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Fueling Eurasia's Modern Great Migration: Ethnicity and Intentions to Migrate among Young People in Kyrgyzstan

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Abstract

This study compares intentions to migrate abroad between Asian and European-origin ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan. The multivariate analyses of survey data collected in 2005 show that even after controlling for socioeconomic characteristics and social embeddedness Europeans are significantly more likely inclined toward migration than Asians. Whereas no gender differences in migration intentions among either group are detected, marriage, childbearing, and social capital exhibit distinct ethnic-specific effects. Although economic considerations are dominant stimuli for migration in both groups, the results point to the formation of two dominant ethnic-specific migration preference types—for temporary migration among Asians and permanent migration among Europeans.

Introduction

The population movements that have accompanied and followed the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 have attracted considerable attention in the literature (e.g., Azrael et al., 1996; Iontsev, 1998; Korobkov and Zayonchkovskaya, 2004, Kulu and Tammaru, 2000; Tishkov, Zayonchkovskaya, and Vitkovskaya, 2005). Indeed, international migration has remained a defining demographic, socioeconomic, and political phenomenon in the part of the world that once constituted a single country and now is composed of several sovereign nations. As was largely the case of migration in the immediate aftermath of the breakdown of the Soviet empire, most current migration flows involve the Russian Federation as the main recipient of migrants and the former Soviet republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus as the main sending areas (Laruelle, 2006). While there is considerable continuity in factors that shape these migration flows, new forces, reflecting new political and economic realities of post-Soviet Eurasia, have also emerged. This study addresses continuity and change in the region's international migration dynamics by examining intentions to migrate abroad among young people in the Central Asian nation of Kyrgyzstan. Because the dissolution of the Soviet Union brought to the fore and rearranged ethnic identities and because ethnicity has been a major factor in post-Soviet migration, we focus in particular on ethnic differences in migration intentions. We also look into other factors that might influence these intentions, such as gender, marriage and childbearing, social capital, and perceptions of economic and sociopolitical environment, and into ethnic differences in the role of these factors.

Traditionally, the literature on migration decision-making, as much of the migration literature in general, has been dominated by microeconomic perspectives that emphasize individuals' and families' economic conditions and expectations as main drivers of migration decisions (Massey et al., 1993). However, the microeconomic approaches, while essentially valid, alone are hardly sufficient to explain migration intentions and subsequent behavior (De Jong, 2000; Fischer et

al., 1997; Massey et al., 1993). Macroeconomic and macropolitical factors, as well as meso-level factors, such as family and community networks, need to be built into the explanations of migration preferences, choices, and behavior (Faist, 1997; Fawcett, 1986; Kritz and Zlotnik, 1992; Massey et al., 1993; Massey et al., 1998; Menjívar, 2000). Attempts to synthesize these diverse factors, whose relative importance vary as migration flows evolve and mature, have led to an influential concept of cumulative causation of migration. The cumulative causation perspective embeds migration within its own context, arguing that migration decisions and moves are shaped not only by several types of factors but also by the very process and tradition of migration that the combination of these factors engenders (Massey, 1990).

Applied to the context of post-Soviet Eurasia, the cumulative causation argument would stress the historical migration links between Russia and other countries in the region that date back to the Soviet and even pre-Soviet past. Thus most of Central Asia was colonized by Tsarist Russia in the 19th century, and by the turn of the last century the region already saw a steady stream of settlers from Russia and other European parts of the Empire. The 1917 Bolshevik revolution and the subsequent incorporation of Central Asia into the U.S.S.R. gave a new impetus to that migration flow. That flow turned into a massive influx during World War II, when a million and a half Volga Germans, seen by the Soviet government as a potential fifth column, were collectively banished to Kazakhstan and other republics of Central Asia and when the large-scale evacuation of the civilian population from the war-torn European parts of the country also took place. In the end and the aftermath of WWII, a number of other ethnic groups joined Volga Germans in Central Asia as “punished” peoples. Finally, a more benign, even if not fully voluntary, upswing of in-migration into the region followed the Khrushchev administration’s directive to develop modern agricultural production on Central Asia’s “virgin lands” in the 1950s. Since that period up until the final years of the Soviet Union, the region saw an intensive migration turnover with Russia and other European republics. This turnover, however, was composed mainly of ethnic Russians and other people of European origin (hereafter also

referred to summarily as Europeans), some of whom were coming to Central Asia while others were leaving it, with the share of indigenous Central Asian groups remaining very modest (Anderson and Silver, 1989; Ball and Demko, 1978; Lewis, 1971). Even so, important changes in those flows started to happen in the 1970s and 1980s, well before the end of the Soviet Union, when in all Central Asian republics, with the exception of Kazakhstan, out-migrants began to outnumber in-migrants (Rowland, 1990). The post-Soviet “exodus” from Central Asia was largely due to the continuation of that trend, as in-migration from the European successors of the Soviet Union into the region practically stopped (Zayonchkovskaya, 2000). Not surprisingly, massive emigration in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse was composed mainly of Europeans and directed primarily toward the Russian Federation (Tishkov, 1997). Largely as a result of this ethnic-specific migration, the share of Europeans has declined considerably in all Central Asian states (Heleniak, 1997; Rowland, 2001). Although the levels of migration from Central Asia subsided after the initial post-Soviet surge, they have remained high in most Central Asian countries, and especially in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Importantly, however, the current flows contain an increasing share of representatives of the region’s indigenous ethnic groups (hereafter also summarily referred to as Asians), who are attracted by employment opportunities in Russia and, to a lesser extent, Kazakhstan, and are encouraged by the networks of informational, social, and even material support established by their predecessors (Economist, 2007a; Laruelle, 2006).

In a rapidly changing world, where mobility is made increasingly more possible by expanding material, transportation, and informational resources, the motivations and expectations behind migration decisions and the very nature of these decisions grow more diverse. The literature often distinguishes between motivations that propel permanent (long-term) migration and those that drive temporary (short-term) moves (e.g., De Jong, 2000; Goldstein and Goldstein, 1993; Goldstein and Goldstein, 1996; Guilmoto, 1998). This distinction, however, should not obfuscate the fact that migration that is intended as temporary

often morphs into permanent and, vice versa, the intended permanent/long-term relocations sometimes are cut short due to a variety of intervening factors both at the sending and receiving ends of the migration process. The complexity of migration preferences and decisions includes other dimensions as well. For example, individuals can have different degrees of certainty regarding their future and the place of migration in that future. Some may have concrete and definite plans to migrate, while others may only entertain the possibility of migration or wish to migrate without making specific plans. Finally, another dimension of migration preferences and decisions is that defined by the number and characteristics of people who are to form a migrant unit. In that dimension, migration by individuals is typically contrasted with migration that involves family members (Boyd 1989; Root and De Jong, 1991; Yang, 2000). Accordingly, intentions to migrate alone and intentions to migrate with spouses, children, parents and/or other family members can be compared and contrasted. In this study, we are able to distinguish between these different types and levels of plans and preferences and to relate possible differences to a variety of socioeconomic, psychological, and socio-structural factors.

Forces shaping migration preferences and decisions

In an attempt to move beyond simplistic explanations of migration intentions rooted in decontextualized economic rationality and to produce a contextually grounded assessment of these intentions, we focus our primary attention in this study on ethnicity. Ethnic differences have not been at the fore of the mainstream international migration literature because the migration flows that this literature typically studies, i.e. flows linking specific sending developing countries to specific countries in North America and Western Europe, tend to be either ethnically homogeneous or ethnically balanced. Not so in the case of the former Soviet Union: as we stated earlier, the post-Soviet net out-migration from Central Asia (as the historically preceding in-migration into the region) contained a disproportionate share of ethnic Russians and other ethnic groups of European roots. The massive and precipitous exodus of Europeans can be

looked at through from the “minority-status group” perspective, which has long gained currency in the sociological and demographic literature. This perspective argues that disadvantaged ethno-racial or religious minority groups adjust their demographic choices and behavior to minimize or overcome their disadvantage (Bean and Marcum, 1978; Goldscheider and Uhlenberg, 1969). While marriage and especially fertility are typically seen as a primary realm of such adjustments, the logic of the minority-group status perspective can also be extended to migration. Thus minority group members entertain and employ all the socioeconomic and demographic resources available to them to improve their disadvantaged position in a social system, and for some the best way of doing so is by getting out of that system altogether. The ethnocultural and ethnopolitical discomfort has been said to be at the root of Central Asian Europeans’ discontent and their excessive propensity to emigrate in the aftermath of independence (Nikolaev, 1994; Vitkovskaya, 1999). However, it is important to note that in the context of post-Soviet Central Asia, overt ethnic discrimination and harassment have been rare and therefore ethnic-specific discomfort could have affected Europeans’ migration desires indirectly, by magnifying their dissatisfaction with economic conditions and prospects (Radnitz, 2006a).

Moreover, both the actual or perceived disadvantage of a minority group and its ability and willingness to deal with that disadvantage through migration could change overtime. Thus, toward the beginning of this century, when the early post-Soviet outflow from Central Asia had largely exhausted itself, the excessive proclivity of the region’s European residents toward migration may have diminished due to two factors. The first factor is the selective nature of post-Soviet migration: those Europeans who felt most uncomfortable with the changes induced by independence and/or had adequate economic and social resources for a move to Russia, did leave. Accordingly, those who stayed were largely less willing and/or less able to migrate. The second factor that may be altering the ethnic balance of migration is the growing migratory aspirations of indigenous groups, who may not contemplate a permanent move to Russia but

may increasingly consider temporary or seasonal migration to earn cash and to remit it to their impoverished families back home. Yet, overall, greater proclivity to migrate among Europeans may still persist due to mechanisms of cumulative causation: prior migration flows create social networks at places of destination that provide information and other resources to potential new migrants thus offsetting the costs of their moves. At the same time, the dwindling share of Europeans in the population of Central Asian nations, due both to the incessant stream of out-migration and to lower fertility, and the continuing indigenization of national politics, could fuel and even exacerbate Europeans' feelings of insecurity and exclusions and strengthen their migration intentions. Finally, state-level incentives for Europeans' emigration can also come from the receiving end, in the form of the Russian government's encouragement for selective "return of compatriots" (Russian Federation, 2006a).

The migration literature has devoted considerable attention to the role of marriage and childbearing in migration decision-making. Thus it is often said that single and childless people are more prone to labor migration (Jacobsen and Levin 2000; Yang 2000). From the migration decision perspective, studies typically posit that childbearing dampens the proclivity to migrate and, accordingly, individuals intent on migration postpone childbearing until after they reach their migration destinations. Besides this "disruption" mechanism, "selection" factors, such as lower desired fertility among potential migrants are also entertained in the literature (Chattopadhyay, White, and Debpuur, 2006; Goldstein and Goldstein, 1983; Lindstrom and Saucedo, 2002). While a conflict between childbearing and migration is commonly assumed, one can also argue that the births of children can put pressure on the family's resources and force its members, usually men, to contemplate labor (temporary) migration as a potential source of income unmatched in the country of current residence. And some families with children may even consider migration hoping to find better life opportunities for their children in a foreign land.

With respect to marriage, the literature focusing on developing countries rarely separates marital union formation from childbearing. However, earlier research on Central Asia points to a possibility that for at least Europeans marriage not immediately followed by childbearing may constitute a type of migration unit that might be better positioned for overcoming the challenges of migration than individuals (Agadjanian 1999; Agadjanian and Makarova 2003). Again, this ethnically-peculiar form of demographic adjustment to adversity, if indeed utilized, fits well conceptually with the minority-group status perspective.

An important segment of the migration literature deals with gender differences in migration motivations, decisions, and behavior (De Jong, 2000; De Jong, Richter, and Isarabhakdi, 1996; Kanaiaupuni, 2000). In the global migration flows men continue to outnumber women, and despite sizeable and rising migration of women in some regions and occupational niches (Kanaiaupuni, 2000; Kofman, 1999; Chant, 1992; Zlotnik, 1995), the part of the world on which we focus this analysis is still dominated by male migration (Laruelle, 2006). However, in most settings, gender differences are manifested mainly in temporary (seasonal) labor migration of individuals (Yang, 2000); permanent migration is more gender balanced for much of it is family-based.

Another central matter in migration research is the role of migration-related social capital. We already mentioned how earlier migration flows might affect migration preferences of Europeans and, increasingly, of Asians. Having relatives and/or friends living in places of potential destination may encourage migration by reducing its perceived costs and inflating its expected benefits (Fuller et al., 1990; Massey, 1990; Menjívar, 2000). Individuals' intentions to migrate may also be influenced by their friends and acquaintances who migrated before or intend to migrate (Epstein and Gang, 2006). However, it is still debatable whether relatives/friends living abroad encourage migration regardless of its objectives and desired duration. Group characteristics may also play a role. Thus while it is plausible to expect that members of a group with a longer and more profuse migration experience would have greater

migration-related social capital than members of a group whose collective migration experience is much more modest, the relative importance of migration-related social capital for migration decisions may vary across the two types of groups. Once again, the “minority-status group” perspective may provide useful guidance: it could be argued that members of a disadvantaged minority group, whose proclivity to migration stems largely from its social vulnerability, might not need the “help” of migration-related social capital to develop intentions to migrate to the same degree as might members of a majority group, whose wellbeing and opportunities are not compromised by their collective status.

Finally, migration choices and preferences may be influenced by individuals’ perceptions of their socioeconomic and political environment at either migration origin or migration destination (De Jong, 2000; De Jong, Richter, and Isarabhakdi, 1996; Stinner and Van Loon, 1992). For a study like ours, which focuses exclusively on the sending context, individuals and social groups that perceive their existing personal and collective opportunities as being circumscribed by a hostile political system or an unfavorable structure of economic and social opportunities may develop and articulate stronger inclinations to migrate. Applied to our specific setting, it would imply not only that Europeans would have a more negative assessment of their community environment and collective opportunities than would the Kyrgyz and other Asians, but also that these factors would have a greater mediating effect on their intentions to migrate.

The setting

As many other former Soviet Republics, Kyrgyzstan, since its independence in 1991, has lived through a generalized societal crisis, painful economic reforms, and spells of political instability (Cokgezen, 2004; Huskey, 1997; Khamidov, 2006; Radnitz, 2006a). Today, the Kyrgyz Republic, with a population of just over five million people remains one of the poorer post-Soviet states, with the Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of about \$440 in 2005, the year when data collection for this project took place (World Bank 2006). Kyrgyzstan is a

multiethnic country: in addition to the Kyrgyz, the titular ethnic group that constitutes about 65 percent of the population, it has a sizeable minority of ethnic Uzbeks and other smaller groups that are indigenous to the region. It is also home to a considerable number of ethnic Russians and other people of European roots, who are largely concentrated in the northern part of the country, including the capital Bishkek. As elsewhere in Central Asia, the European segment of Kyrgyzstan's population is largely a product of massive in-migration, both voluntary and forced, during the Soviet years.

Like other Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan has experienced large-scale net out-migration after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Most attention has been focused on early post-Soviet emigration of Europeans (Kumskov, 2002; Kumskov et al., 1997), but more recent survey data from Kyrgyzstan show that migration decisions are increasingly dominated by economic considerations and that both internal and international migration involves not only Europeans but also an increasing number of Asians (Abazov, 1999; Kumskov, 2002; Shuller and Kudabayev, 2004). The economic attractiveness of Russia that, largely thanks to the soaring international fuel prices, has seen a virtually uninterrupted macroeconomic growth since the financial collapse of 1998 is unquestionable, and so is, increasingly, that of neighboring Kazakhstan, that has also capitalized on the rising global demand for oil and natural gas (Economist, 2007a). Thus, Russia's GNI per capita in 2005 was \$4,460, i.e. ten times that of Kyrgyzstan (World Bank, 2006), and is probably much higher in large cities, especially Moscow, that are the strongest magnets for migrants. Kazakhstan's GNI per capita, \$2,930 (World Bank, 2006), is more modest than Russia's, but the difference may be counterbalanced by that country's geographic and cultural proximity to Kyrgyzstan and a less hostile official and public reception of migrants.

Research questions and hypotheses

Our conceptual model adapts the literature on migration intentions and behavior to the specific context of Kyrgyzstan, and more broadly to the historical, political, economic, ethnocultural, and migration context of post-Soviet Eurasia. With respect to *ethnicity*, the subject of our primary interest, we hypothesize that motivations for migration, while primarily economic, will vary in strength and nature between Asians and Europeans. Specifically, we expect that Russians and other Europeans will show greater inclination toward migrating than will the Kyrgyz and other Asians. These ethnic differences will be particularly pronounced when it comes to firm plans to migrate (as opposed to mere desires or preferences to do so) and in intentions to move permanently rather than temporarily. As we anticipate that Europeans will be more prone to permanent rather than temporary migration, we also expect them to be more inclined toward undertaking family-based rather than individual moves. However, we also hypothesize that these ethnic differences will be largely, if not entirely, due to different perceptions of individual and family past economic achievements and current economic opportunities, of the social environment in the community of residence, and of the economic, political, and ethnic climate in Kyrgyzstan.

With respect to *gender*, we expect that men will exhibit greater propensity to migrate than women, but that gender differences will be mostly manifested in plans and desires to migrate temporarily and individually, usually for work or study. Again, because of more traditional gender relations among the ethnic Kyrgyz and other indigenous Asian groups than among Russians and other Europeans, we also anticipate that the expected gender differences will be more pronounced among the former.

While our general expectation is that individuals in *marital relationships* may be less likely to plan or want to migrate, we also believe that this negative association will be mediated by childbearing. The research on ethnic-specific marriage patterns in Central Asia cited above leads us to expect that, controlling for childbearing, being in a marital union may be associated

with higher proclivity to migrate among Europeans. *Having children*, on the other hand, should act as a deterrent to migration, as children considerably raise the cost of moving. Alternatively, one could hypothesize that parents' concern for the future of their offspring could increase their propensity to migrate permanently and with children or to migrate temporarily, to earn cash to support children back home. In either case, however, we have no basis to expect that the effects of childbearing on migration would differ between the two ethnic groups.

With regard to *social capital*, we posit that *migration-related* social capital, such as having relatives in a foreign country or having friends who plan or wish to emigrate, will bolster proclivity to move abroad. Individuals endowed with migration-related social capital should be more likely to make firm plans to migrate and should also be more inclined to migrate permanently and to migrate with families than those with no such capital. Because of the ethnic history of migration from Kyrgyzstan, we expect that Europeans, on average, will possess more migration-related social capital. While this type of social capital should matter for both ethnic groups, we anticipate that it would be more influential for migration intentions among Asians than among Europeans as the latter can expect a friendlier reception in Russia regardless of their personal ties there and may need less encouragement from peers to contemplate a journey already taken by tens of thousands or their co-ethnics.

In contrast to migration-related social capital, migration-*unrelated* social capital at the current place of residence is expected to be negatively related to migration intentions, especially intentions to leave permanently and accompanied by other family members. Because we assume that migration-unrelated social capital is ethnically neutral, we do not anticipate its influence on migration intentions to be stronger among Asians than among Europeans.

Finally, we expect that intentions to migrate, especially to do so permanently and with family, will be influenced by individuals' *perceptions of wellbeing at the family, community, and national levels*. We anticipate that Europeans will display more pessimistic assessments of trends in their families' wellbeing, of their community surroundings, and of the nation's

conditions as a whole. The ethnic gap should be particularly wide in the assessment of prospects for own ethnic group. We expect, however, that these assessments would show a stronger association with intentions to migrate among Asians than among Europeans, as the latter's migration intentions may be more driven by the cumulative inertia of post-Soviet out-migration history and greater subjective attractiveness of Russia as the most likely destination.

Data and methods

Data

Our data come from a survey conducted in 2005, some three months after the so-called “Tulip” revolution that led to the ousting of president Akayev (Radnitz, 2006b) and right before the elections for his successor. The survey covered three parts of the country's north: Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan's capital city, and rural and urban areas of two northern *oblasts* (provinces)—Chui and Issyk-Kul, where the Kyrgyz are an absolute majority but Russians and other Europeans still constitute a sizeable minority. The survey sample consisted of 1535 men and women aged 18-29 divided equally among three sampling domains: Bishkek and the two oblasts. A three-stage cluster sample was used in each of the three domains: a village (urban cluster) was first selected with a probability proportional to size, then households were randomly selected in each village, and finally, one individual of the target age was randomly selected within each household. This procedure generally assured a balanced representation of sexes. In clusters where it yielded a sex imbalance, the underrepresented sex was oversampled. In each oblast, rural and urban areas were sampled separately. To allow for sound ethnic comparisons, in rural areas, where the Kyrgyz greatly predominate, the non-Kyrgyz population was oversampled by making the probability of a village selection inversely proportional to the share of its Kyrgyz population as recorded in the 1999 population census. Because this sampling approach led to an overrepresentation of non-Kyrgyz individuals in the rural sub-samples, the sociodemographic and ethnocultural profile of the respondents cannot be considered a fully representative

snapshot of the population of that part of Kyrgyzstan. The survey collected detailed information on household characteristics, respondents' demographic, economic, and cultural characteristics, marital history and spouse characteristics, health and reproduction, migration history and intentions, social networks, community characteristics, political involvement and attitudes, and gender attitudes.

Table 1 presents selected characteristics of the survey respondents broken down by ethnicity: Asians vs. Europeans. Women slightly predominated among Asians, while the opposite was true among Europeans. Although similar in mean age, the two groups displayed distinct marital patterns. Thus a higher percentage of Asians was in marital unions. Reflecting the marital status differences, Asians had a larger percentage of respondents with at least one child. The two groups did not differ much in the share of those with at least some higher education, but Europeans were somewhat more likely to work for income and to live in a household that owned an automobile. Finally, Asians were much more likely to have migrated in the five years preceding the survey, reflecting mainly their greater involvement in internal (primarily rural-urban) migration.

Table 1 about here

Methods

Our analyses are centered on factors that shape migration intentions. The term *intentions* is used here to encompass both *firm plans* to migrate abroad and *desires* to migrate abroad in the absence of such plans, but whenever appropriate, we explicitly distinguish between plans and desires. Thus we first look at plans in conjunction with desires to migrate, construing “plan” and “desire” as two types of migration intentions that are similar in essence but different in strength and maturity. Because firm plans are the most reliable predictor of future migration, we also look just at such plans contrasting respondents who stated having them with the rest of the survey sample. Further, we examine intentions (plans and desires) to migrate abroad permanently or

temporary and intentions to migrate abroad with family members or to migrate without them (we include the few cases of respondents intending to migrate with friends and other non-relatives in the “without family” category).

In multivariate analyses, we fit logistic regression for ordered outcomes to analyze the maturity of migration intentions, i.e., having firm plans to migrate; having desires to migrate (but no firm plans); and having neither plans nor desires to migrate (for the analysis of having firm plans vs. not having them we fit logistic regression for binary outcomes). To examine ethnic differences in the outcomes and in factors shaping these outcomes, we fit three models: one for the entire sample, one for Asians only, and one for Europeans only. We present only the results of full models, i.e. models that contain all the covariates (we also test the impact of specific covariates on the strength of association between ethnicity and migration intentions, but for the sake of brevity, the details of these tests are not reflected in the tables included in this paper).

When considering intentions to migrate permanently or temporarily, we do not separate plans from desires to ensure a reasonable frequency distribution (the number of Asians who had firm plans to migrate permanently was too small) and consequently more robust statistical results. Unlike the tests of maturity of migration intentions, in the analysis of permanent vs. temporary migration intentions we follow previous studies (De Jong, Richter, and Isarabhakdi 1996; De Jong, 2000) in using logistic regression for multiple unordered outcomes (multinomial logit model), with the outcome of interest taking three values: 1. neither planning nor wishing to migrate abroad; 2. planning or wishing to migrate abroad permanently; and 3. planning or wishing to migrate abroad temporarily. In a related test, we apply a similar modeling approach to examine variations in intentions to migrate with or without family members. Again, the outcome in the multinomial logit model can take three values: 1. neither planning nor wishing to migrate abroad; 2. planning or wishing to migrate abroad with at least one family member; and 3. planning or wishing to migrate abroad without any family members.

As in the case of the analyses of maturity of migration intentions, for each of the last two tests we fit three models—one for both ethnic group and one for each group separately—and include the same set of covariates. In addition to ethnicity, our main predictor of interest, all the models include gender, marital status (in formalized or not formalized marital union vs. not in union), and childbearing status (having at least one child vs. having no children). We use two measures of migration-related social capital: 1. whether or not respondent has a close relative abroad, which is an indicator of migration-related social capital at potential destinations; and 2. whether or not she/he has a personal network partner (a close or trusted person) who also intends to migrate abroad, which is a indicator of migration-related social capital at the place of current residence (it should be noted that the effect of the latter variable cannot be firmly interpreted in causal terms because the intention of network partners may be influenced by ego's intentions). As a relevant proxy for migration-unrelated social capital we use residence of close kin within a five-minute walk of respondent's home.

To account for perceptions of family wellbeing we use respondent's assessment of changes in family material wellbeing in the preceding twelve months. We do not include prospective assessments of family material wellbeing in the multivariate models because the corresponding survey questions may have been interpreted in connection with a family's intended migration, which would confound causality (these assessments, however, are included in the bivariate explorations presented below). We use three measures of community-level optimism: whether or not people in community of residence help one another (in respondent's opinion); whether or not respondent thinks that living conditions in community improved in the preceding twelve months; and whether or not she/he thinks that living conditions in community will improve in the following twelve months. Finally, two indicators of nation-level optimism are used: whether or not respondent believes that Kyrgyzstan's economic situation will improve after the presidential elections (scheduled for the month after the survey); and whether or not she/he believes that the situation of her/his own ethnic group will improve after the elections.

In addition to these predictors of interest, all the multivariate models control for sociodemographic characteristics defined and presented in Table 1, such as age, education (some or complete higher vs. less than incomplete higher), working status (currently employed or not), family material status approximated by automobile ownership, and area of residence (rural, town, or the capital city). We also control for migration in five years preceding the survey, as migration experience is said to be an important predictor of further migration intentions (De Jong, 1999; Yang, 2000).

Results

Bivariate results

Table 2 compares the two groups on assessment of family material wellbeing, community embeddedness, assessment of community conditions, and country-level optimism. The contrasts are impressive. Thus Asians were much more likely than Europeans to state that the material conditions of their families had improved in the year preceding the survey; they were also much more likely to expect that family material conditions would get better in the following year. The two groups held sharply contrasting views on quality of life and the future of their communities. Thus a much larger share of Europeans thought that residents of their respective communities rarely or never help one another. Whereas in both groups most respondents did not see improvements in the living conditions of their communities in the year preceding the survey, those who did state that living conditions had improved constituted 20% among Asians and only 10% among Europeans. Although in general respondents felt more positive about their communities' future than about their past, the two groups displayed a similarly large gap in their anticipation of the trends in community living conditions in the twelve months to come.

Table 2 about here

The following block of indicators refers to country-level embeddedness and optimism. A comparably high percentage of respondents voted in the parliamentary elections that took place in Kyrgyzstan just three months before the survey and triggered a chain reaction that ultimately led to the ousting of Kyrgyzstan's president. Against this similar backdrop, the ethnic contrasts in the expectations for the future look particularly salient. Thus a much higher percentage of Asians than Europeans believed that the economic situation in the country will improve after the presidential elections. The differences in the expectation of a political stabilization after the presidential elections were slightly less pronounced but followed the same direction. The greatest divergence between Asians and Europeans was registered in their answers to the question on whether they expected the situation of their own ethnic group to improve after the elections. Whereas 37% of Asians expected such an improvement, only 16% of Europeans did.

The last group of indicators addresses respondents' migration-related and unrelated social capital. One-half of the respondents had at least one close adult relative living or staying in a foreign country. Not surprisingly, the share of Europeans who had a close relative abroad was much higher than the corresponding share of Asians. Overall, 39% of respondents said that at least one of their personal network partners planned or wished to migrate abroad. Again, Europeans were considerably more likely than Asians to have network partners with such plans or desires. In contrast to the large ethnic differences in migration-related social capital, on the measure of migration-unrelated social capital used in this study, residence of relatives within five-minute walking distance, the difference between Asians and Europeans were quite modest.

Table 3 reports the overall distribution of migration intentions (plans and desires) variables and the ethnic-specific breakdown of that distribution. Just over one-tenth of the survey respondents said that they had firm plans to migrate, with the overwhelming majority of them having Russia as their migration destination. The contrast between the two main ethnic groups was impressive, with only 5% of Asians having such plans, compared to over one-fifth of Europeans. Of those respondents who reported firm plans to migrate, about two-thirds intended

to migrate permanently; here the gap between Asians and Europeans was particularly wide. Finally, ethnic differences are also apparent with regard to intentions to migrate with or without other family members: whereas Asian potential migrants were almost evenly split between those planning or wishing to migrate with at least one family member and those planning or wishing to migrate without family, among European potential migrants, the former group was more than twice as large as the latter.

Table 3 about here

In addition to those who had firm plans to migrate, about 12% of the respondents said they would like to migrate abroad if the circumstances allowed (i.e., desired to migrate, in our definition). Over half of those who expressed a desire to migrate wanted to do it permanently. The ethnic gaps are somewhat smaller than in the case of firm plans but are still very wide. In all, almost a quarter of the survey respondents planned or wished to migrate abroad, this share reaching as high as 40% among Europeans. Supporting our expectation that Europeans would be much more inclined to want to migrate permanently, almost a third of Europeans planned or wished to leave Kyrgyzstan for good, whereas the corresponding fraction of Asians was only 5%. Interestingly, with respect to the share of those who planned or desired to go abroad temporarily (mainly to work or study), the two ethnic groups were very similar. Over a quarter of Europeans intended to migrate with at least one family member, compared to 13% whose intention was to migrate alone. In contrast, among Asians, those who wanted to move individually slightly outnumbered those who preferred to migrate with family members.

The ethnic-specific breakdown of reasons for planning and wishing to migrate abroad stated by the survey respondents is depicted in Figure 1. Because respondents could pick as many reasons as they wanted, Figure 1 presents the relative number of occurrences of each reason in the total number of given reasons in each ethnic subsamples. The distribution of reasons is

rather similar between plans and desires but vary somewhat between the two ethnic groups. In both groups and for both outcomes, the prospect of finding a better job strongly predominated. This reason seemed somewhat more common among Asians but it was also clearly the most important force behind Europeans' migration intentions. Interestingly, for neither group family motives were of great importance, even though that reason was invoked somewhat more often by Europeans than Asians. Housing problems and related expectations were another common consideration driving the migration intentions among both groups. Educational opportunities abroad were also prominent but were particularly so among Asians. Finally, as one would expect, ethnic discrimination was stated as a reason almost exclusively by Europeans, but in relative terms, that motivation was not of great importance even to them.

Figure 1 about here

Multivariate results

Maturity of migration intentions

The odds ratios from the logistic regression model for the three ordered outcomes—plans, desires, neither—are presented in Table 5: they are to be interpreted as the change in the maturity of migration intention caused by a unit increase in the value of corresponding predictors. The results of these tests generally confirm the bivariate patterns displayed and discussed earlier. The ethnic differences are stark, even after the addition of other covariates. There are no net gender differences in either ethnic group. Having a child discourages migration, but does so only among Asians. On the contrary, being in a union, net of childbearing, increases migration inclinations, but in statistically convincing terms, does so only among Europeans. Migration-related social capital retains a strong impact, but having close kin abroad has a stronger effect among Europeans while having a network partner intending to migrate have a stronger impact on the degree of migration intentions among Asians. In contrast,

migration-unrelated social capital proves largely irrelevant. The expectation of improvement in community conditions tends to weaken migration intentions but seems to do so primarily among Asians (the corresponding parameter estimate is, however, only marginally significant). Neither the nation-level economic optimism nor expectations regarding the situation of own ethnic group show any effect on migration intentions.

Table 4 about here

The effects of the controls are also noteworthy. Thus recent migration tends to dampen migration intentions among Asians, but the positive effect of recent migration in the European model is not statistically significant. Interestingly, Bishkek residence significantly increases proclivity to migrate relative to rural residence, but this effect is present only among Asians. In the overall model, those with higher education were, *ceteris paribus*, more inclined to migrate than those without it. Finally, employment and household affluence (automobile ownership) show no association with migration intentions.

The results of the binomial logistic regression models that contrast having firm plans to migrate abroad with not having such plans are essentially to those of the intention “maturity” models. We therefore do not display these results separately (they are available from the first author upon request).

Permanent vs. temporary migration intentions

We now look at migration intentions from the perspective of its expected or desired duration. With the earlier mentioned caveats in mind, we compare the two groups on whether the stated intentions (plans or desires combined) are for permanent migration or for temporary migration. The results of the multinomial logit model are shown in Table 5. For an easier grasp, the results are broken down by pairs of values of the outcome variable: intentions to migrate permanently

vs. lack of any intentions to migrate; intentions to migrate temporarily vs. lack of any intentions to migrate; and intentions to migrate permanently vs. intentions to migrate temporarily. Adjusting for other factors, Asians' odds of intending to migrate permanently, relative to not intending to migrate at all, are just over one-quarter of Europeans'. Asians are also significantly less likely than Europeans to intend to migrate permanently relative to intending to migrate temporarily. However, no ethnic difference in the odds of intending to migrate temporarily relative to not intending to migrate can be detected once the covariates are added.

Table 5 about here

Gender, again, shows no influence. Being in a union (net of childbearing experience) again stands out as a catalyst for permanent migration—in relation to either intending to stay or intending to migrate temporarily, but does so strongly and significantly only among Europeans. At the same time, preference for temporary migration is not affected by marital status in either group. As already transpired in the previous test, childbearing is not an important factor in migration intentions among Europeans. Among Asians, the negative effect of having a child on migration intentions is more pronounced but is statistically significant only with respect to the intention to migrate temporarily vs. no intention to migrate.

Having kin abroad increases the likelihood of intending to migrate both permanently and temporarily. In the choice between these two alternative migration intentions, having relatives who live outside Kyrgyzstan tilts the preference toward permanent migration but this tendency is statistically significant only among Asians. In both groups, having friends planning or wishing to migrate abroad increases the odds of intending to migrate either permanently or temporarily, but the effects are larger among Asians. At the same time, in neither ethnic group, having friends with migration intentions matters for the choice between permanent and temporary migration.

The presence of relatives in the neighborhood decreases the propensity toward permanent migration, but this effect, especially on opting for permanent vs. temporary migration, is statistically noticeable only among Europeans. Interestingly, among this group, the proximity of relatives encourages the intention to migrate temporarily vs. not migrating. The assessment of recent trends in family economic wellbeing seems irrelevant to either type of migration intention. The perception of community-level social support does not matter for Asians, but among Europeans the lack of community support, while not encouraging permanent migration per se, does make such migration a more attractive option than temporary migration. The expectation of improving economic conditions in the community of residence shows a marginally significant negative effect on Asians' proclivity to migrate temporarily; in comparison, among Europeans it discourages permanent migration. The perception of macroeconomic changes to come after the presidential elections, while irrelevant to migration intentions of Asians, does affect these intentions among Europeans: the expectation of positive improvements discourages temporary migration, relative to not migrating, but at the same encourages permanent migration, relative to temporary migration. Finally, the perception of future changes in the situation of own ethnic group shows no significant impact on intended duration of migration.

Among other factors, prior migration does not affect Europeans but does dampen Asians' temporary migration intentions, relatively to not wanting to migrate. Town residence, relative to living in the countryside, tends to diminish inclination toward permanent migration, but these effects are not statistically significant in the ethnic-specific models. On the other hand, Bishkek residence strengthens both groups' proclivity toward temporary migration. Finally, age, education, employment, and affluence show little if any effects.

Intentions to migrate with or without family members

In our last set of tests, we fit multinomial logit models to examine intentions to migrate with family members, without them, and the lack of stated intention to migrate. Because this outcome

parallels the one we just discussed, it is of no surprise that the results are rather similar. They are presented in Table 6. Asians are significantly less likely than Europeans to report an intention to migrate with family members relative to reporting no intention to migrate: the corresponding odds for Asians are less than one-fifth of the odds of Europeans. Asians are also significantly more likely to opt for family migration vs. non-family migration, although the ethnic gap is less pronounced than in the previous pair. At the same time, the difference between Asians and Europeans in intending to migrate without family members relative to not intending to migrate is much smaller and statistically not significant (similarly to the differences in intentions to migrate temporary vs. not migrating discussed earlier).

Table 6 about here

The effects of the other covariates in the overall and ethnic specific models are generally congruent with those in the previous set of tests, if we consider that the intentions of migrating with family members or without them are related to the intentions of migrating permanently or temporarily, respectively. However, some informative distinctions between the two tests can be noted. Not surprisingly, the most notable differences are in the effects of being in a marital union and of having a child. Thus, in the entire sample, being in a marital union, net of other factors, is conducive to migration with family members. However, this tendency is manifested much more forcefully among Asians than among Europeans. Moreover, among Asians, marital union significantly discourages individual migration, while among Europeans this effect is absent. In the overall sample, having at least one child discourages migration without family, but when it comes to the choice of whether to migrate with family members or without them, this effect is statistically significant only among Europeans. Among other notable differences from the picture presented in Table 5, the improvement in family material situation in the previous year tends to diminish the preference for family-based moves, but these effects are concentrated among

Asians. Relatives' proximity (non-migration social capital) shows no effect on either option in either ethnic group, and the assessment of community's social fabric and economic prospects is largely irrelevant as well.

Discussion and conclusion

Growing interconnections in a rapidly globalizing world fueled and cemented by intensifying and diversifying international migration movements are key components of transnationalism (Faist, 2000; Schiller, Basch, and Blanc, 1995). Although post-Soviet Eurasia's transnational space has formed through an unusual trajectory—a separation of administrative entities previously constituting one country rather than a rapprochement of sovereign nations—it is a transnational space par excellence. Forged by decades and even centuries of political, economic, and cultural interdependencies, redefined but not eliminated after the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., this space is bound together by myriads of individual, economic, cultural, and political ties.

Our study produced some illuminating insights into the forces that shape this transnational space by investigating different dimensions of migration plans and desires of young adults in Kyrgyzstan. First and foremost, it demonstrated a wide gulf in migration intentions between Asian and European youths. Europeans were clearly more migration-prone, and the ethnic gulf remained very salient even after controlling for socioeconomic, socio-psychological, and social capital characteristics. Europeans were also more likely than Asians to choose permanent migration over temporary migration and family migration over non-family migration, regardless of other factors. In contrast, Europeans' greater proclivity to temporary migration vs. no migration and to individual migration vs. no migration was explained by other characteristics. Hence, while the divergence in the types of migration preferences between the two ethnic groups is clearly taking shape, it would be inaccurate to state that Europeans' tend toward migrating permanently and with family whereas Asians' prefer migrating temporarily and individually. Instead, the results suggest that by the middle of the current decade, Asians,

ceteris paribus, had caught with Europeans in proclivity toward temporary and individual migration (usually meant for short-term work or study) but were still much less inclined than Europeans to opt for permanent and family-based migration.

Contrary to our expectation, proclivity to migrate showed little, if any, variation by gender either within or across the ethnic boundaries. Most interestingly, gender differences were generally absent in the type of migration preferences in which they would be intuitively most plausible: temporary vs. permanent migration and family vs. individual migration. Marriage and childbearing, on the other hand, showed instructive effects on migration intentions that generally aligned with our hypotheses. Thus being in a union, net of childbearing, increased the maturity of migration intentions and the odds of wanting to move permanently among Europeans but had no effect among Asians. This finding conforms to the earlier discussed pattern observed in Kazakhstan (Agadjanian, 1999) and may reflect a distinctive migration strategy among the non-native ethnic segments of the population. Yet, at the same time, marital status was associated with higher proclivity to migrate accompanied by family members, relative to not migrating, among both groups but especially among Asians. Ethnic-specific meanings and roles of marriage and their effects on migration intentions, therefore, require further special investigation.

As we expected, childbearing tended to discourage migration intentions. However, we also detected important ethnic differences in this association. Thus having a child exerted an overall negative effect on migration intentions, but this effect was statistically detectable only among Asians. We did not find any straightforward support for an alternative hypothesis, i.e., that childbearing might encourage migration for the benefit of children. In fact, we detected a negative effect of having a child on the intention to migrate temporarily among Asians, and on the intentions to migrate without family members among both groups. At the same time, in neither ethnic group the odds of intending to migrate with family, relative to not intending to migrate at all were affected by childbearing. Yet, having a child tended to strengthen greatly

Europeans' preference for family-based migration over individual migration, despite the lack of any association between childbearing and intended duration of migration.

Our analyses confirmed the importance of migration-related social capital. As we hypothesized, possessing such capital, both at potential destinations and in places of current residence, strengthens migration intentions and increases proclivity to migrate permanently and to do so with family members. Not surprisingly, Europeans proved more endowed with migration-related social capital. Yet the ethnic patterns in the effect of that capital on migration intentions did not align fully with our expectation that migration-related social capital would matter more for Asians. Moreover, our analysis illustrated the differences between the roles of migration-related social capital at origin and at destination. Thus, having network partners who wished to migrate abroad (social capital at origin) indeed had a stronger effect on migration intentions of Asians than of Europeans. In contrast, having relatives who resided abroad (social capital at destination) seemed to affect Europeans' migration intentions to a greater extent. Yet, having relatives abroad was associated with a stronger preference for permanent over temporary migration and (to a lesser extent) for family-based over individual migration. This association, as our hypothesis predicted, was statistically more convincing among Asians than among Europeans.

As we expected, migration-unrelated social capital did not differ much between the two groups. Also as we anticipated, this type of social capital did not affect the strength of migration intentions nor did it show any association with the intended or preferred composition migration. Unexpectedly, however, in the analysis of intended duration, relatives' proximity tended to deter Europeans, and only Europeans, from intending to migrate permanently and encouraged their intentions to migrate temporarily.

The two groups of surveyed young adults had very distinct assessments of both their immediate milieu and their broader societal environment: invariably Asians saw family, community, and country conditions and prospects in a more positive light than did Europeans.

Yet, the proclivity to migrate, however it is measured, did not quite show the pattern of ethnic differences that we had anticipated. Thus Asians did not display any stronger association between the perception of recent trends in family material wellbeing and the strength of migration intentions or its intended duration than did Europeans, even though among Asians the positive assessment of these trends tended to dampen the intention to migrate accompanied by family members.

With respect to maturity of migration intentions, the expectation of improving conditions in community of residence had a somewhat stronger effect among Asians, supporting our expectation. In regard to intended duration it influenced both groups but did so differently—discouraging permanent migration among Europeans, while possibly discouraging temporary migration among Asians. Migration intentions proved largely impervious to expectations for the short-term economic future of Kyrgyzstan, and contrary to our hypothesis, whenever a statistically significant effect of that variable was observed, it concerned mainly Europeans. Finally, also contrary to our hypothesis, expectations regarding the prospects for respondent's ethnic group showed practically no association with any of the investigated dimensions of migration intentions.

The age group on which our study focused represents a qualitatively new generation of Kyrgyzstan's population—the first generation that came of age in independent Kyrgyzstan. It also represents a new generation of migrants. The earlier generation of migrants, having grown up and spent much of their lives in the Soviet Union, reacted “with their feet” to its demise. Today, the Soviet Union and the massive exodus from Central Asia surrounding its collapse are increasingly becoming facts of the past. Yet migration intentions of the new generation of Kyrgyzstanis, fueled by the economic stagnation and political uncertainties, are strong. Also, like a generation earlier these intentions are disproportionately prevalent among the non-native minorities, primarily ethnic Russians and other Europeans. Migration, as we have argued, offers disadvantaged minorities a option in mitigating their disadvantages. As Europeans' insecurities

have lingered, so has their elevated proclivity to migrate, including for permanent settlement in foreign lands. Moreover, the earlier wave of migrants may have helped increase the appeal for the new generation of potential migrants who can (or at least expect to) rely on their successful predecessors' advice and assistance. However, this is just one part of the story told in this study. Our analyses also shed light on the ideational dynamics underlying the rising migration tide among Kyrgyzstan's indigenous population, which differs considerably from Europeans' migration both in nature and antecedents.

It is important to emphasize, however, that individual motives behind both Europeans' and Asians' migration intentions are remarkably similar as they are dominated by a quest for better economic opportunities. The literature on early post-Soviet out-migration from Central Asia may leave an impression that Europeans' emigration was a stampede of refugees fleeing ethnic abuse and persecution. It was hardly the case in the first post-Soviet years and is certainly not the case today. In fact, our study, while producing unmistakable evidence of greater ethnopolitical discontent among Europeans compared to Asians, does not detect any effect of this discontent on proclivity to migrate. This finding agrees with evidence from a recent study in neighboring Uzbekistan (Radnitz, 2006).

Our study, however, also shows that the relative optimism of Asian young men and women has little bearing on their migration intentions. In fact, the strength and longevity of this optimism are questionable too. Abundant anecdotal evidence and our own field observations in Kyrgyzstan suggest that the hopes generated by the 2005 Tulip revolution, especially among the Kyrgyz youth (Khamidov, 2006) quickly wilted. No real economic reforms have been attempted and political instability has persisted (Radnitz, 2006b). In the meantime, the robustly growing economies of Russia and Kazakhstan beacon with opportunities that override the rising xenophobia in those two main destinations of Kyrgyzstan's migrants.

It was not a goal of this study to examine how migration intentions are actually implemented. Migration intentions, as stated by individuals, are often ambivalent and conditional, especially in

circumstances of great uncertainty about the future (Gardner et al., 1986; Uehling, 2002). Yet, studies do point to a strong association between migration intentions and actual moves (De Jong, 1999; De Jong et al., 1985), even though migration intentions may be better predictors of permanent than temporary moves (De Jong, 2000). Stagnation at home and opportunities abroad, and the disenchantment and hopes that they generate, will continue to stimulate the migration flow from Kyrgyzstan. Although this flow contains a sizeable—and increasing—share of the country’s titular ethnic group, the Kyrgyz, as well as other groups native to the Central Asian region, the migration potential remains particularly high among Europeans. Among that group, the effects of economic malaise are compounded by those of political and cultural insecurities and discomfort; together, these factors “push” Europeans out of Kyrgyzstan. Even more important, however, are the “pull” factors. We already mentioned the importance of the cumulative momentum of European out-migration. This momentum is maintained by the legal and political context of immigrants’ reception in host societies, especially in the Russian Federation. Thus the Russian government, apparently driven by concerns about low fertility, high mortality, and the resulting decline of Russia’ population, officially welcomes the “return” to Russia of “compatriots,” i.e., ethnic Russians and other “Russian speakers,” living abroad (Russian Federation, 2006a). Although it remains to be seen whether the Russian government’s pledges to support the return of “compatriots” to Russia will materialize, the widely publicized promises of resettlement and employment assistance are likely to have an effect on their de facto primary target—ethnic Russians and other “Russian-speaking” groups in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus. At the same time, the Russian Federation’s immigration regulations aimed directly or indirectly at the Asian migrant groups remain controversial (e.g., Russian Federation, 2006b), and the public perception of migrants of Central Asia’s and Caucasus’s indigenous ethnic stock has been consistently—and increasingly—negative (Economist, 2007b).

Due to the combination of these factors, Europeans are likely to retain a disproportionate presence in the out-migration flow from Kyrgyzstan for years to come. The future will show whether the excessive out-migration of Europeans will eventually run its course because of the demographic exhaustion of that group or because of rising economic prosperity and ethno-political stability in Kyrgyzstan.

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Table 1. Selected general characteristics by ethnic group (percent except for age)

	All	Asians	Europeans
Male	49.3	47.1	53.0
Age (mean)	22.7	22.6	22.7
Place of residence			
Rural	39.5	38.4	41.5
Town	27.1	27.9	25.7
Bishkek (capital)	33.4	33.7	32.8
In a marital union (official or not)	33.3	34.3	31.6
Has at least one child	30.9	32.1	28.7
At least some university education	38.2	38.8	37.1
Currently works for income	45.3	43.5	48.6
Family has an automobile	27.2	25.8	29.6
Migrated since 2000 (regardless of destination)	25.7	31.6	15.6
Number of cases	1535	971	564

Table 2. Embeddedness and wellbeing assessment, by ethnic group (percent)

	All	Asians	Europeans
<i>Family-level</i>			
Family material conditions improved in past year	31.6	34.7	26.2
Family material conditions will improve in next year	51.8	57.3	42.4
<i>Community-level</i>			
Has close relatives living within 5 min of walking	33.4	34.5	31.6
People do not help each other in community	28.3	25.4	33.2
Living conditions in community improved in past year	16.3	20.0	9.9
Living conditions in community will improve in next year	34.5	40.8	23.6
<i>Country-level</i>			
Voted in last parliamentary elections	66.5	67.3	65.3
Economic situation will improve after the elections	39.7	44.3	31.7
Political situation will become more stable after the elections	37.3	40.0	32.8
Situation of own ethnic group will improve after the elections	29.6	37.3	16.3
<i>Migration-related social capital</i>			
Has a close relative abroad	51.2	35.0	79.1
Network partner wants to migrate	38.5	29.7	53.7
<i>Migration-unrelated social capital</i>			
Close relative living with 5 min. walk	33.4	34.5	31.6

Table 3. Plans and desires to migrate abroad (percent)

	All	Asians	Europeans
<i>Firm plans to migrate</i>	11.4	5.4	21.8
Firm plans to migrate permanently	7.3	1.8	16.7
Firm plans to migrate temporarily	4.1	3.6	5.1
Firm plans to migrate with family	6.4	1.9	14.2
Firm plans to migrate without family	5.0	3.5	7.6
<i>Desires to migrate</i>	12.1	8.6	18.3
Desires to migrate permanently	7.2	3.5	13.7
Desires to migrate temporarily	4.9	5.1	4.6
Desires to migrate with family	7.6	4.5	12.9
Desires to migrate without family	4.5	4.0	5.3
<i>Intentions to migrate (plans and desires combined)</i>	23.5	14.0	40.1
Intentions to migrate permanently	14.5	5.3	30.4
Intentions to migrate temporarily	9.0	8.7	9.7
Intentions to migrate with family	14.1	6.4	27.1
Intentions to migrate individually (without family)	9.5	7.5	12.9

Table 4. Intentions to migrate abroad, ordered logit (odds ratios)

Predictors and controls	All	Asians	Europeans
<i>Predictors</i>			
Asians (Europeans)	0.438 **		
Man (Woman)	0.995	0.928	1.058
In marital union (Not in union)	1.599 *	1.384	1.816 *
Has at least one child ^a (Has no children)	0.558 **	0.367 **	0.645
Has at least one close relative abroad (Does not have any)	2.852 **	2.338 **	3.776 **
At least one network partner wants to migrate (No partner who wants to migrate)	2.521 **	3.248 **	1.908 **
At least one close relative lives within 5 min. walk (no relatives within 5 min walk)	0.863	0.737	0.922
People do not help one another in community (other opinions)	1.074	0.970	1.100
Material conditions of family improved in past year (other opinions)	0.904	1.017	0.791
Living conditions in community will improve next year (other opinions)	0.690 *	0.684 +	0.700
Situation of own ethnicity will improve after elections (other opinions)	0.940	0.993	0.878
Country's economic conditions will improve after elections (other opinions)	0.862	1.009	0.772
<i>Controls</i>			
Age	1.021	1.055	0.993
Lives in town ^b	0.813	0.745	0.815
Lives in Bishkek ^b	1.378 *	2.410 **	0.837
At least some higher education (No higher education)	1.365 *	1.385	1.177
Gainfully employed (Not employed)	1.071	0.902	1.023
Household owns automobile (does not own)	1.034	1.041	0.815
Migrated at least once since 2000 (Did not migrate since 2000)	0.844	0.503 **	1.322
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	308.4 **	150.1 **	65.5 **
Number of cases	1535	971	564

Notes: References categories in parantheses; ^a Includes women who are currently pregnant; ^b "Lives in village" is reference; Significance level: ** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.1.

Table 5. Intentions to migrate abroad permanently or temporarily or not to migrate at all, multinomial logit (odds ratios)

Predictors and controls	All			Asians			Europeans			
	Temp	Perm	Perm	Temp	Perm	Perm	Temp	Perm	Perm	
	vs. None	vs. None	vs. Temp	vs. None	vs. None	vs. Temp	vs. None	vs. None	vs. Temp	
<i>Predictors</i>										
Asians (Europeans)	0.948	0.266 **	0.281 **							
Man (Woman)	0.980	1.021	0.041	1.093	0.760	0.695	0.877	1.152	1.313	
In marital union (Not in union)	1.047	2.025 **	0.660 +	1.337	1.370	1.025	0.667	2.406 **	3.607 *	
Has at least one child ^a (Has no children)	0.465 *	0.679	1.459	0.361 *	0.419	1.160	0.591	0.761	1.289	
Has at least one close relative abroad	1.786 **	4.185 **	2.344 **	1.600 +	3.512 **	2.195 *	2.497 *	5.060 **	2.027	
A network partner wants to migrate	2.783 **	2.406 **	0.864	3.457 **	3.671 **	1.062	1.909 +	1.862 **	0.976	
A close kin within 5 min. walk	1.390	0.634 *	0.456 **	0.842	0.583	0.693	2.891 **	0.651 +	0.225 **	
People do not help one another in community	0.704	1.261	1.791	0.947	0.948	1.000	0.463 *	1.315	2.840 **	
Material conditions of family improved in past year	1.019	0.771	0.757	1.211	0.660	0.545	0.738	0.759	1.028	
Living conditions in community will improve next year	0.707	0.696 +	0.984	0.607 +	1.067	1.757	0.932	0.579 *	0.621	
Situation of own ethnicity will improve after elections	1.186	0.708	0.597	1.181	0.671	0.569	1.345	0.725	0.539	
Country's economy will improve after elections	0.779	1.022	1.312	1.088	0.867	0.797	0.391 *	1.064	2.725 *	
<i>Controls</i>										
Age	1.030	1.021	0.991	1.029	1.099 +	1.068	1.019	0.986	0.967	
Lives in town ^b	1.288	0.660 *	0.513 +	0.925	0.600	0.648	1.444	0.687	0.475	
Lives in Bishkek ^b	3.999 **	0.734	0.187 **	4.046 **	1.372	0.339 *	3.456 **	0.496 **	0.144 **	
At least a year of higher education	1.570 *	1.191	0.759	1.481	1.177	0.795	1.652	1.106	0.670	
Gainfully employed	1.264	1.046	0.827	0.983	0.810	0.824	1.702	1.192	0.700	
Household owns automobile	1.112	0.996	0.896	1.299	0.703	0.541	0.898	1.075	1.197	
Migrated at least once since 2000	0.732	0.818	1.118	0.463 **	0.541	1.168	1.717	1.054	0.614	
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square		425.3**			174.2**			125.0**		
Number of cases		1535			971			564		

Notes: Reference categories in parentheses; ^a Includes women who are currently pregnant; ^b "Lives in village" is reference; Significance level: ** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.1.

Table 6. Intentions to migrate abroad with or without family members, multinomial logit (odds ratios)

Predictors and Controls	All			Asians			Europeans		
	With fam.	W/out fam.	With fam.	W/out fam.	With fam.	W/out fam.	With fam.	W/out fam.	
	vs. None	vs. None	vs. None	vs. None	vs. None	vs. None	vs. None	vs. None	
<i>Predictors</i>									
Asians (Europeans)	0.184 **	0.724	0.429 **						
Man (Woman)	0.887	1.137	0.780	1.145	0.863	1.327	0.825	1.559	
In marital union (Not in union)	2.580 **	0.571	4.515 **	4.259 **	0.288 *	14.800 **	2.282 **	0.872	
Has at least one child ^a (Has no children)	0.885	0.180 **	4.919 **	0.532	0.151 **	3.518	0.999	0.185 **	
Has at least one close relative abroad	3.483	2.148 **	1.621 +	3.237 **	1.537	2.106 +	3.635 **	4.944 **	
A network partner wants to migrate	2.230 **	3.295 **	0.677	2.831 **	4.574 **	0.619	1.709 **	2.587 **	
A close kin within 5 min. walk	0.843	0.895	0.942	0.678	0.689	0.985	0.950	0.963	
People do not help one another in community	0.877	1.299	0.675	0.705	1.297	0.544	0.929	1.246	
Material conditions of family improved in past year	0.688 *	1.207	0.570 *	0.549 +	1.437	0.382 *	0.683	0.963	
Living conditions in community will improve next year	0.690 +	0.711	0.970	0.698	0.813	0.860	0.709	0.541 +	
Situation of own ethnicity will improve after elections	0.940	0.812	1.157	0.813	1.019	0.798	0.939	0.737	
Country's economy will improve after elections	0.810	1.058	0.765	1.345	0.774	1.737	0.622 +	1.516	
<i>Controls</i>									
Age	1.014	1.060 +	0.956	1.040	1.092 +	0.953	0.989	1.009	
Lives in town ^b	0.670 +	1.013	0.662	0.800	0.702	1.140	0.627 +	1.265	
Lives in Bishkek ^b	1.109	2.076 **	0.534 *	1.765	3.600 **	0.490	0.742	0.977	
At least a year of higher education	1.629 **	0.954	1.707 *	2.240 **	0.854	2.623 *	1.381	1.001	
Gainfully employed	1.220	0.993	1.228	0.893	0.840	1.064	1.440	1.098	
Household owns automobile	0.912	1.181	0.772	0.762	1.320	0.577	0.968	0.994	
Migrated at least once since 2000	0.632 *	1.022	0.618	0.508 *	0.459 *	1.107	0.810	2.741	
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square		415.2**			216.6*			120.4**	
Number of cases		1535			971			564	

Notes: Reference categories in parentheses; ^a Includes women who are currently pregnant; ^b "Lives in village" is reference; Significance level: ** p≤.01, * p≤.05, + p≤.1.

Figure 1. Specific reasons for plans and desires to migrate abroad, by ethnicity (percent of all stated reasons)

