osborn narrow and precise procedures were used. Congress responded w/Title III. Title III: An Overview (See Supp.p.87) -designed to regulate all nonconsensual electronic surveillance (no parties have consented), except national security eavesdropping -concerned only w/orders of interception, the aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral communication -criminal and civil penalties, and exclusion of evidence -highly specific procedures, much safeguarding Silent Video Surveillance: Cts have adopted Title III safeguards by analogy; requires more than ordinary PC, heightened particularity requirements, prohibition against bad faith viewing, alternate methods have been exhausted Some Applications of Title III Scott: objective assessment of officers underlying intent regarding minimization requirement Dalia: Title III implicitly authorizes covert entry The Use of Secret Agents to Obtain Incriminating Statements Lopez: recording of a unsolicited bribe offer made to a government agent held permissible; assumption of risk Lewis: where petitioner invited the undercover agent to his home with the purpose of selling drugs, there is no privacy breach Hoffa: use of a government informer does not vitiate defendants consent to entry; assumption of risk argument above three cases were decided together before Katz and before Title III White: the 4th Amendment does not protect a person from having his conversations w/an associate recorded by that associate or transmitted to a recording or listening device located elsewhere Police Encouragement and the Defense of Entrapment The Tests for Entrapment subjective test: (Russell) entrapment as a defense requires a showing the defendant was not predisposed to committing the offense objective test: (Barraza) entrapment test is whether the police conduct was likely to induce a normally law abiding person to commit the offense (many courts have allowed application of the entrapment defense as a punitive measure against the govt for overreaching) More on the Due Process Defense to Government Overinvolvement in a Criminal Enterprise Hampton: the defense of entrapment can never be based upon governmental misconduct in a case where the predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime is established; however, due process principles may be invoked when law enforcement conduct is outrageous (heavy burden) Continuing Controversy Over the Entrapment Defense Jacobson: where government actions create a persons disposition to commit a crime, and then the government suggests the crime which that person commits, it is entrapment (Ct uses subjective test, but Cts main concern is that govt went too far. This case shows how subjective and objective tests are blurred in application. Cts must look to the conduct of both defendant and the police in these analyses.) Hollingsworth: test is whether the apprehension is of an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely would have never run afoul of the law; in trying to induce crime, govt may not confront a person w/circumstances that are different from the ordinary circumstances of private inducement Police Interrogation and Confessions Some Different Perspectives Inbau: Interrogation is necessary b/c physical clues are often absent. Use of threats or force which might induce an innocent person to confess are inappropriate. However, psychological tactics such as trickery and deceit are helpful and necessary to secure incriminating info from the guilty. Often only solution is an admission. Admissions will ordinarily only occur under conditions of privacy, and for a period of several hours (no right to counsel for arrestees prior to start of judicial process). The interrogator must of necessity employ less refined methods than are considered appropriate for the transaction of ordinary, everyday affairs by and btwn law-abiding citizens. Finally, the prompt arraignment rule makes interrogation and thus admissions and thus the beyond a reasonable doubt burden impossible. The way to guard against police abuses is to carefully select and train officers. Kamisar: There is huge disparity between courtroom and police station. Society doesnt know or care about police techniques. A suspect must have a lawyer present immediately. Historical Background The Interests Protected by the Due Process Voluntariness Test for Admitting Confessions; trustworthiness test - doubtful reliability b/c of police methods used police standards test - DP Clauses assurance of appropriate procedure before liberty is curtailed involuntary in fact (i.e. obtained from drugged person) The Shortcomings of the Voluntariness Test totality of the circumstances approach was slippery, unpredictable, problems of proof (swearing contest) seemed inevitable that Ct would seek some automatic device by which the potential evils of incommunicado interrogation could be controlled (Miranda) The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Supervisory Authority Over Federal Criminal Justice vs. 14th Amendment Due Process in exercising its supervisory authority Ct formulated rule of evidence such that a confession that arises during prolonged and illegal detainment is excluded few states adopted the rule on their own initiative though it was believed the Ct might apply it via 14th Amendment due process; instead the Ct closed in on the state confession problem by making increasing resort to the right to counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination The Right to Counsel and the Analogy to the Accusatorial, Adversary Trial Crooker: barring a confession obtained after an arrestees request for his lawyer was denied would have a devastating effect on criminal law enforcement Spano: once a person has been formally charged his constitutional right to counsel begins and therefore a confession obtained during post-indictment question in the absence of counsel is excluded Massiah and Escobedo: The Court Closes in on the Confession Problem Massiah: damaging admissions obtained through deception (utilizing a CI) are inadmissible if the defendant has already been indicted and it doesnt matter that he is not in custody or undergoing police interrogation; no extrajudicial police-orchestrated proceedings designed to obtain incriminating statements are allowed once person is awaiting trial Escobedo: condemns police practice of denying requested attorney but gives conditional holding that where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult w/his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied the Assistance of Counsel in violation of the 6th Amendment as made obligatory upon the States by the 14th Amendment and no statement may be used at trial (Ct not quite ready to hold that the right to counsel begins at the time of arrest). C The Miranda Revolution Miranda: when a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, prior to questioning the person must be told he has a right to remain silent, that any statement made could be used against him, he has a right to have an attorney present, and an attorney will be appointed if he cannot afford one (but a statement made in violation of Miranda may be used to impeach an accuseds testimony if he takes the stand and the statement is otherwise voluntary/trustworthy. nor does it apply to general on-the scene questioning or spontaneous admissions volunteered before the police begin interrogating.) Problems: waiver of rights is not inferred from silence, but type of expression reqd is still open to question. Ct has not answered whether a Miranda violation results in an automatic reversal. Also, are fruits derived from statements obtained in violation of Miranda available? Title II, 3501: purports to repeal Miranda and the McNabb-Mallory rule in federal prosecutions; seeks to substitute for Miranda a test of voluntariness based upon the totality of the circumstances Tucker: Miranda warnings themselves are not rights protected by the Constitution, but only prophylactic standards designed to safeguard or to provide practical reinforcement for the privilege against self-incrimination Quarles: public safety exception (the gun is over there) (see below) Elstad: the fact that the police has earlier obtained a statement from def in violation of his Miranda rights when they questioned him in his home did not bar the admissibility of subsequent confession at the station house when, this time, the police complied with Miranda Leong: 4th Circuit voiced strong disagreement w/the Justice Departments view that Miranda remains binding on lower federal courts notwithstanding 3501 unless it is modified by the SC. Dickerson: 4th Circuit held that the pre-Miranda due process-voluntariness test set forth in 3501, rather than the Miranda case, governs the admissibility of confessions in the federal courts (relied on Burger and Rehnquist Courts continued reference to Miranda as prophylactic) Prof: Are Mirandas procedures constitutionally reqd or prophylactic? If Dickerson is overruled and Miranda is recharacterized as reqd, then a Miranda violation makes statement presumptively coerced, triggering the 5th Amendments built in exclusion rule. Cassell says it seems that SCs admission of unMirandized statements in Quarles, Harris, and Hass proves beyond argument that Dickerson is right, that is, Miranda warnings are not constitutionally reqd. But, Prof says, what will govts position be? Miranda or 3501? Custody vs. Focus: decision unclear as to whether warnings are reqd for arrest only or also for an Escobedo-type focused investigation. Beckwith rejects focus test, says an interview w/govt does not present elements which the Miranda Ct found so inherently coercive so as to require its holding. In Stansbury, Ct held that an officers subjective and undisclosed view concerning whether the person being interrogated is a suspect is irrelevant to the assessment whether the person is in custody. Custody or Custodial Interrogation: Absent special circumstances (arresting a suspect at gunpoint or forcibly subduing him), police questioning on the street in a public place or in a persons home/office is not custodial. A suspect who voluntarily comes,with or w/o a police escort, to station for an interview and is told he is not under arrest is not in custody. Roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a roadside traffic stop does not amount to custodial interrogation. Innis: any words or actions on the part of the police that they should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect constitute interrogation under Miranda and bring the Miranda safeguards into play Perkins: Miranda warnings are not reqd when suspect is unaware that he is speaking to a law enforcement officer and gives a voluntary statement (jail plant situation - the essential ingredients of a police dominated atmosphere and compulsion are not present when an incarcerated person speaks freely to someone that he believes to be a fellow inmate) Quarles: evidence gained in violation of the requirement that suspects be warned of their 5th and 6th Amendment rights prior to a custodial interrogation need not be suppressed when the police, acting for the public safety, fail to give such a warning Fare: juveniles request for probation officer during police interrogation did not constitute a request for counsel Mosley: (second level Miranda safeguards) the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends on whether his right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored Edwards: once a suspect has invoked his right to counsel he may not be subjected to further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him unless he himself initiates further communication w/the police Minnick: when an accused requests counsel, interrogation must cease, and officials may not reinstate interrogation w/o counsel present, whether or not the accused has consulted w/him Davis: not all references to counsel should be treated as a valid invocation of the right; if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, precedent does not require cessation of the questioning Moran: a voluntary confession obtained by police, who fail to inform a defendant that an attorney attempted to contact him, is not an invalid intrusion upon the defendants Miranda rights; also, 6th Amendment not applicable b/c adversarial proceedings have not begun (indictment, etc.) Prof: the difficulties of the totality of the circumstances test are still with us b/c analysis of officers techniques/tactics is still reqd The Due Process Voluntariness Test Revisited Miller: police may not employ trickery/deception to get a suspect to waive his rights but once suspect has voluntarily done so, trickery and deception do not make a confession coerced Fulminante: court doesnt condemn the use of a plant in a jail (see Perkins). However, when an invitation to talk is coupled with threats of physical violence, there is coercion. Massiah Revisited; Massiah and Miranda Compared and Contrasted Massiah was eclipsed by Escobedo which was eclipsed by Miranda Brewer (Christian burial speech case): the police cannot interrogate a defendant represented by known counsel after a refusal to speak w/o the presence of his attorney (follows Innis perceptions of suspect rationale) (Stewart likes 6th A Massiah approach instead of reversing on 5th A Miranda voluntariness grounds) Kuhlmann: police may use statements made by a suspect which are voluntarily given w/o questioning (this is a deception case like Perkins, except were at the indictment stage so Massiah and Edwards preclude interrogation w/o an atty, but can they send in someone undercover? was it more than passive listening? active eliciting? Ct says passive listening OK) Andreson: seizure of defs business records and their admission against him at trial do not violate the 5th A protection against self-incrimination (convergence of 4th and 5th A); theres no privilege w/respect to content of papers b/c statements were voluntarily committed to paper, but there is compulsion if youre issued a subpoena (then you can claim privilege); here, they got a warrant and followed 4th A procedures Lineups, Showups and Other Pre-Trial Identification Procedures Wade and Gilbert: Constitutional Concern About the Dangers Involved in Eyewitness Identifications Wade: once the accused is formally charged, he is entitled to have counsel present at a lineup where witnesses seek to identify the perpetrator of a crime (fair trial rationale: defs right of confrontation); Ct vacates conviction and remands for determination whether in-court identification had an independent source, an impossible inquiry per prof and dissent who argues that an in-court identification is the tainted fruit of an improperly conducted lineup lineup or taking of exemplars is not protected by the 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination judges have been cool toward defense efforts to use expert testimony regarding the frailty and fallibility of eyewitness testimony Stovall: Wade-Gilbert rule not applicable b/c it couldnt be applied retroactively, but Ct uses the DP Back-Up test, to evaluate the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the showup was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification B. The Court Retreats: Kirby and Ash Kirby: there is no right to counsel at police lineups held before the accused is arrested or charged with a crime; this case reflects a new majority and undermines Wade and Gilbert; all police need do is not formally charge a suspect after they arrest him until they have an opportunity to conduct a lineup Ash: critical stages of the prosecution at which the def has the right to counsel are only those stages involving the physical presence of the def, at a trial-like confrontation, with the govt, at which the accused requires the assistance of counsel C. Due Process and Other Limitations (recall Stovall) Manson: if an identification is independently reliable, it will not be excluded solely b/c police identification techniques were suggestive (favors ad hoc approach over per se exclusion rule); factors to consider are: the length of time in which the accused was viewed, the nature of the witness, the circumstances, the length of time btwn the incident and the identification, and the ability to give an initial description of the accused Davis: detention for identification procedures in the absence of probable cause is unreasonable seizure (but Ct hints in dicta that a brief detention in the field for the purpose of fingerprinting, where there is only reasonable suspicion not amounting to PC, might pass constitutional muster) The Scope/Administration of The Exclusionary Rules The Harmless Constitutional Error Chapman: (rejects a correct result approach) a federal constitutional error may be found to be harmless where such is shown beyond a reasonable doubt (implies that constitutional errors are, by their nature, more important than statutory or common law standards b/c constitutional errors are fundamentally more erosive of the justice system) (cts apply Fahy question: whether there is a reasonable possibility that the constitutional error might have contributed to the verdict) Harrington: the introduction of the confessions of two codefendants who did not take the stand violated the defs 6th Amendment right of confrontation but that the constitutional violation was harmless error under Chapman (backs off from Chapman admonishment against giving too much emphasis to overwhelming evidence of guilt) Milton: held harmless the admission of defs confession that was obtained in violation of the 6th Amendment b/c of other highly damaging evidence Fulimante: Chapman standard should apply should apply to the admission of an involuntary confession, but admission in this case not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (Ct divided in its analysis of the distinction btwn constitutional errors subject to Chapman and those requiring automatic reversal) (Gideon denial of counsel at trial and Tumey impartial judge are examples of errors requiring automatic reversal) Standing to Object to the Admission of Evidence Historical Background and Overview a. case and controversy doctrine requires injury in fact, no advisory opinions b. lower courts developed the doctrine that a def lacked standing to challenge evidence seized in violation of a third partys constitutional rights; analysis involved the joinder of the 4th Amendment and the self-incrimination clause of the 5th Amendment and also, no wrong to def = no remedy for def Martin: California abolishes standing requirement for deterrence reasons Alderman: SC reaffirms established standing requirement (despite 4th Amendments general prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure; atomistic vs. regulatory perspectives) Payner: (briefcase caper) rejected the federal DCs supervisory power analysis (supervisory power shouldnt make unlawful what Const. does not) Simmons: (use immunity) testimony given by a def in order to establish his standing may not thereafter be used against him at trial on the issue of guilt Salvucci: on the basis of Simmons, defs charged w/crimes of possession may only claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule if their own 4th Amendment rights have in fact been violated residential premises: under expectation-of-privacy approach, one w/a present possessory interest in the premises searched (a member of the family regularly residing in a home) may challenge that search even though not present when the search was conducted (backs off from Jones legitimately on premises test) business premises: per Mancusi, critical inquiry is whether there is a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion The Current Approach (draws ironically on Katz, which was meant to broaden protection) Rakas: (abandons idea of standing in 4th Amendment context) standing should depend on whether the police action sought to be challenged is a search (i.e., a violation of the legitimate expectations of privacy) w/respect to the person challenging the intrusion (Ct explicitly recognizes the connection btwn search and standing analysis); here def established no expectation of privacy, therefore no search Rawlings: one cannot challenge a search of an area (here another persons purse) simply b/c he claims ownership of the property seized during the search (again, expectation of privacy rationale) Carter: (reiterates Rakas) in order to claim the protection of the 4th Amendment, a def must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable (i.e., one which has a source outside of the 4th Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society) (distinguishes this from Olson overnight guests, Jones quasi-roomates cases b/c of purpose/duration of visit) The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Historical Background and Overview Silverthorne: (taint or bad fruits doctrine) govt could not use information obtained during an illegal search to subpoena the very documents illegally viewed (but independent source can create an exception) Nardone: refused to permit the prosecution to avoid an inquiry into its use of information gained by illegal wiretapping; but established the attenuation doctrine, recognizing that even where the challenged evidence does not have an independent source, it might still be admissible Wong Sun: verbal evidence excluded as the fruit of a bad search inevitable discovery or hypothetical independent source exception (see Nix below) Brown: confession excluded as the fruit of an illegal arrest, despite Miranda warnings b/c Miranda and the exclusion of a confession made w/o them, do not sufficiently deter a 4th Amendment violation (i.e., Miranda warnings dont attenuate the taint of an unconstitutional arrest) Harris: where police have PC to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not bar the use of a statement made by the suspect outside his home even though the statement is obtained after an in-house arrest in violation of Payton (4th Amendment prohibits the police from effecting a warrantless entry into a suspects home to make a routine felony arrest) Murray: evidence observed by the police during an illegal entry of premises need not be excluded if such evidence is subsequently discovered during the execution of an otherwise valid search warrant sought and issued on the basis of information wholly unconnected to the prior entry Ceccolini: the exclusionary rule should be invoked w/much greater reluctance where the claim is based on a causal relationship btwn a constitutional violation and the discovery of a live witness than when a similar claim is advanced to support suppression of an inanimate object The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine: The Sequel to Brewer Nix: evidence obtained as the result of the denial of a defs rights need not be suppressed if it is shown that the police inevitably would have discovered it legally (preponderance standard) Is a Confession Obtained in Violation of Miranda a Poisonous Tree? Elstad: a voluntary signed confession, made after being fully advised of Miranda rights, is not rendered inadmissible by a prior remark made in response to questioning w/o benefit of Miranda warnings Use of Illegally Obtained Evidence for Impeachment Purposes The Expansion of a Once-Narrow Exception Walder: evidence illegally obtained will not be admitted in the case in chief, but if def opens the door by asserting he has no drug problem/history, evidence seized in an earlier, unrelated case may be used to attack the defs credibility (but per Agnello, govt cant try to elicit the expected denial) Harris: earlier conflicting statements obtained in violation of Miranda may not be used in the case in chief but may be used to impeach a defs credibility (privilege to testify in ones defense cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury) Hass: even when a suspect invokes his right and asks for a lawyer, a statement obtained following police refusal to honor the request and continued questioning can be used to impeach James: Court refuses to extend the impeachment exception to defense witnesses other than the def 2. What Kinds of Constitutional or Other Violations Are Encompassed w/i the Impeachment Exception? Portash: testimony given by a person in response to a grant of legislative immunity may not be used to impeach him at his subsequent trial for extortion and misconduct in office Mincey: an involuntary or coerced statement even for impeachment purposes constitutes denial of DP Harvey: statements obtained in violation of 6th Amendment Jackson rule may be used to impeach a defs false or inconsistent testimony 3. Use of Defs Prior Silence for Impeachment Purposes Doyle: using a defs post-arrest silence, after receiving Miranda, to impeach is fundamentally unfair given the fact that the Miranda warnings contain the implicit assurance that silence carries no penalty (but per Weir state can use post-arrest silence if no Miranda was given) Jenkins: defs prearrest silence (hiding for 2 weeks after the killing) may be used to impeach a defs credibility Allocation of the Burdens of Proof 1. Berrios: where defs challenge the admissibility of physical evidence or make a motion to supress, they bear the ultimate burden of proving that the evidence should not be used against them (some states, like the rule in this case, require the prosecution to establish the legality of the search and then ultimate burden is on def to rebut this evidence and prove invalid search; more states place both the initial burden of going forward and the ultimate burden on the def; federal courts pattern of allocation places the burden on the prosecution once def demonstrates standing) (lower courts generally agree however that burden of establishing a confessions admissibility is on prosecution; makes sense given proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt standard, b/c confession meets this burden) Bumper: if prosecutor relies on consent, he has burden of showing that consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given (4th Amendment generally requires a search warrant and burden is on those seeking exception to warrant requirement) Wade: once 6th Amendment is determined to be applicable, prosecution carries the burden of establishing that def intelligently waived his right to counsel at a lineup (but generally def bears burden of showing unfairness in procedure, due process violation) Entrapment: subjective JDs require def to establish inducement and then burden shifts to govt to negate defense by showing defs predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt; in objective JDs entire burden of production and persuasion is on def (preponderance of the evidence standard) prosecution bears burden on a particular exclusionary rule objection (preponderance standard) Lego: state need only establish voluntariness of confession by a preponderance of the evidence Connelly: state need only prove a waiver of Miranda rights by the preponderance of the evidence factfinder on constitutionality of a search is the judge, also for voluntariness of a confession Use Immunity 1. Constitutionality: use of immunity grant to preclude reliance upon the self-incrimination privilege constitutional b/c 5th Amendment only protects against disclosure that subjects person to criminal prosecution 2. Scope of Immunity Hitchcock: to be valid, an immunity grant must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the question relates (transactional immunity) Brown: transactional immunity does not preclude prosecution for perjury based on immunized testimony, not does it extend to an event described in an answer totally unresponsive to the question asked Murphy: (limits transactional immunity) immunity granted in one JD (fed or state) need not necessarily bar prosecution in the other, it is sufficient to bar use and derivative use of the witness testimony in the other JD Kastigar: upholds federal statute that grants federal witnesses immunity only against use/derivative use in federal and state prosecutions (seems to overrule Hitchcock) PAGE 17 PAGE 17 $%E  mr($&  &(z<P #$!,>*H*CJH*5CJ`$%JDE[   L m & F @   & F^ & F & F^ & F@&$a$@&  % - P c  $ Y    , V ^ v w  & F@& & F & F & F @   Z b   z<#$ & F@& & F  & F & F p^p & F & F!IJs&- !!"!#!9!!!@"a""# ^` & F & F & F & F & F  p` & F  pp0^p`0 & F  p0^p`0IJN]sz&-- 0 !!"!9!=!N!P!|!!!!!!!!""###$$$,%4%?%F%G%L%&&N'P'}(()5)W)))) **6+a+++++++%,K,--?.E.....a/k/m/s/////S0U001112233]5d55H*>*CJCJ>*`#####$,%G%c''G(H(b(z( )W))) *6++%,, & F & F  @ 0^@ `0 @ 0^@ `0 & F & F & F^ & F,,,-?..m//023]55K6L667#889:;y<==> & F & F^ & F & F^ & Fd55555K6L666666677#8'888::;;;;y<<========>>>>Q?Y?? @@AAzBBBBCCCCmDoDDDDDFFsFxFFFDGIG)H+HI IJJaKcKnKoKKLLLLLLMMMMSNYNfNuNxN~NNN@OEOH*CJ>*b>?? @BCDFFDGI.JJnKoKKLLMcNNOPP p0^p`0 & F & F & F & F & F^ & FEOOOOOP PPPPPPPPPQQ/R6R}RRRRRSSTUUUUUrVyV]W^WpWWWXXX4Y7YjYnYrY{YYYZZZZ?ZAZ%[.[w[}[[[\\\\\]5]7]I]L]]]]]])^N^T^^^__`aaaVb[bbb6c;cccUdYd5H*CJ>*aPRRRSTUrV]W^WpWWWWX$X_X`XXXXZZp^p & F$ 80^`0 & F & F & F & F p0^p`0 & F & FZZZ%[w[[ \\\I]]]])^M^j__````a ^`p^p & F& p0^p`0^^ & F p0^p`0aaVbbb6cc&dod/e0eeefeefggjghhhNjkk & F* & F' & F) & F( & F'^ & F & F# & F" & FYdodtd|d~d/e0eeeeeffjgqghhhhNj[jkkkkkXo_o p p!prrrrrrsttuuuvvx xzzzzW{^{l{s{}~%€  тڂނ7@RYDŽɄ8?AGMQnwiq6?CJH*>*bkkkkXo p p!p|pp'q_qqqrrsttu[vvxP{ & F2 & F1 & F0 & F/ & F. & F- & F+ & F, & F+ & FP{Q{l{}тފC@i!BCv/ & F4 & F' & F3^!ފCJ@Dip!&16VXBCv|/9v} &->F]dekQSV^&-W^cjy{[_ce".RSkCJ6H*>*a&e[,RSy & F9 & F8 & F7 & F6^ & F & F5 & F'kpuxy~"'.נޠ|oqҦ٦EKاըܨ ,1۪ݪMSܫޫOV <QMRt$(QVxzŲ]buzմH*>*CJCJ>*`EاwxͩMO<tQ & F@ & F2 @ 0^@ `0 & F> & F< & FI 80^`0 & Fմ͵+7r3xAB~ۿ & FF & FE & FD & FC & FB @  & FB & FA & FI 80^`0մ͵Եvy57~ (ku\cxAB~ۿ#X_ ou-2ho EL~qu |9>CJH*>*aX o-Eq2y & FI 80^`0 & FE & FI 80^`0 & FH^ & FG p0^p`09&`#$ & FJ 0JmHnHu0J j0JU/ =!"#$% i0@0 Normal_HmH sH tH 8@8 Heading 1$ & F @&CJ0@0 Heading 2$@&CJ8@8 Heading 3$@&^CJ8@8 Heading 4$@&`CJ<A@< Default Paragraph Font,>@, Title$a$5CJ((J@( SubtitleCJHC@H Body Text Indent0^`0CJLR@"L Body Text Indent 20^`0CJ, @2, Footer  !&)@A& Page Number8YR8 Document Map-D OJQJLS@bL Body Text Indent 3p0^p`0CJ $%JDE[ Lm%-Pc$Y,V^vwZ b  z<#$!IJs&-"#9@a ,!G!c##G$H$b$z$ %W%%% &6''%(((()?**m++,./]11K2L223#44567y899:;; <>?@BBDCE.FFnGoGGHHIcJJKLLNNNOPQrR]S^SpSSSST$T_T`TTTTVVVV%WwWW XXXIYYYY)ZMZj[[\\\\]]V^^^6__&`o`/a0aeafaabccjcdddNfgggggXk l l!l|ll'm_mmmnnoppq[rrtPwQwlwy{{|}~~ކC@i!BCv/&e[,RSyEأwxͥMO<tQհͱ+7r3xAB~ۻۼX o-Eq2y9 %%% % % % % % % % % % % % %% % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % %% w w ww wwwwww w w w w w ww w w ww $       J J J JJ J                                    (  L2 L2 L2 L2 L2 L2 L2 L2 L2 L2 L2L2(  ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;; ; ; ; ;;;;;; ;;( N N N N NN(  ^S ^S ^S ^S ^S ^S^S ^S^S$ TT8TV V V V V V V V V VVV& VV& VVVVV& V V" V" V V# V# V# V# V# VV T0a' 0a( 0a( 0a0a' 0a) 0a0a(' 0a* d* dd Tg+ g, g, gg(+ g- l. l.  l.  l-  l/ l/  l-  l0 l0  l-  l1 l1  l-  l2 l2  l l l3 l3  l3  l3  l3  l3  l3  l3  l3  l3 l3 l3 l3 l3 l3  l3  l3  l3  l3  l3  l3  l l(' g4 C4 CC' C5 C5 C5 C5 CC T6 7 7 7 7 8 8 (9 9  I < < < < I > 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 > @ @ @ (I A B B B B B B B B A C A D (I E BF BF BF BF BBG BG BG BBH BH BB(I E E E E E E E I J J J J 0@@@@0@@ d5EOYdkմjpsuy|~ #,>PZakP{kmnoqrtvwxz{}l !!KL[` LQmv %,-1PXcf $+Yd ,6V]^l  ' 9 zFI@Nb$j$~$$%%W%d%%%%% &&6'?'''%(,(((0155??"E'EGGUU[[\$\\\\\&`+`aab b'h]h|llll'm2mmmmmnnoo~~ޓ,2Хԥ$<Gt|,62<333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333 Chrissy Davis$C:\My Documents\outlines\crimpro.doc Chrissy Davis(C:\TEMP\AutoRecovery save of crimpro.asd Chrissy Davis$C:\My Documents\outlines\crimpro.doc Chrissy Davis$C:\My Documents\outlines\crimpro.doc Chrissy Davis(C:\TEMP\AutoRecovery save of crimpro.asd Chrissy Davis$C:\My Documents\outlines\crimpro.doc Chrissy Davis$C:\My Documents\outlines\crimpro.docMark D. VilaboyOStudent_Directories:MDVilaboy:4 school:4 Fall 2000:crim pro:christine's outlineMark D. Vilaboy>Macintosh HD:4 school:4 Fall 2000:crim pro:christine's outlineRebecca A. Patterson+C:\My Documents\CrimPro\christine's outlineJd6i>`TODpFZ 8.pO׾~  ^8n ֒TZ Z& 3&M9G]klc^q"_M{?i_$l,E-oo/^Bi=3f~!W8:MڥN|:.C.sC:~_/DV*oEPMF YH,NKSWI^dx;iK bRL3Rd{qMZR^T]T@\y'T^`# U y`U]bUPE>?V4VPX G6ziX:EIh5Z Zk} u]p"a[a4d&edSveeڢ \hah~kj6/kn)\;M ltEFQz 5oz8Vo|$S^;p[Arlw1isp s&IZ}u4*Bu\Bu6;xB=z 5o;M l"abTxx!W8JJ@Пs@@UnknownGz Times New Roman5Symbol3& z Arial5# Tahoma"1hK L;;zVi$20d!#Criminal Procedure/Spritzer/Fall 99 Chrissy DavisRebecca A. PattersonOh+'0 $0 L X d p|$Criminal Procedure/Spritzer/Fall 99rimChrissy DavisduhriNormal Rebecca A. Pattersonrit3beMicrosoft Word 9.0n@^в@ 9h)@`RO@@ h[z՜.+,0  hp|   niV! $Criminal Procedure/Spritzer/Fall 99 Title  !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~Root Entry F8[1TableSWordDocument SummaryInformation(DocumentSummaryInformation8CompObjjObjectPool8[8[  FMicrosoft Word Document MSWordDocWord.Document.89q